Part I

1. In defending his “clear and distinct” sufficient condition for knowledge in his Replies to the Second Set of Objections in the Meditations, Descartes argues,

As soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further questions for us to ask: we have everything we could reasonably want. What is it to us that someone may make out that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear to false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged “absolute falsity” bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it?

Evaluate this contention as a response to the objection that something can be perceived clearly and distinctly, yet be false. What potential, if any, does it have as a response to skepticism?

2. Should Descartes’ dreaming argument be distinguished from his evil demon argument? Do they differ in the scope of the knowledge claims that they undercut?

3. Disjunctivism is sometimes seen as a response to either the argument from illusion or the argument from hallucination. Does it work? Do we need it to respond to either the argument from illusion or the argument from hallucination?

Part II

4. What are some of the forms that transcendental arguments can take? What, in your view, is the most promising? Could a transcendental argument succeed?

5. Is there a priori knowledge? What are some examples of it? How do philosophers establish its character? What do they want it for?

6. What, according to Kripke, are the most serious problems for our alleged knowledge of other minds? Can they be overcome?

Part III

7. Do we have knowledge that isn’t justified true belief?
8. Kim accuses Quine’s naturalized epistemology of jettisoning the normative. What does this mean? Does naturalized epistemology jettison the normative?

9. What are the fundamental intuitions motivating the “internalist” and “externalist” positions as regards epistemic justification? Does the internalist/externalist distinction in epistemology have any analogues in other branches of philosophy? Is there any way of resolving the internalist/externalist dispute?