

GENDER DIFFERENCE IN SUPPORT FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IN CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

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April 3, 2017

Paper prepared for delivery to a workshop on “Public Opinion, Foreign Policy and the Use of Force in Turbulent Times,” European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, University of Nottingham, April 25-30, 2017. I am grateful to Benya Kraus for a thorough reading of the manuscript and suggestions for improvement, and to Richard Stoll and Pierangelo Isernia for frequent consultations and advice on the topics addressed in the paper.

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Introduction

Evidence from studies of US public opinion shows that significant gender difference on the question of using military force has been present since at least World War II and characterizes all but one military intervention contemplated or carried out by the US since 1982 (Eichenberg 2016a; Brooks and Valentino 2011; Berinsky 2009; Burriss 2008; Elder and Greene 2007; Conover and Sapiro 1993). In addition, gender difference in citizen attitudes toward the use of military force by the United States is strongly conditioned by the type of military action that is proposed or undertaken; the purpose for which force is used; by humanitarian considerations; and by the prospect of casualties (Eichenberg 2016a). Just as gender has emerged as a crucial factor in US voting behavior, these studies demonstrate that it is an important aspect of domestic polarization in the US on issues of national security.

How generalizable are these patterns to politics in other countries? In a previous paper, I showed that American opinion on some national security issues is more polarized by gender than in other countries (Eichenberg 2016b). This may be due to the salience of gendered debates in American domestic politics generally, or it may be due to the US role as a dominant global power that has threatened or used military force many times over the past several decades. Perhaps gender is less important in other countries, where gender politics is less divisive domestically or where a larger societal consensus underpins policies concerning the use of military force.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an international comparison of the magnitude of gender difference toward the use of military force. I analyze gender difference in as many as 60 countries. In the following section, I review the sparse scholarly literature that compares gender divisions concerning the use of military force in countries other than the US, emphasizing the variety of findings that emerge. During some conflicts or in some countries, gender difference is present, but in other conflicts or countries, it is small or nonexistent. Following this review, I present three sets of analysis. First, using the Transatlantic Trends survey series, I explore gender difference in a series of hypothetical survey questions that resemble the Principal Policy Objective framework that I analyzed using data for the US (Eichenberg 2016a; Jentleson 1992). In a subsequent section, I explore the magnitude of gender difference in four recent situations in which military force was contemplated or actually employed: deployment of troops to Afghanistan; the use of drones in the “war against terror”; possible intervention in the Syrian civil war; and support for military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the final section of the paper, I present an analysis of gender difference in 1098 public opinion questions from 62 countries during 10 historical episodes, beginning with the Gulf crisis and war in 1990-1991 and ending with reactions to Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014-2015. The analysis explores the impact of principal policy objectives, the specific type of military action that is contemplated or carried out, and multilateral participation in the action. I also present a statistical analysis to evaluate the impact of universal logics and national characteristics that influence gender difference in global opinion.

Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, gender difference is generally low when survey respondents are presented with hypothetical scenarios, which limits the utility of this type of question. Second, in concrete questions about the use of military force, gender

difference is evident in most countries of the world, with women almost always demonstrating lower support. Moreover, in statistical tests at the individual level, gender is a significant influence on support for using force even when controlling for variables such as age, ideology, and general attitudes toward international security. Third, it is nonetheless also true that the magnitude of gender difference shows wide variation. On some issues (such as opinions of drone strikes), gender difference is large in many countries, while on others (aiding opponents of the Syrian government), it is small. Further, since 1990 gender difference has varied a great deal in reaction to the use of force. The wide variation in the magnitude of gender difference casts doubt on essentialist (biological) hypotheses (Eichenberg 2016a; Reiter 2015). Fourth, there is evidence across several samples of data that the level of violence in military conflicts is the factor that most strongly influences gender difference —women are least supportive of the most violent military actions. Fifth, there is some evidence for the argument that women share a more liberal world view: they are more supportive of interventions to protect human rights; they are more supportive of humanitarian military interventions; and they react most positively to military actions undertaken with UN endorsement or participation. Indeed, military action undertaken with UN participation is the only type of intervention supported by a majority of women. Sixth, cross-national variation in the magnitude of gender difference is strongly correlated with the level of economic development and levels of gender equality in society. This suggests that as women enter the labor force and achieve access to higher education, their views on security issues are differentiated from those of men. Alternatively, it may be that the “psychological autonomy” that accompanies higher levels of gender equality facilitates the expression of long-held views. Seventh, the correlation of economic development with gender difference illustrates a more general point: national characteristics and the local context of security issues mediate

gender difference. Finally, the findings in this paper make clear that gender difference can be a significant factor in the domestic politics of security. In many countries, majorities of women oppose the use of force, while a majority of men favor it. Whether these gender divisions affect government decisions will depend on the institutional characteristics of individual states.

Comparative Scholarship on Gender Difference and Military Force

One of the earliest studies of gender difference is also one of the most theoretically interesting. Togeby (1994) found substantial gender difference in Danish public opinion on issues such as NATO membership, defense spending, and involvement in the peace movement. She also reviewed studies that found similar gender differences in Sweden, Norway, and New Zealand. Moreover, she found that the magnitude of difference in Denmark was largest on the left of the political spectrum and among the most highly educated and politically engaged. In short, Togeby's findings largely supported the theory articulated by Inglehart and Norris (2003): gender difference was very large in societies with high levels of female labor force participation, access to education, increasing identification with parties of the left, and high levels of support for gender equality. The implication of these findings is that gender difference is not categorical. Rather, the magnitude of gender difference varies as a result of the economic and political mobilization of women.

Lisa Brandes compared gender difference across a range of security issues in the United Kingdom and the US during the Cold War and found substantial differences in the UK on such issues as nuclear weapons, arms control, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam (1994). Much later, Clements (2013) found that gender was the single largest source of variation in British attitudes towards participation in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and NATO's military intervention in

Libya: “The consistently largest differentials across social group categories are between men and women. Overall, across partisan affiliations, men were more likely than women to support military action in Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan, with sizable gaps in approval levels within each partisan category” (2013, 126-127). Another study of British opinion toward participation in the military actions in Afghanistan and Libya found that gender, while significant, was subordinate to more fundamental attitudes concerning the morality, costs, and benefits of the wars (Reifler et. al. 2014). However, Stoll and I have shown that these basic attitudes toward war are themselves strongly correlated with gender, so it is likely that gender had an indirect impact on opinions of the wars in Afghanistan and Libya as well (Eichenberg and Stoll 2017; see also Eichenberg 2016b). Finally, two studies of Canadian opinions toward participation in the war in Afghanistan found a strong gender divide (Boucher 2010; Fitzsimmons et. al. 2014).

However, when scholars focus on societies other than the developed countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the US, evidence of gender difference is more sparse. For example, Wilcox, Hewitt and Alsop studied samples of urban residents in eleven countries and found significant gender differences in Gulf War attitudes only in more economically developed societies (and Mexico City). In Lagos and Ankara, there was no significant gender difference (1996, 75). Tessler and several colleagues studied gender difference in approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict in Israel, Egypt, Palestine, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon. Specifically, Tessler and his colleagues asked respondents in all of these countries if the conflict should be resolved peacefully or if a “military solution” would be necessary. There were no significant gender difference in responses to these questions, that is, women were no more likely to choose peaceful responses than men (Tessler and Warriner 1997; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Grant 1999). Essentially the same result was found in Siegel’s comparison of Israeli and Palestinian attitudes

and in Arian's comprehensive study of Israeli opinion on a host of security issues (Siegel 2012; Arian 1996).

It is important to note that some of these studies control for the possibility that religiosity is masking the presence of gender difference. Specifically, Tessler, Nachtwey and Grant compared the magnitude of gender difference in the countries listed above and found no gender difference among respondents of higher and lower religiosity, a finding that holds both for Israel and Arab countries (1999, 528). Thus, the findings cast doubt on the argument of some scholars that the traditional patriarchy of highly religious societies suppresses the expression of distinctive women's views (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Rather, Tessler, Nachtwey and Grant argue that the importance of gender is likely overridden by the immediacy and saliency of the Arab-Israeli conflict: "...men and women will not hold different attitudes toward international conflict when this concerns a conflict that is concrete, intense, long-standing, familiar, and perhaps to some extent existential, and for these reasons highly salient" (199, 530). Siegel (2011) draws a similar conclusion in her study of Israeli and Palestinian citizens.

In summary, cross-national studies of gender difference on security issues are few, but those that do exist point to the importance of economic development, the political mobilization of women, and strategic context. However, the evidence is sparse and limited to relatively few countries and issues. In the following sections, I analyze gender difference using survey data on a larger set of issues and a larger sample of countries.

Gender Difference in Hypothetical Scenarios

I begin with two sets of questions that were included in the Transatlantic Trends surveys in 2004 and 2007. In both cases, the questions began by asking “To what extent would you approve or disapprove of the deployment of [country’s] troops for the following operations?” As Table 1 shows, the hypothetical purposes that were queried resemble the Principal Policy Objectives (PPO) that I described in my early research on the US: foreign policy restraint (defend a NATO ally, prevent a terrorist attack); humanitarian intervention (provide food and medical supplies, humanitarian assistance, human rights); internal political conflict (combat Taliban); and peacekeeping (Balkans, Lebanon). One surprising feature of the data is that support for most of these military operations among both men and women is quite high—an overall average of 75 percent for men and 73 percent for women. This compares to 54 percent among men and 44 percent among women in the US.¹ Second, the gender differences in Table 1 are very small—1 percentage point on average for 2004 and 5 percentage points for 2007. This compares to the average gender difference of 10 percentage points in data for the US. Both the high levels of support and the small size of the gender difference suggest that the hypothetical nature of the questions is inflating levels of support and perhaps also suppressing gender difference. Although the question does mention the words “deployment of troops,” the first set of questions for 2004 does not mention a specific conflict—the questions are purely hypothetical—and the set of questions for 2007 includes four situations that would not involve combat at all. Tellingly, the two questions that most specifically evoke actual combat (defending a NATO ally in 2004 and combat against the Taliban in 2007) also show the highest gender difference. It remains to be seen whether gender difference is higher when specific military actions in actual conflicts are queried.

¹ Figures for the US in this paragraph are taken from Eichenberg (2016a).

Nonetheless, a comparison of national gender difference for different types of military missions is instructive. Table 2 displays the gender difference for each country on two of the questions from Table 1: the deployment of troops “to conduct combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan” and “to remove a government that abuses human rights.” Two features of the data in Table 2 stand out. First, the question on combat operations in Afghanistan divides the genders significantly in many countries, and in all countries women are less supportive of deploying troops. In the Netherlands and the UK, two countries that made significant troop deployments to Afghanistan, a majority of men favor combat operations, but a majority of women oppose them. Second, women are actually more supportive of deploying troops to remove abusive governments in all but Italy, and in a few countries they are substantially more supportive. In fact, the spread between the negative gender difference on the combat question and the positive difference on the question concerning human rights is over twenty percentage points in the countries at the top of Table 2, and it is very large in others. These data on hypothetical reasons for using military forces confirm the pattern that characterizes US opinion: women are more critical of using military force for combat missions, but they are even more supportive than men of using military force for humanitarian reasons, in this case alleviating human rights abuses (Eichenberg 2016a).

Summary: Hypothetical Scenarios

Gender differences in hypothetical scenarios are small. However, when actual combat is the focus of the question, gender difference increases, with women less supportive. In contrast, women are more supportive of using force to further human rights.

Gender Difference in Four Historical Episodes

Although the data presented in the previous section suggests that gender difference is large in many countries for some types of military action, the analysis is limited because the questions are largely hypothetical. As Conover and Sapiro noted in their study of US opinion during the first Gulf War, “[w]hen we moved from the abstract to the concrete —from hypothetical wars to the Gulf War— the distance separating men and women grew, and on every measure, women reacted more negatively” (1993, 1095).

