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Abstract
We study the factors that influence citizen support for defense spending in fourteen democracies over the period 2004–2013. We pose two research questions. First, what factors influence citizen support for war and military force? We refer to this as the acceptability of war. Second, in addition to the acceptability of war, what other factors affect support for defense spending? Our principal finding is that citizen acceptance of war and support for defense spending are most influenced by basic beliefs and values. Gender also has a strong negative influence on attitudes toward war and thus indirectly lowers support for defense spending among women. Attitudes toward war and defense spending are also sometimes influenced by short-term threats and by alliance considerations, but the effects are not as substantively meaningful. We conclude with a summary of the results and a discussion of the implications for theory and policy.

Keywords
democratic institutions, domestic politics, international security, military alliance, military power, national security, use of force, alliance

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Scholars of international relations have devoted particular attention to the sources of citizen support for defense spending. In so doing, they recognize that governments must attend not merely to external threats but also to public support for defense budgets that compete with domestic priorities. As Michael Howard ([1982] 1983, 317) has put it, governments must engage not merely in defense and deterrence, but also in reassurance, “The object of reassurance is to persuade one’s own people, and those of one’s allies, that the benefits of military action, or preparation for it, will outweigh the costs.”

Recent commentary by scholars and policy makers suggests that citizens in many democracies are no longer reassured, that is, that they no longer believe that the benefits of defense spending outweigh the costs. The concern was most bluntly expressed by former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who argued in 2010 that:

> These budget limitations relate to a larger cultural and political trend affecting the alliance. One of the triumphs of the last century was the pacification of Europe after ages of ruinous warfare. But, as I’ve said before, I believe we have reached an inflection point, where much of the continent has gone too far in the other direction. The demilitarization of Europe—where large swaths of the general public and political class are averse to military force and the risks that go with it—has gone from a blessing in the 20th century to an impediment to achieving real security and lasting peace in the 21st. (Gates 2010; emphasis in original)

Gates’ comments are interesting because they echo predictions made by scholars during and after the Vietnam War and the emergence of nuclear parity in the early 1970s. Many scholars characterized the contention over security policy as essentially a debate about the acceptability of military force and war as instruments of policy. Other scholars observed that the debate about military force reflected the increasing competition between defense budgets and the programs of the welfare state. These scholars predicted exactly the outcome that Secretary Gates now laments: citizens would increasingly find that the benefits of military force had declined and would therefore resist paying the cost.

However, among all these debates among policy makers and the works of scholars, an important element is missing: a thorough, comparative study of the opinions of citizens. In this article, we study the factors that influence citizen support for the cost of defense in fourteen democracies over the period 2004–2013. Our approach is influenced by the work of Bartels (1994) who conceptualized the issue in terms of two research questions. First, what factors influence citizen support for war and military force? We refer to this as the acceptability of war. Second, in addition to the acceptability of war, what other factors affect support for defense spending?

We proceed as follows. In the following section, we review three bodies of scholarly literature that speak to our two research questions: theories of change in both domestic and international politics and its impact on citizen assessments of the acceptability of war and support for defense spending; research on the factors that
most influence support for military force and defense spending at the individual level; and research on the dynamics of defense spending preferences at the aggregate level. Following this review, we estimate models of the acceptability of war and support for defense spending. Our analysis follows both the assumptions and the findings of several scholars who cast citizen attitudes toward war and military force as causally prior to opinions of specific defense issues (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Bartels 1994; Reifler et al. 2014).

Our principal finding is that both citizen acceptance of war and support for defense spending are most consistently influenced by basic beliefs and values and by life experience. Ideology and beliefs about military power affect both attitudes toward war and support for defense spending. Gender has a strong negative influence on attitudes toward war and thus indirectly lowers support for defense spending among women. Attitudes toward war and defense spending are also influenced by short-term threats and by alliance considerations, but the effects are not as consistently significant or substantively meaningful as variables such as ideology and gender. We conclude with a summary of the results and a discussion of the implications for theory and policy.

War, Military Force, and Citizen Support for Defense Spending

War, Social Change, and Support for Defense

The 1960s and 1970s produced a number of scholarly works that sought to understand the increasing contention that arose during the Vietnam War and continued with the question of how the United States and its allies would adjust to the emergence of nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, Hoffmann (1973, 3) characterized debates about security policy as a more recent version of a centuries-old argument: that the acceptability of military force and war would decline as the values of modern industrial democracies came to prevail.

Hoffman’s analysis foreshadowed later theoretical developments, especially works that predicted a decline in the utility of military force in an age of strategic parity, economic interdependence, and welfare states. Keohane and Nye (1977, 23-37) in particular did not argue that military force had lost all utility, but they did observe that security politics would become increasingly contentious in an age dominated by economic interdependence and the emergence of new issues that competed for attention and resources. Other scholars observed that the contention surrounding military force would be exacerbated by the conflict between defense budgets and the programs of the welfare state (Russett 1970; Sprout and Sprout 1968).

The protests that erupted in both Europe and the United States during the years of the Reagan presidency and later during the war in Iraq do not seem surprising in light of these early scholarly predictions, but more recent scholarly analyses have added new elements to the argument that international and domestic changes have
transformed views of military force and thus military spending. For example, Robert Kagan argued that the unwillingness of Europeans to invest additional resources in defense resulted in part from a difference in relative power: strong states invest in military power, but weaker states seek protection through international law and multilateral cooperation. Nonetheless, there was an additional reason. To the question of why Europe had not reacted to American dominance with an effort to increase its own military capabilities, Kagan (2003, 53, 55) answered, “The answer lies somewhere in the realm of ideology, in European attitudes not just toward defense spending but toward power itself . . . Europeans today are not ambitious for power, and certainly not for military power. . . . They have rejected the power politics that brought them such misery over the past century and more.”

