What's the matter with good old fashioned Aristotelian essentialism?

Some contemporary philosophers are "fictionalists" about mathematical objects; others are "fictionalists" about possible worlds. What is fictionalism about a sort of object, and how is it different, if at all, from instrumentalism (about that sort)? Evaluate reasons for and against fictionalism with respect to some particular sort of object.

What is the distinction between natural kinds and other sorts of properties? What would it be for universals to be "sparse"? How are the notions of natural kinds and sparse universals related? Are there natural kinds? Are universals sparse?

What is the point of invoking possible worlds when discussing modality? What must possible worlds be like if it is to succeed?

Are there properties? Evaluate the debate between realists and nominalists with respect to the existence of properties.

Philosophers as diverse as Kant, Moore and Kripke have struggled with the question "Is existence a predicate?" Exactly what hangs on this question, and how is it to be answered?

There seems to be no fact of the matter as to where exactly the "Outback" begins and where it ends. Does this mean that there are vague objects?

What is a criterion of identity? Of what importance are such criteria? Does either the identity of indiscernibles, or the principle of the identity of relative indiscernibles provide such a principle?

It is sometimes said that, since we could in principle explain all the facts without invoking the mental, we have no good reason to think that there are irreducible mental properties. Is this so? Why or why not?

Do macroscopic objects cause anything? If so, is there pervasive causal overdetermination? Does it matter if there is?

"Dinosaurs used to live in what is now the western United States." Does this statement imply that there are dinosaurs?

Under what conditions, if any, do many objects compose one thing?