In this section, I compare gender difference across a number of countries in four concrete historical cases: NATO’s deployment of troops to Afghanistan; the use of drone strikes by the US in the “war against terror”; possible intervention in the Syrian civil war; and possible military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. For several reasons, these examples are particularly interesting and useful. They all represent contentious choices that were highly debated in many countries, and not surprisingly, consensus on each of them was elusive. In addition, the survey items on drone strikes and intervention in Syria were administered in a large number of countries and thus offer the opportunity to broaden the analysis beyond the US and European surveys on which most previous research is based.

Troops in Afghanistan

In August of 2003, the NATO Alliance took the lead of the United Nations International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). The force eventually grew to include more than 130,000 troops from fifty-one countries.¹ ISAF forces engaged in increasingly intense combat against the Taliban insurgency, especially between 2005 and 2012, when yearly casualties

¹ Information on the ISAF mission are taken from NATO’s ISAF webpage: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm. Accessed March 17, 2017.

among ISAF forces numbered as high as 700 (in 2010).² Casualties were suffered by the military forces of thirty countries. The combat role of NATO forces ended in December 2014, after which they undertook the mission of training Afghan security forces in operation “Resolute Resolve” beginning in January 2015. Table 3 shows that the initial deployment of troops to Afghanistan enjoyed majority support in all but Eastern Europe, but the table also shows that there was a large gender difference from the very beginning. For example, the first question in Table 3 (question a.) asked simply if respondents approved of the presence of their country’s troops in Afghanistan. In the US, large majorities of both men and women approved, but women less so than men. In some countries in Western Europe not shown individually, a majority of men approved while a majority of women disapproved (Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK). The same was true of Turkey. In summary, the deployment of troops enjoyed overall majority support in most countries, but it was a perilous majority due in part to a large gender divide.

The second question in Table 3 (question b.) shows that support for the deployments had dropped by 2009 in all countries. In the US, 66 percent of men supported maintaining or increasing troops, compared to a bare majority of women (50 percent). In Western Europe, 50 percent of men supported maintaining or increasing troops, compared to 39 percent of women. In some countries not shown separately, a majority of the total population supported the presence of troops in 2009, but the level of support was precarious, and gender polarization was one reason. In France, Spain, and Portugal, a majority of men supported troops in Afghanistan, while a majority of women disapproved. In both 2004 and 2009, then, there were opposing majorities of men and women in support for the Afghan deployment, and by 2009 the gender difference in the US had produced a narrow majority that was closely divided by gender.

²Casualty figures are taken from <http://icasualties.org/oef/ByYear.aspx>. Accessed March 17, 2017.

Over the ensuing three years, the general public's support dropped noticeably in all countries but Turkey, where it actually increased, but a gender difference remained. Interestingly, in the US and Western Europe, the gender difference on the question of maintaining or increasing troops actually declined over this period because the support of men fell more than that of women. For example, in the US, support fell by 30 percentage points among men and 26 points among women between 2009 and 2012. The pattern is therefore similar to the one that I described for the US: the gender difference in support for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan actually declined as the fighting intensified (Eichenberg 2016a). This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that women are more risk averse than men before or at the beginning of a conflict, but men adjust their support downward as casualties mount (there were over three thousand ISAF casualties in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2012).

Finally, it is worth noting that support for the training mission in 2014 (question c.) began with a more precarious level of support than the initial deployment in 2004, and gender division is one reason. In the US and Western Europe, strong majorities of men favored the mission, but women were less supportive, and in Eastern Europe and Turkey, pluralities of men and women had opposing views. There are also several countries in which majorities of women opposed the mission while a majority of men supported it (Italy, Spain), and support in the US is also divided by gender.

In summary, gender differences on several aspects of the troop deployment to Afghanistan are large and potentially significant politically. The regression analysis in Table 4 demonstrates that gender is also statistically significant at the individual level even when controlling for a number of other variables that past research has shown to be strong correlates of support for military interventions: left-right ideology, the belief that war is sometimes necessary

and that economic power is more important than military power, and several measures of solidarity with the US ally (support for NATO, US global leadership, and partnership with the US). The table shows that most of these variables are strong correlates of support for maintaining troops in Afghanistan in all but Turkey, and even in the latter, ideology and support for NATO have a strong influence. What is notable about the regression results is that gender remains a significant influence in all but Turkey even in the presence of these controls. When countries are analyzed individually (not shown), gender is highly significant in the US and every country of Western Europe save for Sweden. In Eastern European countries and Turkey, gender is insignificant. At least in the US and the countries of Western Europe, therefore, gender polarization was an important reason for the precarious consensus surrounding the deployment of military forces in Afghanistan. Put differently, to the extent that politicians in participating countries sensed a weak political consensus for continuing the deployment, gender polarization was an important underlying reason.

There's Something about Drones

In October, 2001, the United States for the first time employed an armed, unmanned aerial vehicle—a drone—to attack Taliban military targets in Afghanistan. Thereafter, drones became an important part of the US effort to locate and target individuals suspected of planning or actually carrying out attacks against the US or allied forces in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Most drone attacks were against Taliban or Al Qaeda targets in the tribal areas of Western Pakistan, but attacks occurred in Yemen and Somalia as well.³ Estimates of casualties vary widely and evoke some controversy (Williams 2010). According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism,

³ Information on the history of drone warfare is taken from the excellent summary and analysis by Williams (2010).

the US conducted 419 drone strikes between 2004 and June 2015 in Pakistan alone, and the Bureau estimates that between 2,467 and 3,976 people were killed, including civilians. Attacks in Yemen and Somalia also resulted in significant casualties (Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2017).

The drone strikes are controversial on moral, legal, strategic, and political grounds (Boyle 2013; Kreps 2014; Kreps and Wallace 2015). One dispassionate assessment concludes that the strikes have been militarily effective but have come at a high political cost, especially in terms of anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and elsewhere (Williams 2010; Drake 2013; Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2014). One thing is clear: drone strikes produce the largest gender divide in any existing survey question on national security issues. Figure 1 shows the gender difference in response to a question from the Pew Global Attitudes Survey that asked: “Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia?” Although there are some countries in which gender difference is negligible, there are twenty countries in which it is over 8 percentage points and fifteen countries in which it is over 15 percentage points. This gender difference in opinion toward US drone strikes is larger than any presented in previous studies.

These differences raise two questions. First, why are gender differences concerning drone strikes so large? Second, why are the differences large in some countries and small to nonexistent in others? As to the first question, the scholarship surrounding the controversy that has accompanied the increasing use of drones emphasizes their dehumanizing qualities and the technological alienation that is associated with attacks by what are essentially robots, with human pilots sitting thousands of miles away, detached from the human consequences of the strikes. In this view, drones are particularly distasteful to many citizens because they represent

an evolution in which those who employ military force are separated from the human consequences of their actions. However plausible as an explanation for the unpopularity of drones, this view fails to explain why women in particular should be most affected. It may be that their sensitivity to violence leads women to be particularly critical of any attempt to make the employment of force seem more “antiseptic” and detached from its human consequences.

Second, women are more likely than men to perceive vulnerability to violence and to view the employment of violence as risky, and the type of sudden, surprise violence that accompanies drone attacks may evoke particular fears in this regard (Hollander 2001; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2009). In addition, news reports of drone attacks almost always include reports—or accusations—of civilian casualties among women and children. Survey evidence from the US shows that this consideration is the single most important reason that women offer as an explanation for their opposition to drones. For example, in the Pew Research Center’s 2015 survey in the US, 54 percent of women expressed concern that the strikes “endanger civilian lives,” compared to 41 percent of men (Pew Center for the People and the Press 2015).

Table 5 provides more detail that helps to answer the second question: why is gender difference high in some countries and lower in others? At first glance, the data appear to match a pattern that characterizes attitudes toward war in some studies: gender difference is lower in countries that are less developed economically and characterized by lower levels of education, labor force participation, and political empowerment of women (Eichenberg 2016b). However, Table 5 also shows that gender difference is low in less developed countries because there is essentially unanimous rejection of drones among both men and women. Equally significant, none of these countries is an ally of the US. Higher levels of support for drones among men or women (40 percent or higher) does indeed occur in countries that are more economically

advanced, but most of these countries are also formal allies of the US, and many of these allies had troops stationed in Afghanistan. In other words, overall support levels for drone strikes is highest among US allies, but these allies are also the most severely divided by gender. Support levels are lower in countries that are not allied to the US, and many of these countries are less developed economically. Thus, gender difference in approval of drone strikes is associated with both strategic context (which lowers gender difference) and level of economic development (which increases gender difference).

Providing Arms and Military Supplies to Anti-Government Groups in Syria

Syrian society has been torn by civil war since 2011, when the government of President Assad began a violent crackdown against anti-regime protesters.⁵ Armed opposition to the Assad regime continued through 2016, and by some estimates over 470,000 people had been killed, 4.1 million had left the country, and 6.5 million were internally displaced. In 2013, reports of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government led the US, France, and the UK to consider air strikes, but these were set aside as opposition developed in the British parliament, and President Obama declined to proceed with the strikes. In 2014, substantial territorial gains by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in both Syria and Iraq led the US and other coalition members to begin air strikes against ISIS forces in both countries.⁶ In 2015, following the terrorist attacks in Paris, French and British aircraft joined in the air strikes, with other allies of France providing surveillance and logistical support. In summary, the Syrian civil war between 2011 and 2015 evolved into one of the bloodiest conflicts of the century, with periodic calls for

⁵The following summary of the Syrian civil war is taken from the *BBC*: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868>. See also Carpenter (2013) for an excellent analysis of the war.

⁶ Sometimes referred to as ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant).

both Western and Middle Eastern states to intervene more forcefully to alleviate the suffering, topple Assad from power, or contain ISIS.

Public opinion on the question of intervening in the civil war varies with the type of intervention that is proposed. In a previous paper, I presented data showing that Americans strongly supported air strikes against ISIS (70 percent or more) during 2014/2015, but support for sending ground troops was much lower and divided by gender (Eichenberg 2016a). Support for the air strikes against ISIS is high in most other countries as well. For example, in the Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2015, 60 to 70 percent of citizens in most European and Middle Eastern countries supported the US-led strikes against ISIS (as did US allies in Asia), but support was lower in Africa and Latin America (Wike, Stokes, and Poushter 2015). In 2016, similar majorities supported military action against ISIS in ten countries, but there was a significant gender difference: women were less likely to support military action by an average of 13 percentage points. In Japan, the gender difference was 28 percentage points (Wike, Poushter and Zainulbhai 2016).

However, there are fewer polls that query the support of citizens for actually intervening in Syria to support the groups that are fighting the Assad regime. Several polling organizations have asked citizens in Europe, the Middle East, and the US if they would favor some sort of intervention to assist opposition groups fighting the Assad government. For example, in 2012 and 2013, the GMF asked citizens if their country should “intervene” or “stay out completely” in light of the fact that the Assad government was “using military force to suppress an opposition movement which is fighting the Syrian government.” In every sample country, 60 to 70 percent chose “stay out completely,” and gender difference was very small. This result parallels that for the US—both men and women show less support for intervening in civil conflicts, and the

gender division concerning such interventions are smaller than for other military actions (Eichenberg 2016a).

Table 6 displays a question that was posed both in the US and Europe and in some Middle Eastern countries. In Europe, Turkey, and the US, the question asked: “Do you support or oppose (survey country) sending arms and military supplies to anti-government groups in Syria?” [question a. in the table]. In the Middle East, two variants of the question were administered, one inquiring of support for Western countries sending arms and supplies to anti-government groups, and one inquiring of support for Arab countries sending the same arms and supplies [questions b. and c. in the table].