These scholarly works highlight several important factors that are likely to influence citizen views of defense spending. The first is the centrality of citizen views of the acceptability of war and military force. The question is not just how much defense will cost but also what benefit it will bring. Differences in views on this subject are likely to elicit different levels of support for the defense budget. The second is the emergence of the welfare state as a competitor for resources. Finally, Kagan offers the argument that American attitudes are fundamentally different. Partly as a result of the difference in relative power but also as a result of differing historical experience, Americans are more likely than Europeans to view military force and war as acceptable means of policy, and this difference translates into differing views of defense spending as well.

**Support for Defense Spending at the Individual Level**

Given the centrality of individual attitudes to theories of change in support for defense spending, there has been surprisingly little research on the subject. The signal exception is Bartels who estimated the impact of ideology and a variety of foreign policy attitudes on Americans’ support for defense spending in 1992. The results were unequivocal, “the magnitudes of the various parameter estimates clearly suggest that the dominant factor in producing support for defense spending in 1992 was a general willingness ‘to use military force to solve international problems’ . . . it is the dominant determinant of defense spending preferences in every specification, regardless of which other variables are included . . .” (Bartels 1994, 481). When Bartels (1994, 485) turned his attention to support for spending in the Cold War years of 1982–1984, he found the same result: support for defense spending was dominated by the general willingness to use force rather than by other factors, “One implication of these results is that, even in the Cold War era, defense spending preferences were determined more by a predisposition to favor or oppose the use of force in the international arena than by either general political ideology or attitudes toward the Soviet Union per se.” Put differently, Bartels findings suggest that defense spending preferences are conditioned more by long-held attitudes toward military force than by short-term variation in threats or estimates of adversaries.
These findings naturally lead to the question of what determines attitudes toward war and the use of force, and here Bartels (1994, 495) makes an interesting finding: the willingness to use force is more strongly determined by basic cultural attitudes (patriotism and distrust of people) than by ideology or by what might be termed short-term influences. Although Bartels does not draw the conclusion, it seems plausible that fundamental attitudes toward the use of force resemble the basic values that make up an individual’s ideology—in fact, attitudes toward war may be the “international” component of what we normally consider a citizen’s ideology. If so, it is likely an attitude that formed in early adulthood. Such a conceptualization makes it easier to understand why attitudes toward defense spending vary less than one might expect in reaction to short-term forces (Bartel 1994, 497).

Beyond Bartels, there are few other studies of individual defense spending preferences, but his results are consistent with broader studies of the structure of attitudes toward foreign policy and international relations. Most important is the research of Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) who distinguish between three types of attitudes: core values (morality of war, ethnocentrism), international postures (internationalism, militarism), and opinions on specific issues. In their model, the core value “morality of war” is causally prior to citizens’ preferred international posture, which in turn helps citizens form attitudes on specific policy choices, such as defense spending. In fact, opinions of defense spending are quite strongly related to a militarist posture, which in turn is strongly determined by views of the morality of war. Thus, like Bartels and much of the literature on military force reviewed earlier, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, 197) are essentially arguing that fundamental attitudes toward war and military force are a primary determinant of defense spending preferences.

The centrality of attitudes toward military force also characterizes the broader literature on the structure of foreign policy attitudes at the individual level. In a number of studies of American public and leadership opinions from the 1970s through the 1990s, Holsti, Rosenau, and Wittkopf demonstrated that two dimensions dominate individual opinions, a “cooperative” dimension composed of opinion items measuring support for nonmilitary policy instruments, and a “militant” dimension composed of items measuring support for military instruments of policy. A third group reveals a mixture of militant and cooperative views. The findings of these scholars demonstrate with remarkable consistency that support or opposition to the militant and cooperative dimensions is the central cleavage that structures American opinions of foreign policy (Wittkopf 1990, 34-36; Holsti 2004, 163-239; Holsti and Rosenau 1990), and these attitudes are a dominant correlate of specific policy opinions, including opinions of defense spending (Wittkopf 1990, 54).

Less is known about opinion structures in other countries, although those studies that do exist suggest a similarity to the structure of the US opinion. For example, Asmus, Everts, and Isernia (2004) constructed a typology of attitudes toward military force in the United States and eleven European countries. Their typology yields an attitude structure that is quite similar to the one that characterizes US opinion: there are distinct “hawk” and “dove” groupings, along with a mixed “pragmatist”
group (Asmus, Everts, and Isernia 2004, 3). In a subsequent study, Everts and Isernia (2015, 19-22) demonstrate that these attitudes toward military force were strong determinants of support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, Reifler and his colleagues analyzed British support for the war in Afghanistan and North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2011 intervention in Libya in part as a function of citizens’ conceptions of the morality of war. They found that citizen views of the wars’ morality, together with their assessment of the costs, were the most important correlates of war support (Reifler et al. 2014).

Change in Aggregate Support for Defense Spending over Time

The question of how defense spending preferences move over time has produced a small but cumulating literature that focuses principally on the causal impact of change in spending itself. Wlezien’s (1995, 1996) “thermostat” model of spending has come to dominate this body of scholarship. Wlezien argues that the important political question is the public’s desired level of change in spending. Citizens may not have a specific preferred level of spending, but given the salience of the defense budget, they are likely to know if spending has been increasing or decreasing. Following the thermostat metaphor, when spending has been increasing (decreasing), the public will react by moving toward a preference for decreasing (increasing) spending. Wlezien’s (1995, 1996) studies of American federal spending in general and defense spending in particular strongly confirm the thermostat dynamic. Subsequent research finds evidence for the thermostat model in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, and Canada (Eichenberg and Stoll 2003; Soroka and Wlezien 2004, 2005). In summary, there is ample time series evidence at the aggregate level that citizens in democracies are aware of recent change in defense spending and generally prefer that increases or decreases be followed by a change in the opposite direction.

The Data Set: Transatlantic Trends

Most scholarship on public opinion on national security issues is focused on the United States. One reason is the availability of numerous surveys in the United States that employ identical question wording over time. Once we move beyond the United States, however, the task becomes more difficult, as survey organizations in different countries each have their own preferred wording on specific issues, some do not focus on national security at all, and those that do administer the questions at different points in time.

