1. “It is important to remember that talk of deception only makes sense against a background of general non-deception. (You can’t fool all of the people all of the time.) It must be possible to recognize a case of deception by checking the odd case against more normal ones.” (Austin) Is this a good response to the argument from illusion? Is it a good response to the argument from hallucination?

2. It seems, for any standard skeptical hypothesis (e.g., the brain-in-a-vat, dreaming, or virtual reality hypothesis) that we can imagine evidence that would count in favor of its truth. Could the lack of any actual evidence to this effect give us good reason to suppose that the hypothesis is false? What, if any, response to Humean skepticism about the external world can the line of thought indicated by this question give us?

3. Disjunctivism is sometimes seen as a response to either the argument from illusion or the argument from hallucination. Does it work? Do we need it to respond to either the argument from illusion or the argument from hallucination?

4. Kim accuses Quine’s naturalized epistemology of jettisoning the normative. What does this mean? Does naturalized epistemology jettison the normative?

5. Do we have knowledge that isn’t justified true belief?

6. What are some of the forms that transcendental arguments can take? What, in your view, is the most promising? Could a transcendental argument succeed?

7. What are the fundamental intuitions motivating the “internalist” and “externalist” positions as regards epistemic justification? Does the internalist/externalist distinction in epistemology have any analogues in other branches of philosophy? Is there any way of resolving the internalist/externalist dispute?

8. What, according to Kripke, are the most serious problems for our alleged knowledge of other minds? Can they be overcome?

9. Is there a priori knowledge? What are some examples of it? How do philosophers establish its character? What do they want it for?

10. In ordinary contexts we seem to credit ourselves with knowledge even when the possibility of error has not been ruled out on logical or conceptual grounds. If this practice is legitimate, what—if anything—does it show about the role of certainty or infallibility in knowledge or knowledge claims?

11. Should Descartes’ dreaming argument be distinguished from his evil demon argument? Do they differ in the scope of the knowledge claims that they undercut?

12. In defending his “clear and distinct” sufficient condition for knowledge in his Replies to the Second Set of Objections in the Meditations, Descartes argues,
absolutely speaking, false? Why should this alleged “absolute falsity” bother us, since we neither believe in it nor have even the smallest suspicion of it?

Evaluate this contention as a response to the objection that something can be perceived clearly and distinctly, yet be false. What potential, if any, does it have as a response to skepticism?