The table shows that support for assisting the Syrian rebels among Western countries is very tepid, so that the large gender differences in Britain, France, Germany, and the US are probably not politically consequential, although they do confirm the pattern that women in most countries are less supportive of military interventions. In the Arab world, there is support only in Jordan [question b] for Western countries sending assistance, and women there are more favorable to assistance than men. Regarding Arab countries themselves sending arms and supplies, support is moderately high in Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian territories, but gender differences vary: they are positive in Jordan, very small and positive in Palestine, and larger and negative in Egypt.

In sum, the responses to this question are most interesting for what they do not show: a consistent gender difference across a diverse sample of societies. Gender difference is higher in the Western societies where women are more economically and politically mobilized, but the pattern is not uniform, as Egyptian women are also more skeptical. Other differences are likely due to contextual factors. For example, Jordan bears a large burden of Syrian refugees, so the

stronger support of Jordanian women for assisting Syrian rebels may be associated with a humanitarian concern for the refugees, an explanation consistent with the greater sensitivity of women to humanitarian concerns. In fact, this may be why women in several Arab countries are more supportive of the Syrian rebels (however slightly). In summary, like the data on drone strikes, gender difference on the question of intervening in Syria suggest that gender difference is higher in more economically developed societies, but the pattern is not uniform, and there are local, contextual factors that might explain why gender difference is lower or reversed in some Arab countries.

Using Military Force to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Concern about the possibility that Iran might acquire a nuclear weapons capability is longstanding. The Iranian nuclear program began in the 1950s with the purchase of a research reactor from the United States.⁷ Although Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, suspicion about a possible attempt to convert civilian nuclear capabilities to military applications emerged even before the Iranian revolution in 1979. After Iran acquired substantial reactor capability from Russia in the 1990s, concerns grew more pointed. In 1996, President Clinton signed the first American sanction legislation aimed at companies with investments in Iran, and the next thirty years saw a series of disagreements between the US and other Western states, the UN, and Iran, especially on the question of secret nuclear installations and Iran's openness to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. During the 2000s, a series of increasingly stringent economic sanctions were instituted against Iran, both by the US and the UN Security Council. Direct negotiations between the so-called "P5+1" powers —the US,

⁷The chronological details in the following paragraph are taken from this *New York Times* timeline:http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html#/time243_10809. Accessed March 17, 2017.

China, France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Russia intensified beginning in 2009 even as sanctions were continued and even tightened. In 2014, negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran yielded an interim agreement to limit Iran's nuclear program (Joint Plan of Action or JPA). In July 2015, agreement was reached on a fifteen year Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA was approved by Iran's parliament later in 2015, the International Atomic Energy Agency certified that Iran had complied with an initial set of requirements, and implementation of the JCPOA took place on January 16, 2016.⁸

Throughout the many years of negotiating what eventually emerged as the JCPOA, politicians and scholars discussed the possibility of a military strike to slow down or destroy Iran's nuclear capability or indeed as a reaction to any Iranian violation of the 2015 agreement. For example, faced with vehement criticism both from domestic critics and from Israel that Iran might violate the interim agreement reached in 2014, President Obama's deputy national security adviser for strategic communication told two Israeli television stations that if Iran were to breach the agreement, the president had all options at his disposal: "If Iran violates, all options are on the table... The president, this president or the next president, will have all options on the table including a military one. If there is a violation, all options will be considered."⁹ During the 2016 presidential campaign, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that she reserved the use of the military option should Iran violate the nuclear agreement (DeBenedetti 2016)

The wisdom and likely effectiveness of a military strike against Iran have been much debated. Whether any US President would choose the military option is obviously uncertain, but one factor that will likely condition the choice is the anticipated reaction of public opinion, both

⁸A comprehensive overview of the provisions of the JCPOA is provided by Katzman and Kerr (2017).

⁹Quoted in *Haaretz*: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.650772>. Accessed March 17, 2017.

in the United States and in allied countries. I showed in earlier research that US public support for military action against Iran has been lukewarm –an average of 45 percent from 2002-2013 (Eichenberg 2016a). This is lower than the 60 percent of the public that supported war with Iraq prior to 2003, and it is likely the frustrations of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars that left Americans less than enthusiastic about further military endeavors. Another reason may be the simple fact that sanctions were being applied, negotiations were underway, and some progress was achieved in the form of an interim agreement in 2014. Public opinion generally favors negotiation and nonmilitary solutions so long as these are realistic alternatives, but pollsters rarely test respondents by asking them what action they would favor should negotiation prove fruitless.

An important exception is a series of questions on the Iran nuclear program in the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Trends surveys. A first question in the battery asks: "As you may know, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons are under way. Which of the following do you think is the best option?" Respondents are then offered alternatives that include "military action," "economic incentives," "economic sanctions," "support to opponents of the government," and "use of computer technology to sabotage nuclear installations." A final response option is to "accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons." The public's preferences in response to this question are clear: an average of only 6 percent of Europeans chose "military action" over the alternatives (in the US it was 17 percent). Gender difference on this question did not exist in Europe, Russia, or Turkey, but in the US women were 7 percent less supportive of "taking military action." Among the nonmilitary options, economic incentives and economic sanctions were far and away the most popular options, with little gender difference. The responses to this question were very stable between 2010 and 2014.

A second, follow-on question was directed to those respondents who chose nonmilitary options in the first question: “And now imagine that all of these non-military options have been tried and the only option left to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is the use of military force. In that case, should the [European Union/United States/Turkey/Russia] take military action against Iran, or should [it/they] simply accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons?” An important feature of the responses to this second question is the unusually high percentage of “don’t know” and refusals to answer the question—an average of 22 percent for all countries and as high as 30 or 40 percent in some countries. Many respondents simply do not want to answer this question or express an opinion, perhaps because it presents a choice that genuinely conflicts many citizens, or because they prefer their own alternative (perhaps a wish that negotiations could somehow continue).

Table 7 displays the combined responses to the questions on “military action” against Iran for the Transatlantic Trends surveys between 2010 and 2014. Support for military action (combining “military action” in the first and second questions) is divided in most countries, although it is higher in some countries than the levels of support for intervention in Syria described in the previous section of this paper. Majorities favoring military action against Iran if negotiations fail exist in only five of the thirteen countries in the survey. Clear rejection of military action characterized opinion in several important P5+1 countries, including Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

Gender differences on this question are small, with the exception of the US, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. However, the most notable feature of the gender difference is that it is small or even positive in many countries (if the “don’t know” responses are excluded, the gender difference is wholly insignificant in all but Spain, where it is large and positive). In other words, the prospect

of taking military action against Iran during this period yields a gender difference that is very small in comparison to other questions about the use of force.

Why this should be the case is an interesting question. One possibility is that it is the forced, “closed” nature of the follow-on question, which stipulates that nonmilitary options have been tried without success. Since women may prefer nonmilitary options, the forced nature of the question obviously constrains their preferred response. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that far more women choose the “don’t know” or “refused” responses to this question. That is, they seem to reject the premise of the question more than men, perhaps preferring the alternative of continuing to negotiate rather than accepting that negotiation “has been tried....” If that is the case, gender polarization on this question is actually higher than the figures in the table would suggest, because the percentage of women who disapprove of military action or choose “don’t know/refused” is higher than for men in all but France, Spain, Portugal, and the US.

A second possibility is that the relatively small gender difference reflects the objective for which force would be used: preventing the possible spread of nuclear weapons capability. A substantial amount of research has shown that women are far more favorable to the regulation of nuclear energy than men and also more favorable to safety and environmental regulation more generally (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986; Davidson and Freudenberg 1996)

A final possible explanation for the relatively small gender difference on the Iran nuclear issue is that the questions refer to “military action” by the “European Union” –only in Turkey, Russia and the US are national military forces referenced, and the specific type of military action is left undefined. As I’ve noted in earlier work, support for using force is usually higher when the question refers to an undefined “military action” rather than to a specific action, such as sending troops. For example, this is the case in support for military actions in US opinion

(Eichenberg 2016a). A more concrete question was asked in Transatlantic Trends only in the 2012 survey. Respondents who chose “military action” to either preliminary question were asked further if they would support using their own country’s military forces a.] to conduct air strikes against Iran or b.] to send ground troops. The results are shown in Table 8. The table shows clearly that support for using national forces to conduct air strikes or send ground troops is unpopular with both genders in most countries: air strikes enjoy narrow majority support among men only in France and the US. However, women in these two countries are far less supportive of air strikes, so that overall opinion in the two countries is deeply divided (the dissent among women means that overall French support is less than a majority, and the overall majority in the US is narrowed by female dissent). Significant gender differences exist in other countries as well, especially in Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, and Sweden. Clearly, when the issue turns from the abstract question of “military action” by the “European Union” to the issue of using one’s own country’s military forces, gender polarization takes the place of what were formerly muted differences. The same is true of using ground forces (question b. In Table 8), although the political significance of gender difference on this question is lessened by the fact that neither men nor women in any country is supportive of sending ground forces to attack Iran.

In summary, the magnitude of gender difference on using military force against Iran reveals several interesting patterns. First, when the question format forecloses the possibility of a nonmilitary outcome, gender difference is very small compared to other questions that do not foreclose this possibility. Second, a general invocation of “military action” results in a smaller gender difference, but when the question mentions specific military actions to be carried out by national air and ground forces, support drops, and gender difference is quite large in many countries. Indeed, in the two countries that displayed the strongest support for air strikes against

Iran —France and the US— majorities of women and men find themselves on opposite sides of the issue.

Summary: Gender Difference in Four Historical Episodes

When analysis is focused on specific cases in which military force has been used or threatened, gender difference is larger—in some cases substantially larger and politically significant. In fact, in questions concerning deployment and maintenance of troops in Afghanistan, use of drone strikes, and potential use of force against Iran, gender difference is substantial and significant, and in many countries, a precarious majority (or plurality) in favor of military action is complicated by substantial gender polarization. In many countries, men favor military action, while women oppose it. The same is true of gender difference in support for military action against ISIS. Finally, in surveys concerning the provision of military assistance to regime opponents in Syria, there is evidence that local circumstance and context affects the size of gender difference. In some countries (Jordan) women are more supportive of assisting Syrian rebels, while in others (Egypt) women are less supportive than men. The findings in this section therefore suggest that national context mediates the extent of gender difference.

Global Variation in Gender Difference: Universal Logics and National Characteristics

Introduction

I noted earlier that it is difficult to generalize about gender difference on security issues because there is little cross-national research on the question. In this section, I close this gap by examining variation in gender difference in support for using military force in ten historical episodes using surveys from more than sixty countries. Specifically, using public opinion data

from ten historical episodes involving the threatened or actual use of force from 1990 through 2015, I analyze the extent to which variation in gender difference in support for using force can be traced to two sets of variables: universal logics and the national characteristics of states. By universal logics, I mean a set of considerations that should have an impact on opinion in all societies, regardless of historical experience, geopolitical position, cultural tradition, or level of economic development. Among these are the specific type of military action that is contemplated or carried out, the principle policy objective of the action, and the presence or absence of multilateral participation in the action. By national characteristics, I mean those variables that measure each state's economic development and geopolitical position, including its alliance commitments.

I organize the analysis as follows. In the next section, I provide a description of the global public opinion data that I employ. In a subsequent section, I provide an initial overview of gender difference in the ten historical episodes. Following this overview, I examine the effect of three sets of variables that I describe as universal logics: the type of military action contemplated or carried out, the principal policy objective, and the international legitimacy of the action as measured by the presence or absence of multilateral participation in the action. Having analyzed the effect of these factors individually, I specify a regression model to assess the relative importance of universal logics and national characteristics. I also compare the results for global public opinion to the results of an analysis of similar US opinions. The section concludes with an evaluation of the robustness of the results and a discussion of the implications of the results for future situations in which the use of military force may be contemplated or indeed carried out.