Fortunately, the opinion surveys in the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends series offer the opportunity to close the gap in comparative research. Beginning in 2002, Transatlantic Trends has conducted a yearly survey on foreign and security policy issues. The questions are identically worded in each country, and sampling takes place at the same time each year (June). In light of the scholarly
findings reviewed earlier, we are particularly interested in a measure of the acceptability of war and in a measure of support for defense spending. A measure of attitudes toward war is available in the data set for all years since 2004, and a measure of support for defense spending is available in five years between 2004 and 2013.

The analyses reported here group results for the United States, Turkey, and for the pooled responses for Western Europe and Eastern Europe.¹

**Modeling Citizen Views of the Acceptability of War**

Although the scholarly literature reviewed earlier varies in methodological approach and historical reach, one theme is a consistent focus: citizen attitudes on the acceptability of war and military force. We model attitudes toward war using the following question that has been administered since 2003 in the *Transatlantic Trends* surveys:

> Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following—Under some conditions war is necessary to obtain justice.

In the analysis to follow, we operationalize the acceptability of war as a dummy variable for which the value of 1 is assigned to respondents who agree “strongly” or “somewhat” with the aforementioned statement.

The question is not without some weaknesses. The mention of “justice” is of particular concern, especially in the environment after September 11, 2001, when respondents might interpret the question as specifically inspired by the attacks on the United States. Yet as we have seen in the research of Hurwitz and Peffley, the “morality of war” is one of the “core values” that has a strong influence on a variety of other security attitudes, and it is precisely the sentiment that we want to measure. Moreover, the GMF “war is necessary” question was not formulated in reaction to recent events. It was first used in the 1930s as part of the research program of L. L. Thurstone (1929, 1931, 1959; Droba 1931; Peterson 1931), a social psychologist who was a pioneer in the development of attitude scales on a variety of topics, including a “pacifism” scale. At the time, psychologists debated the validity of the overall pacifism scale, but it was widely employed (see Carter 1945 for a review of studies that employed the scale). In fact, the war is necessary item is still in use by psychologists who study attitudes toward war (Kuterovac Jagodi 2000; Jones-Wiley, Restori, and Lee 2007). In short, the question is attractive because it seeks to measure a basic attitude toward war that is independent of time and circumstance.

The question has other virtues as well. The first is the blunt invocation of “war,” a welcome contrast to survey research that often employs generalities, such as “military action.” Second, the measure is available in identical form over ten years in as many as sixteen countries. As a result, many research findings that exist only for the United States can now be explored comparatively. Third, the question subtly invokes the ambivalence that most citizens have about policy choice (Zaller and Feldman 1992). War may be necessary but only “under some conditions.” The research
question is whether different citizens resolve this ambivalence in different ways. A fourth virtue of the question is that it has proven to be a very robust predictor of opinions on other security issues, which increases our confidence that it measures fundamental attitudes toward military force (Everts and Isernia 2015). In summary, the question appears to measure a fundamental toleration or rejection of war as an instrument of policy.

The analyses reported subsequently are logistic regressions with the acceptability of war as the dependent variable. Because we pool Eastern and Western European responses in the analyses, we employ clustered standard errors for each country to account for the fact that observations may not be independent within countries. Our reading of the methodological literature suggests that there is no dominant recommendation for treating observations within clusters, although some evidence does suggest that the clustered standard errors that we employ here produce conservative estimates of statistical significance. In addition, we should note that, although our estimates are based on five cross-sectional surveys taken in different years, they do not represent “pseudo panels” (Deaton 1985) or repeated cross sections (Lebo and Weber 2015). These approaches require a larger number of surveys in adjacent time points to estimate a dynamic parameter describing the functional form of the movement of the dependent variable over time. Our data do not allow such an estimate, but we do control for changes in the intercept by specifying a dummy variable representing the year of survey administration.

**Independent Variables**

Our regression model of the war is necessary dependent variable includes measures of both long-term and short-term influences. The most important long-term influence is ideology, which is a consistently strong correlate of attitudes toward war and other security issues in many studies. We measure ideology using a three-point scale (left–center–right) and expect a positive sign on the coefficient. A second independent variable is a survey measure of citizens’ belief that economic power is more important than military power. As we noted earlier, several scholars have argued that a primary source of domestic contention over matters of national security is the confluence of two long-term trends: the emergence of economic welfare as a primary value of industrial societies and the emergence of international economic interdependence. If these arguments are correct, we would expect that individuals who think that economic power is now primary in world affairs will be more skeptical of war as an instrument of policy. To measure this belief, we specify a dummy variable that equals 1 when respondents agree with the following statement: “economic power is more important than military power.” We expect a negative sign on this variable.

The third independent variable is gender. There is a cumulating literature on attitudes toward war and national security in the United States that demonstrates that women are significantly less supportive of using military force (Conover and Sapiro
1993; Nincic and Nincic 2002; Eichenberg 2003; Reiter 2014). Whether this skepticism is the result of innate, biological factors or the experience or socialization of women is still far from established, but one precondition for assessing the question is comparative research to evaluate the universality of gender differences. We hypothesize that gender (female = 1) will take a negative sign.

We also specify the age of respondents. During the 1980s, there was considerable speculation that younger citizens had more skeptical attitudes toward national security because they had not experienced the tensions of the early Cold War. However, as we saw earlier, Kagan has made a cogent argument that contemporary European attitudes toward national security, European integration, and world affairs more broadly reflect a disgust and exhaustion resulting from the two world wars in the twentieth century. If Kagan is correct, we would expect older respondents to have more negative attitudes toward war. Which hypothesis is correct remains to be seen. Our age variable is grouped chronological age, with six groups beginning with age eighteen to twenty-four and ending with a group sixty-five years and older.

In prior theory and research findings, the impact of educational attainment, social position (occupation), and political engagement is mixed. For example, in some research, educational attainment increases support for international activism and military intervention because citizens with higher education are more politically active, cosmopolitan, and engaged in global affairs (Everts 2011). In his studies of the United States, Wittkopf (1990, 46) finds support for two different views: in the 1970s, those with higher education were less supportive of militant activism, but in the 1980s, they reversed positions and became more supportive. In Bartel’s (1994, 502) analysis of US citizens, those with higher education and higher levels of political information in the United States were less supportive of using force.

