Dilip Ninan

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Tufts University
Department of Philosophy
Miner Hall, Room 223A
Medford, MA 02155

Office: 617.627.2874
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Associate Professor

Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind

Dilip Ninan received his Ph.D. from MIT, B.Phil. from Oxford University, and B.A. from the University of Western Ontario. Before coming to Tufts, he spent three years as a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of St Andrews in Scotland.

His research interests include the philosophy of language, formal semantics, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. He has worked on the representation of de se and de re attitudes, the nature of personal identity over time, and on foundational questions in semantics.

When not philosophizing, he enjoys reading, running, cooking, and skiing.

Ph.D., MIT
B.Phil., Oxford University
BA, University of Western Ontario


  • "Quantification and Epistemic Modality"
    2018. Philosophical Review, 127(2): 433-485.
  • "Relational Semantics and Domain Semantics for Epistemic Modals"
    2018. Journal of Philosophical Logic 47(1): 1-16.
  • "Aboutness and Justification"
    2017. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95(3): 371-377.
  • "Names in Fiction"
    2017. Theoretical Linguistics 43(1-2): 61-70
  • "Imagination and the Self"
    2016. In A. Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, Routledge.
  • "What is the Problem of De Se Attitudes?"
    2016. In M. Garcia-Carpintero and S. Torre (eds.),
    About Oneself: De Se Attitudes and Communication, Oxford University Press.
  • "On Recanati's Mental Files"
    2015. Inquiry 58(4): 368-377.
  • "Taste Predicates and the Acquaintance Inference"
    2014. Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) 24: 290-309.
  • "Self-Location and Other-Location"
    2013. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87(2):301-331.
  • "Counterfactual Attitudes and Multi-Centered Worlds"
    2012. Semantics and Pragmatics 5(5):1-57.
  • "Propositions, Semantic Values, and Rigidity"
    2012. Philosophical Studies 158(3): 401-413.
  • "Semantics and the Objects of Assertion"
    2010. Linguistics and Philosophy 33(5): 355-380.
  • "De Se Attitudes: Ascription and Communication"
    2010. Philosophy Compass 5(7): 551-567.
  • "Persistence and the First-Person Perspective"
    2009. Philosophical Review 118(4): 425-464.
  • "Two Puzzles About Deontic Necessity"
    2005. MIT Working Papers in Linguistics51: 149-178.