The Data Collection

I intend to evaluate hypotheses about gender difference in support for using military force in many countries, something that has not been done in the existing literature. The analysis requires responses to a large number of survey questions from a large number of countries. Moreover, as revealed in my analysis of US public opinion, the survey questions must contain variation in the question wording employed. For example, to study the importance of international legitimacy on gender difference, it is necessary to compare questions that mention a United Nations mandate for military action to those that do not, and it is also useful to compare questions that mention a multilateral military intervention to questions that mention the use of US forces or the military forces of a particular country alone. The remainder of this section provides an overview of the procedures that I employed to collect the survey data. Like the collection of questions on US public opinion that I have described elsewhere (Eichenberg 2016a), the overriding principal is to code specific features of survey questions based on the exact wording of the question itself. The subsequent statistical analysis relies on these variations in question wording to test hypotheses about variation in support for the use of military force.

Sources of Cross-National Data on Public Opinion and the Use of Military Force

Public opinion data from countries outside of North America and Western Europe have become much more accessible in recent years than was previously the case. There are six principal sources. The first are compilations by scholars who study public opinion on national security issues. These compilations are based on press reports and the websites and publications of polling firms in many countries. Second, the Office of Research in the US Department of State (ORDOS) has for many years conducted public opinion surveys on foreign policy and national security issues throughout the world. The coverage of these surveys is concentrated in Western

Europe, but there are also surveys from the Middle East, Turkey, India, Australia, Japan, and other countries. Some of these surveys are reported in government memorandums that, while not classified, are also not widely circulated, but some ORDOS surveys are available from public opinion archives. A third source is the Eurobarometer survey, conducted bi-annually by the Commission of the European Union, a poll that occasionally includes questions about intervention in international conflicts. A fourth source of global public opinion is the growing number of international polls conducted on behalf of news organizations, such as the Economist, the Guardian, or the BBC. Fifth, a number of public affairs organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the Pew Center for the People and the Press, now commission international polls on a regular basis. Finally, commercial polling organizations in many countries occasionally ask questions about military intervention, and some organizations conduct regular international surveys.

I examined more than ninety individual sources in search of the opinion data for this paper. The resulting data collection contains 1098 survey questions from as many as 61 countries covering the period from August 1990 through May 2015 (a list of the countries is contained in the Appendix).¹⁰ The ideal circumstance for testing cross-national hypotheses about gender difference on the use of force would be to identify survey questions on every actual or threatened use of the military on the part of all countries in the world. For example, one would like to study not just global opinions on the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Syria, but also to study Indian opinion concerning a possible military conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir,

¹⁰ This is the number of questions for which gender breakdowns were readily available in published sources or datasets available to scholars. The data collection contains 2208 questions that measure overall population support for using military force.

Japanese opinion concerning the response to a potential threat from North Korea or China, or African opinion on the deployment of peacekeepers in the Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Unfortunately, although there are scattered data from several countries on specific historical incidents involving the use of force (the British in the Falklands or scattered Canadian or Dutch surveys on UN peacekeeping missions over the years), there is to my knowledge no source that would allow a systematic comparison of many questions for many countries on specific regional or bilateral conflicts.

One reason is that public opinion polling in many poorer countries is a relatively recent phenomenon. A second reason is access. I suspect that there may indeed be surveys of public opinion in many countries on the prospect of using national military forces in specific conflicts, but many of them are conducted by government agencies and are rarely available publicly. Even those that might be publicly known (conducted perhaps for a major newspaper) are very difficult to find if they were published before the advent of modern information retrieval systems, and newspapers have the frustrating habit of publishing only partial question wording and percentages. Moreover, even if one had the necessary money and linguistic skills to retrieve them all, I suspect the sample would still not yield a sufficiently large number of comparable questions to allow the sort of testing of hypotheses that I propose here.

As a result, I focus the analysis on public opinion surveys during ten historical episodes in which military force was contemplated, threatened or employed and in which many states actually participated in the military actions or provided political or military support for those actions. The ten episodes are listed in Table 9. Note that these are episodes in which the global community formally or informally deliberated on proposed actions in the United Nations or the European Union. In effect, the global community was involved in debating and deciding whether

to sanction the use of force or to otherwise sanction particular actors. In four cases, the UN Security Council explicitly authorized the use of military force (Gulf War 1991, confrontation with Iraq throughout the 1990s, Bosnia, and Libya). In the aftermath of the 2001 attacks on the US, the UN also affirmed the US right to self-defense, although it did not specifically authorize the use of force. In Afghanistan, the presence of NATO forces (International Security Assistance Force) occurred under a UN mandate.

In other cases, the UN did not authorize the use of force. However, beginning in 2005, the UN did authorize sanctions against Iran for noncompliance with nuclear inspections and against several groups fighting the Assad regime in Syria. Proposals to sanction the Assad regime itself failed due to Russian opposition. Proposals for the UN to affirm the territorial integrity of Ukraine also failed due to Russian opposition, but the US and the European Union did institute progressively more severe sanctions against Russia during 2014-2016.

In summary, the information in Table 9 reveals something that is important to the interpretation of the analysis to follow: the available survey information provides a solid basis for analyzing gender difference in reaction to what might be called “internationalized conflicts” (those debated by the global community or important regional institutions), but it does not contain information on public opinion toward the use of national forces in specific bilateral or regional conflicts outside of the Middle East and Europe. What is more, although the use of military force in many of these episodes was sanctioned by the United Nations, in the end a substantial share of the military forces deployed in the conflicts was provided by the more powerful, Western nations of North America and Western Europe. It also seems plausible that the US was perceived as the major military actor in virtually all of these conflicts. There is a

risk, therefore, that the data actually measure support for the use of force by the rich and the powerful rather than support for using force more generally.

Nonetheless, the risk concerns only the proper bounds of generalization. The survey data concern opinions towards the use of force in these ten conflicts (and perhaps in those similar to them), but there is no question of generalizing the findings for these conflicts to other conflicts in entirely different contexts (such as the regional or bilateral conflicts mentioned above). In addition, as I describe immediately below, the collection of surveys does allow analysis of variations in gender difference according to whose military forces are referenced in the question, and the data collection further allows an examination of the presence or absence of multilateral participation in each military action. Thus, although gender difference might be different if the survey questions concerned, say, defending India from a Pakistani threat or defending Taiwan from threat or attack, there remains sufficient variation in the available data to allow inferences on the sensitivity of women relative to men to a number of important considerations concerning the use of military force. Finally, it is worth noting that the future is likely to bring additional occasions when the question of threatening or using military force with or without the endorsement of the international community will be debated both in domestic political settings and in international institutions. Under what conditions the world's citizens support such actions is therefore an important question, and it will be useful to know how the gradual political mobilization of the world's women will affect the level of consensus surrounding these actions

Defining Citizen “Support for the Use of Military Force”

In my earlier work, I defined public support for using force in the US as support for the “potential or actual use of military force [past, present, or future]... [including] only those questions that actively (if sometimes hypothetically) query approval or disapproval of an action

involving military force as a means of policy.” I required that questions actively inquire if respondents “favor” (or “approve” or “agree” to) a specific action involving the military means of policy. This definition provided a specific operational guide for collecting the survey questions that I published in previous work (Eichenberg 2016a). As I searched through survey materials from other countries, however, I became aware of additional question formats that are used by pollsters around the world to gauge citizen support for military actions. To be sure, there are a great many survey items that meet the operational definition above: respondents are simply asked if they favor or oppose a military action or if they agree or disagree with the action. More than 80 percent of the survey items analyzed in this section employ this format. Nonetheless, an even larger and cross-nationally richer data collection can be attained by expanding the definition somewhat to include other question formats that elicit a positive or negative evaluation of the use of force. For example, there are questions that ask if the use of force is “justified” or if it is the “right” or “appropriate” thing to do. Since the response percentages to these types of question differ little on average from the standard “approve/disapprove” type of question, I include these items in the data collection to increase both cross-national variation and the statistical power of the analysis.

In summary, “support for using military force” in this section is defined as any survey item that seeks a positive or negative opinion on “the potential or actual use of military force [past, present, or future]... including questions that actively query approval or disapproval of an action involving military force as a means of policy and also including questions that ask if the action is justified, appropriate, or the right thing to do.”

Putting Question Wording to Work

Variation in the wording of public opinion survey questions can be frustrating for scholars who seek to ascertain comparable levels of support for particular policies or actions, but that same variation can be employed to test important hypotheses concerning support for using military force. Consider the following survey questions that were posed by polling organizations in one or more countries during each of the following historical conflicts:

- Gulf War, January 1991: “Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to use military force against Iraq? ...Do you approve or disapprove of the role that [survey country’s] forces have taken in the Gulf?” (Office of Research, US Department of State)
- Bosnia, October 1993: “Do you support or oppose the participation of your country’s military units with the military forces of the UN command in order to impose UN sanctions in the former Yugoslavia?” (Office of Research, US Department of State)
- Kosovo, April 1999: “As you may know, NATO has recently taken military action in Kosovo. Do you support or oppose NATO’s decision to carry out air and missile strikes against Serbian military installations?” (Angus Reid/ the Economist)
- War against terror (Afghanistan), December 2001: “Do you personally agree or disagree with the United States military action in Afghanistan?” (Gallup International)
- War against Iraq, June 2004: “Would you approve or disapprove of sending/keeping [survey country’s] troops to Iraq if the United Nations approves a multinational force to

assist with security and reconstruction?” (German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends 2004)

- NATO military action in Libya, May 2011: “Do you support or oppose an extension of NATO’s military intervention in Libya to include the following? The deployment of ground troops from [survey country].” (Louis Harris Poll Global Omnibus)
- Intervening in Syria, June 2013: “Recently, there has been discussion of the desirability of intervening in Syria, where the government has been using military force to suppress an opposition movement which is fighting the Syrian government. In this situation, what do you think [survey country] should do? [survey country] should stay out completely...[survey country] should intervene. (German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends 2013).

These and other survey questions provide the basis for evaluating the impact of different “considerations” that may influence citizen attitudes toward using military force (Zaller 1992). Some questions mention general “military actions,” while others refer specifically to air strikes. Other questions refer to “sending troops” or “ground troops”. The principal military actor (NATO, UN, the US, a specific survey country) is mentioned in some questions, while in others it is not. The questions also offer variety in terms of the degree of international legitimacy of the action by mentioning the UN or “UN forces” in some questions but not in others. These variations in question wording provide the empirical leverage for testing the hypotheses below.

The exact procedures for classifying these and other specific considerations relevant to each hypothesis are described below. The overriding principal is that the hypothesis to be tested (principal policy objectives, international legitimacy, specific types of military action) is classified from the wording of the question itself. I make no judgments about the purpose, risk, or legitimacy of the military actions mentioned in the survey items, despite the arguments of governments, political leaders, or scholars that often surround them. For example, if a question specifically inquires of support for taking the side of one party to an internal conflict (for example, explicitly on behalf of Kosovar Albanians or opponents of the Syrian president), I classify the policy objective as “internal political conflict,” even though the U.S. government, NATO, or other observers might argue that the intervention was really humanitarian in motivation. As we will see, even precise rules such as these leave some ambiguity concerning some questions, but I respect the rule to the maximum extent possible. Furthermore, this principle for classification based on question wording is firmly grounded in what we know about how individuals respond to survey questions. Individuals often resolve ambivalent attitudes about a difficult policy choice by employing the “considerations” that are most salient to them at the moment, and the wording of the survey question is among the most immediate considerations at hand (Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992).