In preliminary estimates of our model, we studied the effects of educational attainment, political engagement, and occupational status and found that each has some positive influence on acceptance of war, but the influence is sporadic. However, the most consistent and significant correlate in these preliminary estimates was that citizens in professional and managerial occupations are more accepting of war. Based on existing literatures, this is likely due to the fact that professional occupations require higher education, that professionals work in more cosmopolitan locations and environments, and that both education and income increase engagement in politics, which also increases support for global activism. For all of these reasons, on the basis of both parsimony and the results of our preliminary analyses, we specify a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for respondents who describe their occupation as “professional [or] managerial.” We expect a positive sign on this variable.3

Finally, we estimate the effects of four variables measuring short-term threat perceptions.4 For the entire time period for which complete data are available (2004–2013), we specify variables representing a perceived threat from the Iranian nuclear program and a perceived Chinese military threat. The Iran threat variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is “very or somewhat
concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.” The Chinese threat measure is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent believes that “China is a military threat” (vs. the alternative response that China is not a military threat).  

### Results: The Acceptability of War

The results, shown in Table 1, indicate that attitudes toward war are more strongly and consistently conditioned by fundamental values and life experience than by short-term threats. The most obvious examples are ideology and gender, which are highly significant in all countries or groups of countries in the direction predicted by our hypotheses. In addition, in three out of the four groups (excluding Turkey), those in professional and managerial positions are more supportive of war. Other variables are significant, although the parameters take different signs in different locations. In Eastern Europe and the United States, older respondents are less supportive of war, while in Turkey older respondents are more supportive. In Western Europe and Turkey, a belief that economic power is more important than military power does not lower judgments about the acceptability of war, while in Eastern Europe and the United States it does. Nonetheless, in Table 1 the most consistently significant influences on attitudes toward war are personal beliefs and life experience; these

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**Table 1. Logistic Regression Analysis of War Acceptability, 2004–2012.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left–right ideology</td>
<td>0.312 (5.96)**</td>
<td>0.050 (2.06)*</td>
<td>0.139 (3.48)**</td>
<td>0.487 (12.67)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic power more important than military</td>
<td>0.197 (3.00)**</td>
<td>−0.226 (2.21)*</td>
<td>0.635 (8.73)**</td>
<td>−0.133 (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (female = 1)</td>
<td>−0.628 (7.06)**</td>
<td>−0.445 (10.52)**</td>
<td>−0.205 (3.31)**</td>
<td>−0.354 (5.66)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age grouped</td>
<td>−0.052 (1.28)</td>
<td>−0.106 (5.60)**</td>
<td>0.051 (2.43)*</td>
<td>−0.080 (3.98)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation: professional or managerial</td>
<td>0.400 (2.89)**</td>
<td>0.212 (1.98)*</td>
<td>−0.063 (0.32)</td>
<td>0.153 (2.18)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons</td>
<td>0.149 (1.88)</td>
<td>0.101 (2.20)*</td>
<td>−0.064 (0.99)</td>
<td>0.545 (7.47)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concerned about China being a military threat</td>
<td>0.033 (0.67)</td>
<td>0.128 (1.67)</td>
<td>0.291 (4.39)**</td>
<td>0.038 (0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−0.940 (3.08)**</td>
<td>−0.215 (1.67)</td>
<td>−1.484 (9.18)**</td>
<td>0.344 (2.06)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>47,689</td>
<td>15,344</td>
<td>4,575</td>
<td>6,676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Coefficients are logistic regression coefficients with normalized z-scores within parentheses; controls for year of survey are specified but not shown.

*p < .05. **p < .01.
variables have no relation to contemporary global events, nor are they easily influenced by policy arguments (arguments in favor or against war are unlikely to change an individual’s gender or ideology).

It is true that views of war are related to short-term assessments of threats, but these are less consistent and cross-nationally uniform than individual characteristics. Concern about the Iran nuclear program is most consistent; it is a significant influence in Eastern Europe and the United States and near significant in Western Europe. The military threat of China is significant only in Turkey. It is important to note, however, that no combination of threat variables substantially weaken the effect of basic values and life experience. Moreover, if we examine the magnitude of the slopes for variables with the same metric (e.g., the dummy variables for gender and the threat from Iran), the magnitude of the slopes for personal values and characteristics is generally higher. An important exception to this pattern is the magnitude of the slopes for threat variables in the equations for the United States, which are both steeper than the parameters for other countries and regions and steeper than the variables representing personal characteristics and values.

Finally, the overall similarity in the structure of the parameters does not mean that the US and European views of the acceptability of war are essentially “the same.” Rather, the results refocus attention on the distribution of the independent variables, most importantly on the distribution of citizens along the ideological spectrum and the threat variables. We return to this question after analyzing support for defense spending.

**Modeling Support for Defense Spending**

We estimate support for defense spending as a function of long-term forces and short-term forces. The models presented subsequently are logistic regressions in which the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the response to the following question is a preference for increased defense spending:

> And how about defense spending? Do you think the [country’s] government should increase defense spending, keep defense spending at the current level, or decrease defense spending?

This item is available for the years 2004, 2008, and 2011–2013.

**Independent Variables**

We argued earlier that support for defense spending is a cost–benefit calculation: the question is whether the cost of defense is commensurate with its benefits. An important determinant of support for defense spending is therefore whether one considers war an acceptable instrument of policy and also whether there is utility to military power as an instrument of policy. We specify these considerations in two
independent variables. The first is the war is necessary question modeled in the previous section. Obviously, we expect a significant positive coefficient on this variable because it goes to the heart of what it means to support spending for the defense establishment—if one views war as sometimes necessary, one is likely to support spending for defense. We also specify the question on economic versus military power described earlier. We expect a significant negative coefficient, that is, that those who consider economic power more important than military power are less likely to support spending for defense.

