Are objects bundles of properties? State, explain, and evaluate the two best arguments for and the two best arguments against the bundle theory of properties.

How should one distinguish intrinsic and relational properties? Why might one want to?

What is the best version of the ontological argument for God’s existence? Does it succeed?

What is a fact? Are there such things? Why or why not?

Sometimes if a cause hadn’t happened, its effect wouldn’t have happened either. Is it possible to build a general analysis of causation on such counterfactual relations?

“If we take away a small part of this house, we shall be left with a house. And what we would be left with would surely have been here before we took away the part. But since it hasn’t the parts this house has, it isn’t this house. So there are at least two houses here.” Discuss the problems raised by this argument.

State Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment. What reasons have philosophers given for accepting it? What reasons have philosophers given for denying it? Evaluate.

Are there fictional objects? Sketch and assess the most plausible responses to this question.

Suppose a person P1 with body B1 has one half of his brain transplanted into a body, B2, and the other half transplanted into a body, B3. What happens to the persons involved in a scenario of this kind? What does the position you take in connection with this kind of case say about our concept of personal identity?

Are there any good arguments in favor of a four-dimensional ontology?

Does talk of grounding do a better job of capturing pre-theoretical notions of dependence and determination than talk of supervenience does?

Some philosophers think the same objects occur in different possible worlds. Others deny this. Who is right, and why?