Overview: Gender Difference in Ten Historical Episodes

Figure 2 displays the average percentage of women and men in all countries who supported the use of military force in the ten historical episodes. Both the levels of support and the magnitude of gender difference vary. The Gulf War of 1990-1991, the interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the War against Terror were more popular among both genders than other episodes, but the magnitude of gender difference varies widely. The largest gender difference occurs during the

confrontation with Iraq during the 1990s, the intervention by NATO in Kosovo in 1999, and NATO's attack against Libya in 2011. The gender difference in these episodes averages 15 percent versus 8 percent overall. What sets these episodes apart is that all consisted of air or missile strikes conducted by US and other NATO forces. No intervention by ground forces occurred. Note that the same is true of the gender difference in the US: one of the larger differences occurred for US air or missile strikes (Eichenberg 2016a). Pending controls for other variables, this suggests that one universal logic of gender difference is an aversion to air strikes that risk inadvertent casualties among civilians. As I noted earlier in this paper, this is a pattern that has been explicitly documented in US opinion of drone strikes.

A second feature of the data in Figure 2 is the substantial variation in the magnitude of gender difference across the historical episodes, ranging from 3-4 percentage points in the case of potential interventions against Syria or Iran to 19 percentage points in reaction to NATO's air campaign in Kosovo. This adds additional evidence that gender difference is not large and unvarying across different contexts, an additional reason to discount essentialist theories that predict invariant gender difference.

Finally, gender difference is clearly a factor of potential political importance in global opinion. Across all ten historical episodes, a narrow majority of exactly 50 percent of men supported the use of force, compared to 43 percent of women. In three episodes, a majority of men supported using force, while a majority of women favored it in only one (the Gulf War of 1990-1991). In two additional episodes, a clear plurality of men favored military force, but among women, this is true of only one episode (Kosovo). Thus, the gender divide on using military force has the potential to exert real political influence, depending on political institutions

in particular states and the influence of other variables. I turn to an analysis of these variables in subsequent sections.

Gender Difference, Universal Logics, and National Characteristics

Research on US opinion reveals a scholarly consensus on several important points and some controversy or uncertainty on others. First, support for military action is conditioned by the level of violence and perceived risk that surrounds the action, especially the risk to human life: women are less supportive of more violent actions (including air strikes) and are more sensitive to the prospect of casualties, especially before a contemplated military action or in the early phase of using force. If this pattern were universal, we would expect to find similar gendered sensitivities in global opinion. Second, the objective for which military force is threatened or employed is among the most important determinants of gender difference. For example, research on US opinion shows that gender difference concerning military action that is designed to deter or undo a clear aggression (foreign policy restraint) is generally high, while humanitarian and peace keeping interventions produce smaller gender difference because women are more supportive of these interventions than for other objectives (Eichenberg 2016a). A third pattern in gender difference is more contested. Some research on US opinion finds that women are more supportive of multilateral interventions, perhaps because they support the “consensus decision making” that accompanies endorsement of military action by international institutions (Brooks and Valentino 2011), a corollary perhaps of a broader liberal world view that sees institutional cooperation as more productive than military competition (Wolford and Johnston 2000). However, I presented conflicting evidence elsewhere. Multilateral interventions are indeed more popular in US opinion, but the effect is the same for men and women, so that the resulting gender difference is quite small (Eichenberg 2016a). Moreover, in both the US and Western Europe,

women are not consistently more supportive of the UN's legitimizing role when it comes to the use of force (Eichenberg 2016b). Nonetheless, there may be reason to expect a larger gender impact in global opinion, as women in other societies may be more likely to endorse the legitimacy and risk-sharing that multilateral endorsement or participation may offer.

In this section, I explore the impact of these considerations on global variation in gender difference in support for using force. I begin with an analysis of the specific type of military action and continue with an analysis of principal policy objectives and multilateral endorsement or participation in military actions.

Gender Difference and Specific Military Actions

Table 10 displays the support of women and men and the resulting gender difference for ten types of military action that have been mentioned in opinion surveys since 1990. Several features of the data are noteworthy. First, some military actions produce quite large gender differences. Air and missile strikes and questions about the presence of troops in conflicts produce a gender difference that is almost twice as large as the overall average of 8 percentage points. The mention of war, increasing troops, and even unspecified actions also produce large differences. This hierarchy of effects is roughly similar to that in US opinion (Eichenberg 2016a). In both global and US opinion, then, most military actions that are likely to produce the highest levels of violence (air strikes, war, increasing troops) also produce the highest gender difference. Conversely, military actions that do not directly evoke violence (selling arms or sending advisors) produce the smallest gender difference. In summary, six types of military action produce a gender difference that is higher than the overall average, and all of them are statistically significant.

Second, these differences portend substantial political significance. In three cases, a majority of men favor the action, but a majority of women either oppose it or have no opinion (presence of troops, maintaining existing deployments of troops, and general military actions). In other cases, opinion is closely divided by gender even though there is not a majority in favor (send or increase troops). Clearly, both in total and with reference to specific military actions that are often contemplated by governments, gender polarization is a politically significant fact with the potential to affect government decisions.

Gender Difference and Principal Policy Objectives

At first glance, the influence of Principal Policy Objectives on gender difference appears less decisive than is the case for US opinion (Table 11). True, as expected, the smallest gender difference is for peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions because women are more supportive of these types of actions than they are for others. This is similar to the pattern in the US. Yet, the largest gender difference occurs for survey questions that are “unclassified,” that is, questions for which the wording does not provide a clear indication of the PPO. These unclassified questions are distributed across historical episodes that might be subjectively labeled as foreign policy restraint (Gulf crisis and war, Iraq confrontation, War against Terror, and Iraq War) and internal political conflict (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya). An examination of the gender difference for these cases reveals that the gender difference is extremely large (greater than 15 percentage points) for the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Libya—all arguably interventions in civil wars. Nonetheless, the gender difference during all of the conflicts with Iraq from 1990 through the Iraq war are also well above average. In fact, the average gender difference for all unclassifiable questions is 11 percentage points versus 8 percentage points for

questions classified by PPO. Note also that all of these unclassified questions occur during interventions that were accompanied by high levels of violence —air strikes, land invasion, or both —and I showed immediately above that these actions evoke large gender difference. In summary, gender difference is lowest for peace keeping and humanitarian missions – actions that are characterized by low levels of violence relative to other actions. Examination of the “unclassified” questions further reinforces the inference that the most important factor that influences gender difference is the magnitude of the violence employed.

Gender Difference and Multilateralism

There are several reasons to expect that a multilateral military intervention will produce smaller gender difference than interventions undertaken unilaterally. One reason, suggested by Brooks and Valentino (2011), is that women may prefer “consensus decision-making” to the hierarchy and power competition that often characterizes international relations. A related hypothesis is precisely that international institutions are designed to protect weaker sovereign states from the powerful —they are designed explicitly to replace power and hierarchy with community responsibility. Simply put, international institutions can restrain the powerful. Multilateralism may also have appeal for women because it resonates with the cosmopolitanism that is sometimes associated with feminist thinking on international relations. Finally, multilateral operations allow for the sharing of the human risk and financial cost of military action. To the extent that women are more sensitive to the casualties of war and to the opportunity cost of defense spending, they should be more likely to support multilateral operations.

Table 12 demonstrates that the thrust of these arguments is correct. The table shows both the support for using force as well as the gender difference according to which actor is

mentioned in the question —regardless of whether that actor is named as the one whose military forces who will actually carry out the action. For example, the mention of the UN might occur because the question asks if the respondent would favor using military force “to enforce UN weapons inspections” or if the respondent would favor “international action.” Such questions contrast with others that imply unilateral action (“favor or oppose sending French troops to Afghanistan”). Most strikingly, the smallest gender difference (4 percentage points) occurs with mention of general multilateralism (international action), the UN, or the EU. Indeed, support for military action when the UN is mentioned is the only one for which women express majority support. In contrast, the gender difference is twice as large when no multilateral organization is mentioned and four times as large when NATO or “allies” are mentioned.

Similar results occur with a more specific set of codes that I created to identify exactly which military actor or forces would carry out the action. These codes are closely related to those described immediately above, but they provide slightly more detail about whose military forces are referenced in the question. As Figure 3 shows, the pattern is very much the same as that for the simple mention of multilateral organizations: the smallest gender difference occurs when the military actor is specified as “UN [or international] forces,” compared to much larger differences for other combinations of military actors. In summary, there is clear evidence that multilateral military actions reduce gender polarization, primarily because women increase their support for military action when the primary actor will be an international organization and even when those organizations are simply mentioned in the question. Note also that this pattern is in stark contrast to the findings for the US. In the US, men increase their support even more than women when multilateral participation is mentioned.

Gender Difference and National Characteristics

The universal logics described in previous sections are based on the plausible hypothesis that there are considerations surrounding the use of military force that influence gendered attitudes regardless of societal conditions and the geopolitical position of states. Nonetheless, many hypotheses about gender difference are rooted in the argument that societal characteristics and the geopolitical situation of states affect both absolute levels of support for using military force as well as gender difference in support. Robert Kagan, for example, argues that differing attitudes toward military force in Europe and the United States are a function of power. He argues, for example, that the unwillingness of Europeans to invest additional resources in defense results in part from a difference in relative power: strong states invest in military power, but weaker states seek protection through international law and multilateral cooperation. True, Kagan's argument was designed to explain different attitudes toward power in the US and Europe, but the implication is that both the US and Europe should be more accepting of military power than weaker, less developed states (Kagan 2003, 53, 55).

However, it is also the more powerful states that are likely to experience the highest level of gender difference in attitudes toward using that power, because power—or potential power—is rooted in wealth, and the process of economic development that produces that wealth is also likely to increase gender difference in political attitudes. Inglehart and Norris, for example, show that economic development is accompanied by increased labor force participation and access to higher education among women. These changes are accompanied by a leftward drift in ideology and policy preferences among women, including a more pacifist attitude toward the deployment of military force. The political importance of these trends is amplified by increasing political mobilization among women (Inglehart and Norris 2003, 78-92). Iversen and

Rosenbluth (2006) make a similar argument relating the increased labor force participation of women to a leftward movement in political preferences. What is common to these theories is the argument that economic development and increasing gender equality will lead to a leftward drift in policy preferences and increased gender polarization on issues of national security.

A similar paradox accompanies geopolitical considerations. In most of the historical episodes that I analyze in this section, the United States and its allies deployed most—if not all—of the military forces, even though many of these interventions were sanctioned by the UN. It is therefore likely that absolute levels of support among both women and men will be higher among US allies than in other states. Yet most of these states are also among the most economically developed states, and as noted above, they are therefore likely to be characterized by higher gender difference in political attitudes, including attitudes toward using military force. Further, because the military interventions were controversial in many allied states, political polarization is likely to be high. Finally, the political representation of women is also higher (on average) in states that are allies of the US, so that the visible political articulation of women's views is higher than elsewhere. For all of these reasons, gender difference among US allies is likely to be high even though absolute levels of support for using force should be higher than in states not allied with the US.

Table 13 shows that both of these patterns are evident in public attitudes. The top half of the table displays three groups of states: those with a mutual defense treaty with the US; those that are members of the nonaligned movement; and a third group that fall into neither category. The bottom half of the table displays a number of countries individually. The data show that absolute levels of support for using military force are highest within states that are allied to the US and characterized by higher women's labor force participation and higher levels of economic

development (wealth). However, the results also show that gender difference is highest within these allies of the US. Countries that are less developed economically and not allied to the US are both less supportive of using force and have smaller gender differences. The data therefore make clear that gender difference is affected both by universal logics and by the characteristics of individual states.