Existing research on support for defense spending emphasizes the impact of recent change in the defense budget (the “thermostat” effect), budget trade-off considerations, and the impact of short-term variations in perceptions of threats. To these, we can add two additional categories of variables: the importance of alliance solidarity and support for the alliance’s dominant partner (the United States) and support for the European Union (EU) as a global actor and its aspiration to act independently of the United States.

In preliminary estimates of support for defense spending, we found to our surprise that the thermostat effect and trade-off considerations had almost no effect on support for defense spending. We estimated respondents’ sensitivity to change in defense spending and to budget trade-offs in several ways. First, following the literature, we estimated the impact of the percentage change in each sample country’s real defense spending both in the year prior to each opinion survey and during the year of the survey. The results showed no significant impact of lagged change in defense spending or change in the current year, so we omitted these measures from further estimation. Second, we evaluated the effect of additional variables that plausibly measure sensitivity to budgetary trade-offs among different classes of citizens. Specifically, we expected a significant negative coefficient for several groups of respondents with a self-interest in civilian government spending: the retired, those whose primary occupation is “taking care of the home,” and those who are currently seeking a job. None of these variables proved significant in our preliminary estimates, so they are excluded from the estimates reported subsequently. 7

There are two variables that are relevant to trade-off considerations that did prove significant in at least some of our estimates. The first is left–right ideology. While it is true that the indirect effect of ideology is already captured by the acceptability of war variable, we think it is also plausible that ideology has a direct effect on attitudes toward defense spending because it raises the prospect of short-term budgetary trade-offs that are distinct from an individual’s fundamental attitudes toward war. That is, it may be that a person on the left of the ideological spectrum feels that war is sometimes a necessary action in world politics but who in any particular year fears that spending for defense might threaten more valued social programs (Eichenberg 1989, 186). Thus, we think it plausible that there will be a significant positive association between left–right ideology and support for increasing defense in addition to the indirect effect of ideology through the acceptability of war variable.
The same is true of gender. Some women may find war acceptable under some circumstances, but they may not support increased defense spending if it would threaten the education and social spending that serve the interests of women more so than men (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006). Although comparative evidence on gender difference in support for defense spending is not available, Eichenberg and Stoll (2012) find that women in the United States have been significantly less supportive since the 1960s. We expect a negative coefficient on the gender variable (female = 1).

Earlier, we quoted former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who urged his European colleagues to increase defense spending to redress what he saw as severe deficiencies in NATO’s collective efforts. This pressure within the Alliance to increase spending is not unique to the years of Gates’ tenure. In the 1970s, for example, the NATO allies committed themselves to the explicit goal of increasing defense in real annual terms by 3 percent—the so-called 3 percent solution. Throughout NATO’s history, member governments have had to reconcile the competing pressures of alliance expectations to increase spending with domestic budget necessities.

Our interest here is not in modeling the outcome of this balancing act, but rather to model the competing considerations in the preferences of citizens. We do so by specifying considerations of alliance solidarity in two ways. First, we estimate the impact of support for the NATO Alliance, reasoning that those who support the Alliance are more amenable to increases in defense spending that are often justified as alliance obligations. Our measure of support for NATO is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the survey respondent believes that “NATO is essential for [our country’s] security” (the alternative response is that NATO is “not essential”). The second measure of alliance solidarity is support for US global leadership. Because the United States is the dominant power in the Alliance and often the source of pressure to increase defense, we reason that those who are more supportive of the US global role are more likely to support increasing defense. We estimate support for US security policy by specifying a variable that measures support for US global leadership. The questions reads, “How desirable is it that the United States exerts strong leadership in world affairs: Very desirable, somewhat desirable, somewhat undesirable, or very undesirable?” Our measure of support for US leadership is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent chooses “very desirable” or “somewhat desirable.” We expect a positive sign on this coefficient.

Note that these two alliance variables also allow evaluation of a competing hypothesis: that Europeans “free ride” on the efforts of the United States. If free-riding considerations are present in European attitudes, we would expect to find a negative association between support for NATO and support for defense spending precisely because the alliance provides the opportunity to spend less than would otherwise be necessary.

We also experimented with an index of “Atlanticist” sentiment. Following the approach taken by Everts and Isernia (2015), we constructed an index based on positive, “pro-Atlanticist” responses to the NATO question and the US leadership question described earlier as well as a question on the transatlantic security partnership.
(described subsequently). The results for the United States and Western Europe are nearly identical to those using the indicator variables taken separately. As our discussion reveals, the separate indicators are meaningful in policy terms, so we report them here.8

**Europe’s role in the world and European independence.** Beginning with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU has constructed joint policies and capabilities to increase the EU’s ability “to assert its identity on the international scene” (as the Maastricht Treaty puts it). As a result, the EU now has a joint military command, joint military forces, and joint training exercises, and EU forces have served in a number of peacekeeping and training missions (e.g., in Bosnia, Kosovo, Mali, the Central African Republic, and elsewhere).9 In the view of some scholars, these efforts are in fact an attempt by the EU to balance the US “hyper power” that has been much discussed since the 1990s (Posen 2006). Scholars such as Kagan argue that support for the EU in general represents a rejection of military instruments because of a preference for peaceful integration. It is therefore an interesting question whether European citizens who support the EU’s global aspirations or who favor more security independence from the United States are more or less supportive of defense spending.

We evaluate these questions in two ways. The first is by specifying a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when respondents declare that it is “very desirable or somewhat desirable that the EU exert strong leadership in world affairs.” We are agnostic as to the expected sign on this variable. On the one hand, following Posen, one might expect increased support for defense spending from those who desire strong European global leadership. On the other hand, Kagan’s hypothesis is also plausible if the European project is largely seen as a soft power enterprise, then support for defense spending will be less among those who support Europe’s global role.

The effect of sentiments favoring security independence from the United States (or from Europe in the United States) is tested by specifying a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when respondents choose a more independent approach in response to the following question: “Do you think that the partnership in security and diplomatic affairs between the United States and the EU should become closer, should remain about the same, or should the (EU-US) take a more independent approach . . . ?”

