1. BonJour (Can empirical knowledge have a foundation?) writes:

Thus it finally seems possible to make sense of externalism only by construing the
externalist as simply abandoning the traditional notion of epistemic justification
and along with it anything resembling the traditional conception of knowledge.

Is this right? Does externalism require such dramatic revisions in our traditional
notions?

2. How is the argument from hallucination supposed to establish the existence of
sense-data? Evaluate Austin’s objection to the argument.

3. Kim accuses Quine’s naturalized epistemology of jettisoning the normative. What
does this mean? Does naturalized epistemology jettison the normative?

4. Is coherentism ultimately only a sophisticated form of circular reasoning?

5. What conclusions if any should we draw from what appears to be the evident
failure over decades to supplement truth and justification with an extra ingredient
that enables us to define knowledge?

6. Does the experience of an apple justify one’s claim to know that there is an apple
“there”? Does it provide the claim with greater warrant?

7. In what sense, if any, is G.E. Moore’s proof of an external world a proof?

8. Some philosophers argue that for all we know we could be dreaming or could be
in the throes of being fooled by an evil demon, and that therefore we don’t know
anything about “the external world.” Explicate this argument and then evaluate it.

9. Is there a priori knowledge? Is the cogito an example of it or a specialized case?
Can properties of the cogito be used to characterize other examples of a priori
knowledge?

10. In ordinary contexts we seem to credit ourselves with knowledge even when the
possibility of error has not been ruled out on logical or conceptual grounds. If this
practice is legitimate, what—if anything—does it show about the role of certainty
or infallibility in knowledge or knowledge claims?

11. What are some of the forms that transcendental arguments can take? What, in
your view, is the most promising? Could a transcendental argument succeed?

12. Is knowledge possible without belief? Can we know things that we don’t believe,
or don’t believe that we know, or that we haven’t thought about one way or the
other at all?