Modeling the Impact of Universal Logics and National Characteristics

In this section, I present a regression analysis of gender differences in support for using military force across the ten historical episodes described in the sections above. The regressions analyze the support of women and men and the resulting gender difference as a function of several types of universal logics and national characteristics. “Universal logic” variables are dummy variables representing the presence or absence of a particular question wording (mention of casualties, a specific military action, or mention of a multilateral organization). “National characteristics” are measured either as dummy variables (member of NATO or the nonaligned movement) or by specific measures such as gender equality (ratio of female-to-male labor force participation). The regression models reported in Table 14 take the same form as those for US opinion that I reported in previous research (Eichenberg 2016a). The figures in Table 14 are parameters from an OLS regression containing the independent variables listed in the table. Because most of these are dummy variables that take the values of 1 and 0 (indicating the presence or absence of a particular question wording), they are readily interpretable as the percentage change in opinion due to the presence of a particular wording. The constant in the regression represents a baseline average level of support for questions for which the principal policy objective is unclassified. The impact of a different question wording (for example, a question coded as humanitarian or

which mentions air or missile strikes) can be read as the deviation or change from this baseline average. For example, average support among men for humanitarian intervention is almost 25 percentage points higher (+24.63) than the baseline and 28 percentage points higher among women (+28.03). This difference in sensitivity to humanitarian wording reduces the gender difference by more than three percentage points (-3.40) below the baseline gender difference, and this reduction is statistically significant. The central question is whether the impact of these variables on support for using force is different for men and women and thus whether the variables specified in the regressions increase or decrease gender difference significantly (the third column of the table is a regression, not a subtraction).

The analysis yields a number of interesting findings. First, there are many commonalities in the overall structure of support for using military force among men and women. In most cases, the direction and significance of the coefficients for the independent variables are similar for men and women (columns 1 and 2). For example, support for using force is significantly higher among both men and women when the purpose of the action is humanitarian or foreign policy restraint, when terrorism is mentioned in the question, and when the NATO Alliance is mentioned in the question. In addition, for both men and women, support for using force is positively related to the ratio of women-to-men in the labor force. Similarly, support is lower among both men and women in reaction to many other variables, most prominently the mention of weapons of mass destruction, casualties, selling or providing arms, air and missile strikes, and the mention of US forces. In short, there is much that is similar in the reaction of men and women to a number of considerations affecting judgments of military action. Put differently, although the baseline level of support for military action is lower among women, increases and decreases to this baseline among women and men are similar.

Second, there are nonetheless some prominent differences, that is, variables that differ either in statistical significance or in the magnitude of their relative impact on the views of men and women, which of course increases or decreases gender difference. For example, women respond more positively to humanitarian interventions and to interventions involving United Nations troops (which men do not respond to at all). Both of these effects have the result of reducing gender difference significantly. Women also respond more negatively than men to air or missiles strikes and to sending or increasing troops, and these variables increase gender difference significantly, once again highlighting the fact that the most violent military actions increase gender difference. Men respond more negatively to mention of WMD's, the mention of US forces, and selling or providing arms. Men also react more positively to the mention of the use of NATO forces, and men within members of NATO and other US mutual defense alliances are significantly more supportive of using military force. Men within states that are members of the nonaligned movement are less supportive of the use of force in these episodes, while women are more supportive, a combination that lowers gender difference in nonaligned states. In summary, although there is an overall pattern of similarity in the direction and significance of the independent variables, the size of the coefficients varies among women and men in ways that increase or decrease gender difference in significant and interesting ways.

Third, it is interesting to focus on the variables that have the largest effect on gender difference. The most prominent of these is the effect of air and missile strikes: although both men and women are less supportive of this action, the effect is almost twice as large among women. The result is that gender difference increases by over 7 percentage points above the baseline when air or missile strikes are mentioned. A second large effect is the mention of UN forces in the question. The effect among men is not significant, but among women support for

military action increases by over 7 percentage points, which yields a decrease of over 6 percentage points in the gender difference. Whether this is due to considerations of international legitimacy or the shared risk and cost of multilateral actions is unclear, but multilateral participation is clearly an important influence on women's views and therefore on the magnitude of gender polarization. Finally, the mention of weapons of mass destruction produces a much larger reduction in support among men than among women and has the effect of reducing gender difference substantially (more than 6 percentage points). A closer examination of these questions (not shown) reveals that these are the questions on using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons that were described in an earlier section of this paper. Why men reduce their support below the normal baseline in this situation is unclear, but it points to an important fact: gender difference arises from variation in the opinions of men as well as women, and men express more "pacifist" attitudes than women at times.

Finally, both universal logics and national characteristics are important influences on gender difference. Although gender difference is influenced by universal considerations such as participation of the United Nations (which dampens gender difference) or the specific type of military action (many of which increase gender difference), the baseline of gender difference is also lower or higher depending on whether a state is allied with the US or has a higher or lower level of women's labor force participation. True, the effect of women's labor force participation relative to men has only a modest impact on gender difference, but the effect is positive and close to significant. The reason is that the labor force ratio has a positive effect on the support of men as well as women: both exhibit higher levels of support in states with higher female labor participation. As I noted above, the highest levels of women's labor force participation and gender difference on the use of force occur in states that are also allied with the US and in which

the support for using force is higher among both women and men. This correlation makes it difficult to disentangle the gendered effect of economic development and gender equality from the effects of alliance politics. For example, the correlation between women's labor force participation relative to men and status as a NATO ally is .37 and highly significant. The same is true of other variables, including gross domestic product and percentage of women represented in parliaments. In effect, these high correlations among the alliance variables and gender equality variables means that they are "competing" for significance within the regression.

For this reason, in Table 15 I present a set of regressions that compares the effects of several different measures of gender equality in equations that include the alliance variables to the coefficients that occur in models that exclude the alliance variables. The regression model for gender difference in column 1 of the table is reproduced from the immediately preceding table. It shows the regression with both alliance variables and the female-to-male labor force ratio, which is insignificant in this model. Columns 2 through 4 in the table each include a measure of gender equality with the alliance variables excluded. All of the gender equality indicators are positively and significantly related to the magnitude of gender difference in this specification, with the labor force ratio showing the highest level of significance. Note also that the overall pattern of the other variables remains largely the same, and the R^2 values are roughly similar. What these results suggest is that the alignment variables and the variables measuring gender equality and wealth are measuring a common dimension. Thus, it is true that women and men in wealthier states with higher levels of gender equality are more supportive of using military force, but their views are also the most polarized. Put differently, in the wealthier societies that are allied to the US, gender polarization on the question of using military force is also higher. The price of higher support is a higher level of gendered political debate.

Comparing Correlates of Gender Difference in US and Global Opinion

In an earlier paper (Eichenberg 2016a), I presented an analysis of variables that most influence gender difference in US opinion, but those results are not directly comparable to the results for global opinion presented in the sections immediately above. My US data span the period beginning in 1980 and include many historical episodes not covered in this paper. To facilitate a comparison between the correlates of US and global opinion, I constructed comparable datasets for US opinion and global opinions, beginning in 1990 and covering only those historical episodes for which both US and global opinion data are available. The data include the historical episodes displayed in Table 9 but exclude the Ukraine episode because it is not covered in the US data (there are very few polls in the US on the situation in Ukraine).

Table 16 displays regression models of gender difference in support for the use of force within three groups: the US, mutual defense allies of the US, and all remaining states in the global dataset. With the exception of the labor force ratio that is specified for states other than the US, all of the variables represent what I have called universal logics. My expectation is that these variables will affect opinion within all states, regardless of geostrategic position or national characteristics. True, the US does have unique qualities that might produce higher gender difference on security issues. It is the leading superpower in the global system that has engaged in numerous military interventions, and it might be argued that domestic contention on gender-related issues is more prominent in the US than in other societies. Still, such arguments are more likely to affect the average level of gender difference rather than variation around the average.

The results in Table 16 do indeed show that the baseline average of gender difference (the constant in the regression) is higher in the US than elsewhere. Nonetheless, the pattern of

regression coefficients indicates that variation in gender difference exhibits a great deal of cross-national commonality. In many cases, both the direction and significance of the coefficients are the same in all three groups. For example, humanitarian objectives, internal political conflict, and mention of weapons of mass destruction significantly reduce gender difference in all three groups. The mention of air or missile strikes increases gender difference significantly in all three groups. Further, the responses of women and men that produce these changes in gender difference are similar more often than not. For example, humanitarian intervention reduces gender difference in all three groups because women increase their support for these interventions substantially more than men. In the case of air and missile strikes, women react more negatively (outside the US) or less positively (in the US), yielding increased gender difference in all three groups. In summary, not only does a similar set of variables influence the level of gender difference in US and global public opinion, the reactions of women and men to these variables is also similar across the globe.

However, there are two notable exceptions to this observation. In the US, the mention of the UN increases gender difference because men increase their support at a higher rate than women. In other countries, gender difference is reduced when UN forces are mentioned because women increase their support much more than men. To the extent that there is a liberal worldview underlying the opinions of women, it occurs in countries other than the US. Second, in states that are not US allies, the mention of US forces as the agent of military action reduces gender difference because men in these states reduce their support for such interventions much more than women.

Summary: Global Variation in Gender Difference

Gender differences vary substantially across societies and within a number of international conflicts. The data therefore cast doubt on any theory that would predict constant gender differences, most importantly any essentialist, biological explanation. There are many commonalities in the views of men and women in attitudes toward the use of force, but the direction of gender difference is generally that women are less supportive of using military force than men. The fact that gender differences vary positively with economic growth and measures of gender equality suggests that they result from changes in political circumstances, economic structures, and attitudinal change. Nonetheless, while it is true that gender difference is generally higher in more economically developed societies with higher levels of gender equality, gender difference is also large in some societies with lower levels of gender equality (Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Turkey).

A comparison of the correlates of gender difference in the US to gender difference within US allies and other societies indicates a number of commonalities. Humanitarian interventions lower gender difference, and more violent actions such as air strikes increase difference. Among the notable cross-national differences, gender polarization outside the US is lower for multilateral missions because women react more positively. In the US, both men and women increase support for multilateral missions. Thus, to the extent that gender difference arises from a divide between more “realist” men and more “liberal” women, it is not a universal phenomenon.

Summary: Gender Difference in Support for the Use of Military Force in Cross-National Perspective

In this paper, I asked if the gender divide that often characterizes US opinions on the use of force also characterizes opinion in a broader, global sample of countries. Several conclusions emerge from the analysis. First, gender difference is generally low when survey respondents are presented with hypothetical scenarios, which limits the utility of this sort of question. Second, in concrete questions about the use of military force, gender difference is evident in most countries of the world, with women almost always demonstrating lower support. Moreover, in statistical tests at the individual level, gender is a significant influence on support for using force even when controlling for variables such as age, ideology, and general attitudes toward international security. Third, it is nonetheless also true that the magnitude of gender difference shows wide variation. On some issues (such as opinions of drone strikes), gender difference is large in many countries, while in others (aiding opponents of the Syrian government) it is small. Further, since 1990 gender difference has varied a great deal in reaction to the use of force in ten historical episodes. The wide variation in the magnitude of gender difference adds to the evidence that casts doubt on essentialist (biological) hypotheses. Fourth, there is evidence across several samples of data that the level of violence in military conflicts is the factor that most strongly influences gender difference —women are least supportive of the most violent military actions. Fifth, there is some evidence for the argument that women share a more liberal world view: they are more supportive of interventions to protect human rights; they are more supportive of humanitarian military interventions; and they react more positively to military actions undertaken with UN endorsement or participation. Indeed, military action undertaken with UN participation is the single type of intervention supported by a majority of women in many countries. Sixth, cross-national variation in the magnitude of gender difference is strongly correlated with the level of economic development and levels of gender equality in society. This

suggests that as women enter the labor force and achieve access to higher education, their views on security issues are differentiated from those of men. Alternatively, it may be that the “psychological autonomy” that accompanies higher levels of gender equality facilitates the expression of long-held views. Seventh, the correlation of economic development with gender difference illustrates a more general point: national characteristics and the local context of security issues mediate gender difference. Finally, the findings in this paper make clear that gender difference can be a significant factor in the domestic politics of security. In many countries, majorities of women oppose the use of force, while a majority of men favor it. Gender polarization is particularly salient in NATO countries, where majorities of men and women often stand on different sides on important issues (such as troops in Afghanistan or the use of force). Of course, whether these gender divisions affect government decisions will depend on the institutional characteristics of individual states.