Finally, we specify external threats in the equations for support of defense spending. Although the indirect effects of threats on acceptability of war are already captured by specifying that variable in the earlier equation, we think it plausible that short-term attitudes toward defense spending may yield different results. That is, although a perceived threat from terrorism, to choose one example, might increase one’s general acceptance of war as an instrument of policy, it is a different question altogether whether this same threat translates into short-term support for specific national policy measures such as an increase in defense spending in one’s own country.
In early evaluations of the model, we found that concern about the Iranian nuclear problem was unrelated to support for defense spending, so it is excluded from further analysis, and the analysis includes only the variable representing the perceived military threat from China.10

**Results: Support for Increased Defense Spending**

The results are shown in Table 2.11 What is interesting about the results is the presence of both commonality and variety in the effects of the independent variables. The most important commonality is the strong impact of basic values and beliefs. In three of the four groupings shown, opinions of the acceptability of war and the
relative importance of economic and military power are a highly significant influence in the predicted direction. Acceptance of war increases support for defense spending, and the belief that economic power is more important decreases support. Left–right ideology is also significant in two groupings—Western Europe and the United States, and this is in addition to the indirect effect of ideology that flows through the acceptability of war variable. The important implication of these findings is that long-held beliefs and values that are largely independent of current events are the most important determinants of attitudes toward increased defense spending. Significantly, it is also on these measures that the United States most differs from its European allies. We return to the importance of this finding in the discussion subsequently.

We noted earlier that a number of measures of individual sensitivity to defense spending had little to no impact in preliminary evaluations of the model, and here we see that gender, which one might expect to show sensitivity to trade-offs, has a significant negative impact only among East European respondents. Of course, gender does have a strong indirect effect because of its association with the measure of war acceptability, so the result here reinforces the finding that attitudes toward defense spending arise more from fundamental attitudes toward war and military power than from trade-off considerations associated with the defense budget itself.

A second commonality is that the China threat variable has a positive and significant influence on support for increased defense in Western Europe and the United States.

Some of the most interesting and politically significant results concern the variety in the impact of alliance solidarity variables and the EU’s global role. Support for NATO does increase support for defense (in Western Europe and Turkey), as does support for US leadership (in both European groups). In other words, at least one measure of alliance solidarity has a significant, positive effect on support for defense, a finding that has important implications. The first implication is that arguments concerning the need to support NATO do have positive resonance, and since support for NATO has been largely stable in most countries for over fifty years, alliance solidarity has been a source of support for defense spending. However, a second implication is that support for defense spending in Europe is not simply the result of the calculus of security policy. It is also sensitive to broader assessments of US global leadership. In Europe, the trend on the US leadership question was steeply downward during the Bush presidency and the war in Iraq, and our results suggest that these assessments of US foreign policy undermined support for defense spending. Views of US leadership have since recovered, but the important point is that the much-discussed US “image” does have important policy consequences.

In all four groups, including the United States, support for European global leadership is negatively associated with support for defense spending. Further, in Europe and Turkey, support for a European security policy that is more independent of the United States does not translate into support for more defense spending. Taken
together, these findings support Kagan’s argument that support for the EU’s global role does not translate into support for strengthening its military capabilities, a pattern that is true among Americans as well. In both Europe and the United States, a strong European role appears to be defined in nonmilitary terms.

Finally, the results for the United States on the alliance and global leadership variables deserve special mention. Somewhat surprisingly, support for US global leadership is not a significant influence, but this may be due to the very high and largely unvarying American support for US global leadership (over 80 percent of Americans think strong US leadership is desirable). Support for NATO is slightly more evenly divided; 67 percent supported the alliance over the period of this analysis. Nonetheless, in the United States, variations in support for NATO have no effect on support for defense spending. Rather, it is support for a security policy that is independent of Europe that most strongly affects American attitudes toward defense spending. Those favoring more independence from Europe are significantly more supportive of defense spending.

The contrast in patterns of support in Europe and the United States illustrate the political differences within the alliance. In Europe, support for Alliance with the United States and for US leadership increases support for defense spending. In the United States, these variables have no effect, and support for defense is highest among those who prefer independence from Europe. To the extent that this can be interpreted as a unilateralist preference, it is precisely the sentiment that undermined European support for American leadership during the Iraq War period and therefore contributed to a decline in European support for defense.

This pattern also provides an interesting perspective on the “free-riding” argument. As we noted earlier, a desire to free ride on the efforts of the alliance leader should yield a pattern in which support for the NATO Alliance or for US leadership reduces support for defense spending. Here we see the opposite—support for NATO and/or the US increase support for defense spending. Interestingly, it is only in the United States that support for NATO is not correlated with support for increasing defense. Rather, in the United States, it is a desire to be “independent” of Europe that increases support for defense, a posture that is unlikely to improve Europeans’ assessment of the United States or NATO. The likely result is obvious, that is, to the extent that the United States seeks to increase military capabilities outside of the NATO context, the less support there will be in Europe for increasing military spending. This is contrary to what theories of free riding would predict, but it is consistent with the evidence presented here.

Finally, before describing the marginal effects of the independent variables, we should consider the possibility that the direction of causality is the reverse of what we assume here, that is, that support for defense spending is actually influencing ideology, attitudes toward war, or the measures of alliance solidarity. For a number of reasons, we think the latter interpretation is implausible. First, in the fields of political behavior generally and public opinion on security policy specifically, the dominant theoretical framework emphasizes the causal precedence of basic values...
and fundamental beliefs as cognitive filters that assist citizens in making sense of specific policy choices about which they may know very little (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2009). Thus, partisanship and ideology are often specified as the filters that inform policy preferences and citizen votes (Zaller 1992). In the words of Berinsky (2009, 124), “in the battle between facts and partisanship, partisanship always wins.” In brief, we know of no theoretical argument that policy preferences (such as support for defense spending) “cause” a change in ideology or partisanship. We think it far more plausible that citizens use ideology and fundamental attitude toward war as filters to guide their views of defense spending. Second, we think it is similarly plausible that attitudes toward the transatlantic alliance are causally prior to opinions of defense spending because existing research suggests that attachment to the alliance is very stable and immune to disagreement on specific issues. For example, Eichenberg (1989) reviewed historical evidence on support for NATO and found that it was quite stable and ultimately unaffected by vociferous debates about nuclear weapons in the 1980s (1989, 118-158). Several additional scholars reviewed similar evidence through the early 2000s and also found largely stable trends (Isernia, Juhasz, and Rattinger 2002). Reviewing the evidence, Everts (1995, 409) concludes that opinions of specific security policies do not have a large impact on support for the alliance: “... it is often alleged or feared that, because of a primitive sort of ‘domino effect,’ opposition to NATO policies would inescapably lead to reduced support for NATO as such. The available evidence does not support this conclusion.”

