What is the principle of the identity of indiscernibles? Is there more than one? Is any of them true?

Is there good reason to think that we can act freely but that other higher mammals--dogs, vervet monkeys, pigs, etc.--cannot?

There seems to be no fact of the matter as to where exactly the "Outback" begins and where it ends. Does this mean that there are vague objects?

State Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment. What reasons have philosophers given for accepting it? What reasons have philosophers given for denying it? Evaluate.

Is conceivability a reliable guide to possibility?

Are there reasons to believe in the existence of universals? What would it be for universals to be "sparse", and are universals sparse?

Is the fact that objects of a sort are causally inert a good reason to think that there are no objects of that sort?

Suppose a person P1 with body B1 has one half of his brain transplanted into a body, B2, and the other half transplanted into a body, B3. What happens to the persons involved in a scenario of this kind? What does the position you take in connection with this kind of case say about our concept of personal identity?

What is an INUS condition, and how is it used in the analysis of causation? Does the analysis succeed? Why or why not?

Some philosophers think the same objects occur in different possible worlds. Others deny this. Who is right, and why?

Can a presentist say things that are true about the past and the future? How?

Does talk of grounding do a better job of capturing pre-theoretical notions of dependence and determination than talk of supervenience does?