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Table 1. Support for the use of force and gender difference in hypothetical circumstances

“To what extent would you approve or disapprove of the deployment of [country’s] troops for the following operations?”

	Percent approve		Gender
	Men	Women	Difference
	%	%	(women - men)
	% %		
2004 (11 countries)			
To defend a NATO ally that has been attacked	84	75	-9
To provide peacekeeping troops after a civil war has ended	83	79	-4
To prevent an imminent terrorist attack	86	83	-3
To stop the fighting in a civil war	66	65	-1
To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons	77	77	0
To provide food and medical assistance to victims of war	91	92	1
To ensure the supply of oil	52	53	1
To remove a government that abuses human rights	58	62	4
Average	75	73	-1
2007 (13 countries)			
To conduct combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan	38	29	-9
To maintain peace and order in post-conflict Balkans	71	66	-5
To monitor and support a ceasefire in Southern Lebanon	65	60	-5
To contribute to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan	69	64	-5
To provide humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region of the Sudan	80	78	-2
Average	65	60	-5

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2004, 2007

Table 2. Comparison of support for using force and gender difference in two hypothetical situations

	Conduct combat operations in in Afghanistan 2007				Remove government that abuses human rights 2004			
	Approve		Gender Difference	N	Approve		Gender Difference	N
	Men (%)	Women (%)	(women - men) (%)		Men (%)	Women (%)	(women - men) (%)	
Netherlands	52	41	-11	1000	51	65	14	961
Germany	30	19	-11	1009	33	44	11	960
United Kingdom	54	49	-6	1000	61	73	11	918
France	42	34	-8	1003	52	59	7	964
Portugal	40	30	-10	1000	70	75	5	871
USA	75	62	-13	1000	65	70	5	926
Spain	32	23	-9	1000	61	65	4	932
Turkey	36	27	-9	832	73	75	3	899
Slovakia	23	16	-7	1013	47	50	2	827
Poland	24	19	-5	1000	54	55	1	891
Romania	32	28	-4	894	--	--	--	--
Italy	36	24	-12	1002	62	54	-7	949
Bulgaria	28	18	-10	956	--	--	--	--
Average	39	30	-9		57	62	5	

Note: See Table 1 for full question wording.

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends 2007*.

Table 3. Gender difference in support for troops in Afghanistan

a.) Percent approving of presence of troops in Afghanistan, 2004

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	75	60	-15	1219
Western Europe	64	50	-14	6528
Eastern Europe	36	19	-17	909
Turkey	58	36	-22	1159

b.) Percent responding "maintain or increase troops in Afghanistan"

2009	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	66	50	-16	941
Western Europe	50	39	-11	6846
Eastern Europe	30	24	-6	3735
Turkey	43	33	-10	868

2011	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	38	29	-9	975
Western Europe	41	34	-7	6871
Eastern Europe	32	29	-3	3839
Turkey	54	48	-6	873

2012	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	36	24	-12	961
Western Europe	32	26	-6	6864
Eastern Europe	30	25	-5	3807
Turkey	59	48	-11	879

c.) Percent Approving of NATO training mission after 2014

2013	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women – men)	N
USA	58	50	-8	1000
Western Europe	62	52	-10	8005
Eastern Europe	45	36	-9	3042
Turkey	43	30	-13	1002

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, for years indicated.


Table 4. Regression analysis of support for maintaining or increasing troops in Afghanistan, 2009-2012

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	USA	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Turkey
Left-right ideology (3 point scale)	0.287*** (0.066)	0.183** (0.057)	0.083 (0.049)	0.487*** (0.091)
Agree war is sometimes necessary = 1	0.984*** (0.129)	0.624*** (0.041)	0.683*** (0.052)	0.176 (0.148)
Agree economic power is more important than military = 1	-0.450*** (0.118)	0.121 (0.067)	-0.024 (0.056)	0.183 (0.161)
Female = 1	-0.435*** (0.102)	-0.292*** (0.034)	-0.158*** (0.016)	-0.151 (0.151)
Respondent age	0.005 (0.003)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.009 (0.005)
US global leadership is desirable = 1	0.563** (0.180)	0.369*** (0.045)	0.364*** (0.100)	0.664** (0.215)
EU global leadership desirable = 1	-0.198 (0.134)	0.315*** (0.033)	0.170 (0.094)	0.266 (0.170)
NATO is essential to security = 1	0.131 (0.110)	0.687*** (0.042)	0.736*** (0.069)	0.747*** (0.147)
US-Europe security partnership close or closer = 1	0.199 (0.117)	0.375*** (0.046)	0.597*** (0.090)	0.324* (0.147)
Constant	-0.436 (0.358)	-1.285*** (0.119)	-1.976*** (0.254)	-1.649*** (0.422)
Observations	2027	15,974	6,052	883
R ²	.15	.11	.08	.09

Note: The results are coefficients from a logistic regression in which the dependent variable equals 1 if respondent supports maintaining or increasing troops in Afghanistan and 0 otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001 ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2009-2013

Figure 1. Gender difference in support for US drone strikes



Note: Question wording: “Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia?”

Sources: Pew Global Attitudes Surveys, 2012 and 2013; German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2013.

Table 5. Comparison of support for US drone strikes and resulting gender difference

“Do you approve or disapprove of the United States conducting missile strikes from pilotless aircraft called drones to target extremists in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia?”

	Gender				Gender		
	Approve		Difference		Approve		Difference
	Men	Women	(women - men)	Men	Women	(women - men)	
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Israel	77	70	-7	Italy	37	25	-12
United States	76	60	-16	Ghana	36	27	-9
India	63	59	-4	Spain	32	12	-20
Kenya	62	63	0	Mexico	31	23	-8
Australia	62	33	-28	China	29	29	0
Canada	61	32	-29	Lebanon	25	28	3
Netherlands	59	39	-20	Brazil	23	12	-11
Nigeria	59	54	-5	Russia	22	18	-3
Britain	58	32	-26	El Salvador	21	12	-9
Uganda	58	52	-6	Chile	18	12	-7
Germany	57	30	-27	Tunisia	13	9	-5
South Africa	54	55	1	Malaysia	11	11	-1
Portugal	51	29	-22	Indonesia	9	10	0
France	49	33	-16	Greece	9	3	-6
Poland	49	34	-16	Turkey	9	10	1
Slovakia	49	33	-16	Pakistan	8	5	-3
Czech							
Republic	49	19	-30	Bolivia	8	4	-4
Philippines	49	43	-6	Argentina	7	7	-1
Romania	48	36	-12	Egypt	7	5	-1
Sweden	44	19	-25	Jordan	6	5	-1
South Korea	40	25	-15	Venezuela	6	7	1
				Palestinian			
Senegal	38	33	-6	territories	3	4	0
Japan	38	11	-27				

Sources: *Pew Global Attitudes Surveys*, 2012 and 2013; German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2013.

Table 6. Support for sending arms and military supplies to anti-government groups in Syria

a.) Sending arms and military supplies

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	N
Britain	40	29	-11	874
France	37	26	-11	997
Germany	21	12	-9	998
Turkey	29	27	-1	907
USA	32	25	-7	894

b.) Western countries sending arms and military supplies

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	N
Egypt	38	34	-3	927
Jordan	51	58	7	970
Lebanon	18	20	2	983
Palestinian territories	32	34	2	764
Tunisia	32	38	6	963
Turkey	23	26	3	900

c.) Arab countries sending arms and military supplies

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	N
Egypt	44	37	-7	947
Jordan	65	71	6	951
Lebanon	39	37	-3	965
Palestinian territories	43	46	3	764
Tunisia	39	41	2	911
Turkey	27	26	-1	895

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Survey, 2013.

Table 7. Support for using military force against Iran if negotiations on nuclear program fail, 2010-2014

	Men	Women	Gender Difference	N
	(%)	(%)	(women - men) (%)	
Slovakia	33	23	-10	1985
Poland	38	29	-9	3162
USA	62	55	-7	4117
Bulgaria	27	20	-7	1893
Romania	40	34	-6	2280
Russia	16	12	-4	2779
Portugal	65	62	-3	3209
Sweden	43	42	-2	3298
UK	43	42	-1	3327
Italy	51	51	0	3050
Turkey	21	22	2	3019
Netherlands	45	47	2	3108
France	62	64	2	3252
Greece	34	39	4	867
Spain	54	60	6	3202
Germany	39	44	6	3272

Notes: See text for question wording. Percentages include those responding “don’t know” or “refused to answer.”

Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends*, 2010-2014 (as available).

Table 8. Percent approving air strikes or ground troops if negotiations on Iranian nuclear program fail, 2012

	a.) approve air strikes			b. approve ground troops			N
	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	
France	52	31	-21	36	25	-11	795
USA	62	49	-12	39	35	-4	823
Portugal	43	31	-12	39	32	-7	756
Netherlands	37	26	-11	25	27	2	723
Germany	24	14	-10	18	13	-5	833
Slovakia	24	15	-9	27	15	-12	412
Sweden	35	26	-9	24	21	-3	751
Romania	28	20	-8	26	16	-9	586
UK	38	31	-7	29	25	-4	824
Spain	32	26	-6	29	26	-3	811
Poland	19	14	-5	19	13	-6	585
Russia	19	15	-5	16	11	-5	800
Italy	40	36	-4	31	32	0	645
Bulgaria	17	15	-2	18	15	-3	496
Turkey	11	11	0	12	14	2	616

Note: Asked only of those who approved of using military force if negotiations fail (see Table 7).


Source: German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends* 2012.

Table 9. List of historical episodes, number of survey questions, and number of states surveyed

Historical episode	Time period	Number of Survey Questions	Number of States Surveyed
Gulf Crisis and War	1990-1991	94	23
Bosnia	1992-1995	280	17
Iraq confrontation	1992-2003	36	4
Kosovo	1998-1999	32	16
War Against Terror	2001-2013	360	51
Iraq War	2003-2012	97	16
Iran	2003-2013	96	28
Syria	2003-2013	41	18
Libya	2011-2012	29	14
Ukraine	2014-2015	33	11
Total	1990-2015	1098	

Source: author's data collection.

Figure 2. Average support of women and men for using military force in ten historical episodes



Note: The data represent the average percentage supporting the use of force for all types of potential or actual military actions across all states in the data collection. See text for further detail on definitions and data collection procedures.

Source: author's data collection.

Table 10. Support for using force and gender difference for specific types of military actions

	Men	Women	Gender Difference (women - men)	N
	(%)	(%)	(%)	
air/missile strikes	43	29	-15	170
presence of troops	51	37	-15	16
war/all out conflict	64	53	-11	24
increase troops	46	37	-10	42
unspecified action type	35	25	-10	44
send troops	43	35	-8	89
keep/maintain troops	54	47	-7	106
military action (general)	52	45	-6	408
sell/send arms	35	32	-4	186
provide advisors or training	75	75	-1	9
Total	47	39	-8	1094

Note: The data represent the average percentage supporting the use of force for potential or actual military actions across all states and historical episodes in the data collection. See text for further detail on definitions and data collection procedures.

Source: author's data collection.