In a later analysis, Everts and Isernia conceptualize the transatlantic relationship not merely as a military alliance, but as a “community” or indeed a “political order.” Following John Ikenberry (2001, 23), Everts and Isernia define this order as “the [governing] arrangements among a group of states, including its fundamental rules, principles, and institutions.” There is in fact evidence to support this conceptualization. In its 2013 survey, the GMF asked those who supported NATO in a preliminary question (58 percent in thirteen countries) for the reason underlying their support. Material, instrumental reasons (burden sharing, legitimizing the use of force, and responding to threats) were named by no more than 15 percent. In contrast, a majority of 56 percent of respondents in thirteen countries chose the response which read “NATO is an alliance of democratic countries which should act together” (German Marshall Fund of the United States 2013, 29). For a substantial percentage of Europeans and Americans, NATO is seen more as a community of values than a military alliance, and we think it plausible that the strength of one’s attachment to this community is employed as a filter to appraise specific policy choices, including the question of increasing defense spending.

**Marginal Effects**

The preceding analysis has shown that basic values and beliefs are more consistently significant in analyses of both the acceptability of war and support for defense
spending. External threats do have an impact, but they are less consistently significant across countries and regions. One way to summarize the substantive effect of these variables is to compute the marginal effects from the regressions reported earlier. We computed the marginal effects for all of the equations reported earlier.

In the equation for the acceptability of war, the most important substantive effects were for left–right ideology and gender, although not always in the same pattern for different countries and regions. In Western Europe, the average predicted probability of responding that war is sometimes necessary is 30 percent for those on the ideological left and 44 percent on the ideological right, that is, a change of 14 percent. In the United States, the change in probabilities from left to right is 16 percent, and in Turkey 7 percent. Large negative changes in probabilities also exist for gender in both Western and Eastern Europe (−14 percent and −9 percent, respectively). Only in the United States and Turkey does external threat have a substantive impact on war acceptability; the predicted probability of agreeing that war is sometimes necessary shifts upward by about 8 percent in reaction to external threats. In summary, in the equations for the acceptability of war, either ideology or gender produces larger substantive effects than any external threat variable.

Table 3 displays the same analysis of marginal effects from the equations modeling support for increased defense spending. The results reflect what was apparent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War is necessary</th>
<th>Western Europe</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China is military threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Change in probability from lowest to highest value of independent variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War is necessary: disagree–agree</th>
<th>+8</th>
<th>+4</th>
<th>+3</th>
<th>+9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: left–center</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: center–right</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology: left–right</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>+3</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese threat: no–yes</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>−1</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in the regression models. For fundamental values and beliefs (ideology and acceptability of war), the change in the average predicted probability of supporting an increase in defense from the lowest category to the highest is generally much larger for each country or regional grouping. For example, in Western Europe, the largest marginal changes occur for the war is a necessary variable (8 percent) and left–right ideology (8 percent moving from the left to the right). In comparison, those who find China threatening in Western Europe differ from those who do not by a smaller margin (4 percent). In Eastern Europe and Turkey, the substantive effect of most variables is small. In the United States, it is the acceptability of war and the Chinese military threat that have the largest marginal impact (9 percent and 6 percent, respectively). In summary, where meaningful marginal changes occur, they are most often due to core values and beliefs (ideology and acceptance of war) than to external threat.

These results highlight the perceptual distance that characterizes policy differences, especially between the United States and West Europeans. Since the United States is more ideologically conservative than most other countries in this analysis and also substantially more accepting of war, the recurring disagreements between the United States and its European allies—such as those of Secretary Gates cited in the opening of this article—are understandable. This perceptual gap is offset somewhat by the fact that West European support for defense is positively influenced by support for NATO and the US global role, but as we noted earlier, this means that European support for defense is subject to fluctuating assessments of American foreign policy more generally.

**Summary, Conclusions, and Implications**

Although there has been no lack of theoretical or policy arguments about the sources of citizen support for defense spending, there has been no comparative research to assess these arguments. In this article, we analyzed a comparative data set that covers fourteen countries during the period 2004–2013. The evidence is the most comprehensive available in the literature.

Our results indicate that basic values and beliefs, as well as life experience, are the most important influences on attitudes toward war and defense spending. Fundamental beliefs about war and military power, ideological identification, gender, and occupational status are more frequently significant and cross-nationally uniform in our regression models than short-term threats in the external environment. In fact, the strong association between ideology and war acceptability suggests that fundamental beliefs about war may be an integral component of ideology rather than a separate belief that is “caused” by ideology.

The results also illuminate the sources of disagreement that often arise within the transatlantic alliance, especially between the United States and its West European allies. The United States is one of the most conservative societies in the alliance, while the West Europeans are among the least. The United States is by far the most
accepting of war as an instrument of policy, while the West Europeans are the least. While attitudes in both the United States and West Europe are at times influenced in similar ways by external threats—which might push them together—the fact is that US attitudes are more consistently affected by threats, and the magnitude of the effect is larger. Although tempered somewhat by West European support for the NATO Alliance and by support for US leadership, the ideological distance and the difference in attitudes toward war arise from long-held beliefs and values that are unlikely to change in response to situational factors.