Table 11. Support for using force and gender difference by Principal Policy Objective (PPO)

	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference (women - men) (%)	N
Foreign policy restraint	44	37	-7	369
Internal political change	42	35	-7	339
Humanitarian Intervention	72	66	-6	96
Peacekeeping	55	54	-1	3
Unclassified	47	36	-11	291
Total	47	39	-8	1098

Note: The data represent the average percentage supporting any use of force across all states and historical episodes in the data collection. See text for further detail on definitions and data collection procedures.

Source: author's data collection.


Table 12. Support for using military force and gender difference according to which multilateral actor is mentioned in the survey question

Multilateral actor mentioned in question	Men (%)	Women (%)	Gender Difference	N
			(women - men)	
no multilateral mention	44	36	-8	624
NATO/allies	54	38	-16	53
EU, NATO & UN	49	41	-8	243
allies or friends	43	38	-5	5
multilateral general	51	46	-4	60
UN specifically mentioned	55	51	-4	61
EU mentioned	45	43	-2	50
(all multilateral mentions combined)	50	43	-7	474)
Total	47	39	-8	1098

Note: The data represent the average percentage supporting any use of force across all states and all historical episodes in the data collection. See text for further detail on definitions and data collection procedures.

Source: author's data collection.


Figure 3. Gender difference in support for using force according to which military forces are mentioned in the question



Note: The data represent the gender difference in support for any use of force across all states and all historical episodes in the data collection. See text for further detail on definitions and data collection procedures.

Source: author's data collection.

Figure 4. Gender difference in support for using military force in 61 countries



Note: The data represent the average gender difference in support for any use of force across all historical episodes in the data collection. See text for further detail on definitions and data collection procedures

Table 13. Support for Using Military Force and Gender Difference by National Characteristics

Alliance status	National characteristics			Support for using force		Gender Difference (women - men)	N
	GDP/capita (1,000 US\$)	Female-Male Labor Force Ratio (%)	% Women in Lower House Parliament	Men%	Women%		
Other	23.30	69	21	41	35	-6	140
Nonaligned	18.38	40	10	37	34	-3	75
US ally	31.75	76	21	49	40	-9	883
Total	29.90	73	21	47	39	-8	1098
Japan	33.45	73	7	49	30	-19	9
Saudi Arabia	37.35	19	3	61	47	-14	3
UAE	109.36	29	0	60	47	-14	21
Canada	35.25	85	19	56	44	-12	4
Australia	35.80	80	22	56	44	-11	6
Sweden	39.36	94	43	48	38	-10	22
UK	33.55	83	19	53	44	-10	7
Brazil	14.16	75	8	44	34	-9	9
Germany	37.78	81	30	49	40	-9	8
Finland	30.99	92	35	36	29	-7	86
Turkey	16.49	39	10	32	25	-7	31
India	3.10	39	8	57	52	-6	10
Bahrain	38.31	34	0	46	40	-5	3
Greece	22.60	62	10	37	32	-5	9
Argentina	-----	66	34	12	8	-4	20
Mexico	13.59	45	18	35	31	-4	3
Nigeria	4.89	76	7	54	51	-4	5
Russia	22.66	88	13	26	23	-3	14
China	10.23	84	22	31	30	-2	4
Tunisia	10.70	36	27	24	23	-2	21
Egypt	9.87	32	2	25	24	-1	7
Indonesia	8.29	61	16	35	36	1	44
Jordan	11.19	23	10	30	31	1	4
Pakistan	4.35	28	22	17	24	8	116

Source: Author's data collection for opinion data; for data on national characteristics Stotsky, Shibuya, Kolovich, and Kebhaj (2016). I am grateful to these authors for providing access to their raw data.

Table 14. Regression analysis of support among men and women for using military force and resulting gender difference

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Men	Women	Gender Difference
Humanitarian intervention	24.63*** (1.971)	28.03*** (1.835)	-3.401*** (0.835)
Foreign policy restraint	4.308* (1.703)	5.500*** (1.585)	-1.192 (0.721)
Peace keeping	-0.364 (9.669)	2.966 (9.001)	-3.330 (4.095)
Internal political change	-0.663 (1.430)	1.168 (1.331)	-1.830** (0.605)
does question mention terrorism or terror?	13.08*** (2.089)	11.80*** (1.944)	1.281 (0.885)
does question mention WMD in any way?	-14.07*** (2.231)	-7.683*** (2.077)	-6.388*** (0.945)
UN forces mentioned	1.033 (2.546)	7.365** (2.370)	-6.331*** (1.078)
NATO forces mentioned	5.173* (2.301)	2.659 (2.142)	2.514* (0.975)
U.S. forces mentioned	-14.87*** (1.868)	-11.84*** (1.739)	-3.029*** (0.791)
Survey country's forces mentioned	-13.29*** (1.424)	-12.13*** (1.325)	-1.155 (0.603)
Civilian or military casualties mentioned	-28.30*** (3.090)	-28.41*** (2.876)	0.111 (1.308)
does question specifically mention 'ground' troops	4.506 (3.631)	6.406 (3.380)	-1.900 (1.538)
Air or missile strikes	-7.349*** (1.511)	-14.36*** (1.407)	7.014*** (0.640)
Send or increase troops	-6.404*** (1.863)	-8.007*** (1.734)	1.602* (0.789)
Sell or provide arms	-18.51*** (1.627)	-14.30*** (1.514)	-4.208*** (0.689)
Member of NATO	6.493*** (1.654)	4.666** (1.539)	1.827** (0.700)
Mutual defense ally of U.S.	11.62*** (2.983)	5.203 (2.777)	6.415*** (1.263)
Member of Nonaligned Movement	-1.033 (2.673)	2.123 (2.489)	-3.157** (1.132)
Ratio of female to male labor force participation	15.35*** (3.547)	13.26*** (3.302)	2.082 (1.502)

Constant	37.84*** (2.998)	30.90*** (2.791)	6.942*** (1.270)
Observations	1,077	1,077	1,077
R ²	.401	.431	.301

Note: Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.

Table 15. Regression analysis of gender difference in support for using military force with alternative gender equality indicators

	(1) Gender difference	(2) Gender difference	(3) Gender difference	(4) Gender difference
Humanitarian intervention	-3.401*** (0.835)	-3.509*** (0.850)	-3.617*** (0.861)	-3.467*** (0.857)
Foreign policy restraint	-1.192 (0.721)	-1.665* (0.725)	-1.825* (0.737)	-1.897** (0.729)
Peace keeping	-3.330 (4.095)	-3.768 (4.172)	-3.240 (4.212)	-2.837 (4.204)
Internal political change	-1.830** (0.605)	-1.725** (0.615)	-1.710** (0.624)	-1.623** (0.620)
does question mention terrorism or terror?	1.281 (0.885)	1.257 (0.898)	1.296 (0.917)	1.486 (0.905)
does question mention WMD in any way?	-6.388*** (0.945)	-6.528*** (0.963)	-6.238*** (0.978)	-6.369*** (0.970)
UN forces mentioned	-6.331*** (1.078)	-5.981*** (1.094)	-5.859*** (1.109)	-6.088*** (1.103)
NATO forces mentioned	2.514* (0.975)	2.490* (0.994)	3.088** (1.003)	2.834** (0.999)
U.S. forces mentioned	-3.029*** (0.791)	-3.388*** (0.783)	-3.225*** (0.796)	-3.454*** (0.789)
Survey country's forces mentioned	-1.155 (0.603)	-0.858 (0.612)	-0.168 (0.617)	-0.645 (0.616)
Civilian or military casualties mentioned	0.111 (1.308)	0.166 (1.332)	0.667 (1.344)	0.455 (1.341)
question specifically mentions 'ground' troops	-1.900 (1.538)	-1.588 (1.565)	-1.256 (1.584)	-1.469 (1.578)
Air or missile strikes	7.014*** (0.640)	7.038*** (0.652)	7.068*** (0.664)	7.124*** (0.657)
Send or increase troops	1.602* (0.789)	1.577* (0.798)	1.480 (0.808)	1.548 (0.805)
Sell or provide arms	-4.208*** (0.689)	-4.092*** (0.690)	-4.228*** (0.699)	-4.297*** (0.697)
Member of NATO	1.827** (0.700)			
Mutual defense ally of U.S.	6.415*** (1.263)			
Member of Nonaligned Movement	-3.157** (1.132)			
Ratio of female to male labor force participation	2.082 (1.502)	6.389*** (1.295)		

Ratio of female to male secondary school enrollment				9.974** (3.301)	
Female percentage of members lower house of parliament					0.0551* (0.0215)
Constant	6.942*** (1.270)	5.368*** (1.037)	-0.162 (3.343)		8.859*** (0.633)
	Observations	1,077	1,077	1,066	1,077
	R ²	.301	.271	.259	.259

Note: Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05

Table 16. Regression analysis of gender difference in support for using force in USA, allies of USA, and other states

	(1) Gender difference USA	(2) Gender difference USA allies	(3) Gender difference Non Allies
Humanitarian intervention	-10.03*** (2.188)	-2.663** (0.871)	-8.275** (2.823)
Foreign policy restraint	1.488* (0.594)	0.832 (0.923)	-3.644* (1.569)
Peace keeping	-3.891*** (0.871)	-3.273 (4.138)	
Internal political change	-2.785*** (0.595)	-1.292* (0.652)	-11.22*** (2.787)
does question mention terrorism or terror?	-2.828** (0.895)	-1.138 (1.134)	1.493 (1.690)
does question mention WMD in any way?	-3.545*** (0.856)	-9.011*** (1.162)	-4.817* (1.860)
UN forces mentioned	1.975* (0.938)	-5.236*** (1.205)	-7.766** (2.585)
NATO forces mentioned	-0.0332 (0.697)	3.846** (1.232)	10.55** (3.995)
U.S. forces mentioned		-0.457 (0.912)	-6.738*** (1.814)
Survey country's forces mentioned		-0.428 (0.629)	-1.685 (2.877)
Civilian or military casualties mentioned	-0.0519 (0.529)	0.436 (1.316)	
does question specifically mention 'ground' troops	-1.014 (0.826)	-0.272 (1.719)	
Air or missile strikes	3.534*** (0.744)	7.488*** (0.728)	4.539** (1.614)
send	-0.577 (0.784)	0.134 (1.068)	1.729 (2.657)
Sell or provide arms	2.296 (1.542)	-4.306*** (0.854)	3.818 (2.537)
Ratio of female to male labor force participation		2.228 (1.946)	6.986*** (1.884)
Constant	10.14*** (0.441)	7.988*** (1.543)	6.808*** (1.467)
Observations	762	850	194
R ²	0.167	0.301	0.371

Note: Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. Standard errors in parentheses. ***
p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix

List of states included in the data collection on comparative support for using military force

	Number of survey items in collection
Argentina	3
Australia	21
Austria	7
Bahrain	4
Belgium	24
Bolivia	1
Brazil	6
Bulgaria	18
Canada	22
Chile	1
China	7
Croatia	1
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	25
East Germany (DDR)	21
Egypt	9
El Salvador	1
Finland	8
France	82
Germany	86
Ghana	1
Greece	31
Hungary	4
India	10
Indonesia	3
Ireland	24
Israel	3
Italy	78
Japan	9
Jordan	9
Kenya	2

Lebanon	8
Luxembourg	23
Malaysia	1
Mexico	20
Netherlands	64
New Zealand	1
Nigeria	3
Norway	1
Oman	4
Pakistan	5
Palestinian territories	5
Philippines	1
Poland	42
Portugal	55
Romania	21
Russia	14
Saudi Arabia	4
Senegal	1
Slovakia	28
South Africa	1
South Korea	3
Spain	72
Sweden	21
Taiwan	1
Tunisia	7
Turkey	44
USA	2
Uganda	1
United Arab Emirates	4
United Kingdom	116
Venezuela	1
<hr/>	
Total	1,100