However, there is one frequently cited source of transatlantic disagreement for which we find little basis: there is no evidence that European opinions of defense spending are animated by a free-riding dynamic. Were that the case, we would expect to find that support for alliance and partnership with the United States would be associated with lower support for defense spending. We find the contrary: in both Europe and Turkey, support for the NATO Alliance, for the security partnership with the United States, or for strong US global leadership are positively related to support for defense. In the United States, it is those who desire more independence from the transatlantic partnership who most strongly support defense spending. Presumably, this includes those of a more unilateralist bent, a posture that alienates Europeans and thus undermines the very support for the United States that would increase support for defense spending.

Our results also speak to important issues in the scholarly literature on national security, military force, and defense spending. The first is the centrality of individuals’ beliefs about war as an organizing principle—a filter—that conditions opinions on specific security policy choices, such as defense spending. This focus emerged as an important theme in the scholarly literature as early as the 1960s, but much scholarly discussion of national security continues to focus on the nuts and bolts of specific issues. As we noted earlier, these factual details of defense choices are something that most citizens are unlikely to understand thoroughly. Rather, it is their fundamental attitude toward war and military force that guides citizens as they arrive at opinions on specific issues.

The second finding of broad importance is the consistent, significant impact of gender on attitudes toward war, and as a consequence, opinions of defense spending and presumably other issues. Of course, scholars of international relations have studied the impact of gender since at least the 1980s, especially as concerns gendered perspectives on war and military force (Goldstein 2003; Eichenberg 2003; Reiter 2014), but this focus is far less evident in empirical research on national security. Moreover, as concerns gender effects in public opinion, almost all of the research is confined to the United States, which is unique in its global role and may be uniquely polarized on gender issues. Certainly, there is little work on gendered aspects of transatlantic relations and security policy. Because gender presumably affects opinions on a number of security issues through its impact on attitudes toward war, there is ample justification for pursuing gender issues in future research, and our findings suggest that these effects are cross-nationally generalizable.
Finally, our results address the important question of how opinion changes. As we noted earlier, the most preeminent theorist of opinion formation is Zaller (1992) who argued that citizens form opinions based on the “considerations” that are most salient in their minds at the moment that survey questions are posed. Applied to our model of defense spending, these perspectives would suggest that opinions of defense spending change as the salience of the considerations that influence those opinions changes. For example, we have seen that support for defense spending is affected by considerations of alliance solidarity, and we would expect this impact to increase in magnitude when the salience of the alliance increases. We might therefore speculate that support for defense spending would increase in the aftermath of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine because this event increased the salience of the NATO Alliance and highlighted the important role of US leadership (both the president and the vice president visited Europe to reinforce these points). Other events at different times might increase the salience of other variables. For example, the murder of the cartoonists in France in early 2015 was followed by saturation news coverage and government action for several weeks. In such circumstances, it seems a certainty that the salience of the threat from terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism will increase, and the impact on support for defense is therefore also likely to increase.\(^{12}\) It is also true that some opinions may change in response to exogenous factors, quite apart from the impact on their salience. Even seemingly unrelated events such as the release of the US Senate’s torture report might have an impact if they affect judgments of US leadership and the desirability of partnership with the United States. In summary, although our model does not directly estimate a dynamic function of support for defense spending, prevailing models of opinion formation and change provide the basis for understanding how opinions might evolve.

**Author’s Note**

A replication file including our data set, Stata commands to replicate the analyses, and supplementary appendices are posted on the journal website together with this article.

**Acknowledgment**

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Notes

1. The online replication package includes appendices to supplement the analysis reported here. Appendix A contains a list of the surveys and the countries and years for which the two dependent variables are available. Appendix B contains a list of Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research study numbers for the surveys.


3. We also tested alternative versions of the model including higher educational attainment while excluding professional occupational status. The version of the model including the occupational status variable was more consistently significant in these preliminary tests.

4. Further details on the threat perception variables are provided in Appendix C in the online replication package.

5. For a more limited number of years (2004–2008), we also estimated the effect of two additional threat questions. The first is the perceived personal or national threat from “international terrorism.” The second is the perceived threat from “Islamic Fundamentalism.” These variables proved significant in some cases, but they do not change the overall pattern of results reported here. The estimates are reported in Appendix D in the online replication package.

6. Individual national models for West and East European states are reported in Appendices F and G in the online replication package. Results for West European states are very consistent in both the signs and significance of the grouped results. East European states differ somewhat, especially in the significance of ideology, but in other regards, they are very similar to the grouped results reported here. A summary characterization is that our substantive interpretation applies to national as well as the grouped models.

7. Results for our analysis of the thermostat effect are included in Appendix J in the online replication package.

8. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for recommending that we explore the index.


10. We did estimate the impact of the perceived threat of terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism for the two years in which it was available (2004 and 2008). The threat of terrorism was significant for most states, but this result does not change the overall pattern of results that we report here for all years. The estimates are reported in Appendix E of the online replication package.

11. Individual national models for West and East European states are reported in Appendices H and I in the online replication package. Results for individual West European states are very consistent in both the signs and significance of the grouped results. Where differences occur, it involves the significance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or US leadership variables, but one of these two is significant in all states but France (as one might expect). Results for East European states vary more than their Western counterparts, with different variables showing significance for each state, and no variables other
than gender showing a significant influence in Poland. However, in the other three Eastern European states—and the influence of gender in Poland—the significant coefficients reinforce the substantive conclusions that we draw here.

12. We conducted a brief exploratory analysis to examine how the relationship between the independent variables and support for defense spending change over time by estimating the model for each year, country, and regional grouping separately. We found that the direction and significance of the variables remained substantially the same as those reported in Table 2, so our substantive conclusions are robust with respect to time. However, the magnitude of the coefficients does vary. An interesting example is the impact of the belief in Western Europe and the United States that “economic power is more important than military power.” The magnitude of this coefficient is smaller in 2004 and 2008, but after the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, it increases considerably (more than doubling in Western Europe), which is what we would expect, given that the economic crisis after 2008 dramatically increased the salience of economic issues. In summary, the changing salience of the variables in the model is an important task for future research.

Supplemental Material

The online [appendices/data supplements/etc] are available at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental.

References


