Thirties Throwbacks: Explaining the Electoral Breakthroughs of Jobbik and Golden Dawn

An honors thesis for the International Relations Program

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Abstract

The radical right experienced a general resurgence across Western Europe in the past few decades, but in Hungary and Greece support recently swelled for parties even further to the right. In the last few years, Jobbik in Hungary and Golden Dawn in Greece have gone from fringe extremists with no electoral power to parties with seats in national and European parliaments. Though the rise of the radical right as a Europe-wide phenomenon was unexpected, the successes of Jobbik and Golden Dawn are especially surprising because these parties are much more extreme than other successful far right groups. Golden Dawn is anti-immigrant, Jobbik is anti-Roma, and both parties are anti-Semitic. They explicitly use symbols, language, and tactics that evoke the fascists of the 1930s and 1940s. These parties are growing and their success directly contradicts previous scholarship on the radical right.

In this thesis I address the anomalous successes of Jobbik and Golden Dawn and present a new party family type called nationalist extremists. In addition to creating this party group, I formulate a theoretical framework to explain the factors that make nationalist extremist success a possibility. Finally, I present comprehensive reviews of Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s histories, ideologies, and activities in order to demonstrate their unique spots in the far right party pantheon.
Chapter 1. Introduction

A member of parliament proposes making a list of the country’s Jews on the grounds that they pose a threat to national security. On the floor of parliament, a group of MPs greet their party chairman with their right arms held out stiffly, palms down. Groups of uniformed men march in formation through ethnic minority neighborhoods. Though these instances of extremism could easily match occurrences in Nazi Germany and other fascist countries during the interwar period and World War II, they come from present-day Hungary and Greece. This conduct is a mere taste of the extremist rhetoric and actions perpetuated by the Hungarian party Jobbik – currently the third-largest party in Hungarian Parliament – and the Greek party Golden Dawn – the fifth-largest party in Hellenic Parliament. Jobbik and Golden Dawn are further to the right than any elected parties in Europe since the interwar fascists and they represent a threat to minority groups in Hungary and Greece and to the democratic nature of these countries more generally.

This paper addresses how Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to win votes given their extremist nature. In the second chapter, I define a new party type called nationalist extremists to clarify the unique position in the far right party arena that Jobbik and Golden Dawn hold, and in the third chapter I review scholarship on far right parties and present my own theory for how nationalist extremists are able to achieve electoral success. The fourth and fifth chapters are exhaustive analyses of Jobbik and Golden Dawn respectively and act as empirical case studies that validate the party definition given in chapter two and the theoretical framework presented in chapter three.
Up until 2009 – the year Jobbik exceeded expectations by getting almost fifteen percent of the vote in the European Parliamentary elections – scholars studying the European far right had asserted that blatant racism, an association with a fascist past, and extra-political violence were insurmountable barriers to electoral success.\(^1\) Though Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s electoral performances have proven these premises false, there has yet to be any scholarship devoted to conceptualizing a theoretical framework that can explain their phenomenal and previously unimaginable successes. While there have been scattered scholarly efforts to theorize on the success of Jobbik and Golden Dawn separately, no work analyzes the two parties as iterations of a larger phenomenon. Similarly, no serious effort has been made to clear the terminological thicket that has grown up around the two parties. The media has alternately referred to them as neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, extreme right, ultranationalist, and a host of other names.\(^2\) This etymological puzzle is addressed and solved in the second chapter of this paper, where it is argued that Jobbik and Golden Dawn represent a new type of European party that must be conceptualized outside of the now-unsuitable far right framework.

Implicit in the assertion that Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s successes merit explanation is the idea that they represent a political party type distinct from the radical right. Since many scholars have already advanced theories to explain the success of the radical right, if Jobbik and Golden Dawn were mere children of this party family, there would be no need to create the theoretical framework that is integral to this thesis. In order to show Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s uniqueness and thereby legitimate this research, I present the main tenets of radical right party definitions in chapter two. I systematically go through these definitions to demonstrate that Jobbik and Golden Dawn do not qualify as radical right parties because of their blatant biological racism, use of violence, and associations with a fascist past. I also highlight those pieces of
scholarship that assert that parties with the characteristics of Jobbik and Golden Dawn are by definition not of the radical right.

After establishing that Jobbik and Golden Dawn belong to a party group distinct from the radical right, I present my definition of a new group called nationalist extremists and expand upon this term’s definition and the reasons for its creation. To validate this new term, I demonstrate not only that both Jobbik and Golden Dawn meet this definition, but that traditional radical right parties, such as the French National Front, do not.

Although I find Jobbik and Golden Dawn to be separate from the radical right, I begin the third chapter with a summary and synthesis of scholarship on the radical right in order to introduce possible theories for nationalist extremist success. After evaluating different hypotheses, I address this thesis’ central question: why Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to gain significant vote shares despite their extremism. This larger inquiry involves numerous smaller questions, such as whether economic conditions played a role, whether party structure was a factor, and so on. Because no single cause is sufficient to explain Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s success, I present a causal pathway to elucidate how a number of different variables interact in a way that makes the election of parties such as Jobbik and Golden Dawn a possibility.

The theory given in the third chapter to explain the anomalous success of Jobbik and Golden Dawn is, in brief, that in countries with suddenly poor and worsening economic conditions and decreasing levels of trust in government, a heightening of ethnic tensions between the majority ethnicity and a widely disliked minority can – when dealt with by the government in a way that a substantial portion of the population finds unsatisfactory – allow a well-organized, extreme, and ethnocentric party that demonstrates its commitments through action, to capture a
significant portion of the electorate. The key and unique feature of this theory is that instead of causing unelectability (as established scholarship on the radical right suggests), the paramilitary/supra-political actions of Jobbik and Golden Dawn are counter-intuitively argued to be precisely the factors that produced their electoral successes. I contend that these activities function as legitimizing agents that – while perhaps repulsing a majority of voters – appeal to a significant minority. However, a party can only gain support with such actions if certain conditions are already present in a country. This caveat and other constituent parts of my theory are explained fully in the third chapter.

In order to validate my hypothesis, I rely on comparative studies of the conditions within Greece and Hungary immediately prior to Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s initial electoral breakthroughs. Further, I examine the supra-political actions and rhetoric of these parties to demonstrate the unique way in which they were able to take advantage of peculiar political, social, and economic circumstances. I also provide counter-cases to show the relevancy of certain aspects of my theory and the irrelevancy of some oft-suggested hypotheses for far right success.

The chapters immediately following the explanation of nationalist extremist success are thorough descriptions of Jobbik and Golden Dawn that serve not only to provide the reader with an extensive background on the parties’ ideologies and activities, but also to place Jobbik and Golden Dawn in the wider context of their countries’ histories. The fourth chapter, dealing with Jobbik and Hungary, and the fifth chapter, discussing Golden Dawn and Greece, provide the necessary details to understand the demand for the creation of a new party family. The evidence presented in these chapters is presaged somewhat by the literature review in the third chapter.
Because the main focus of this paper is why Jobbik and Golden Dawn have been able to achieve electoral success, the reasons such parties exist in the first place will not be discussed. One would be pressed to name a country that does not have an extremist fringe group – the United States has the Ku Klux Klan and most European countries have bands of neo-Nazi radicals. These smaller groups have already been extensively documented and the causes for their existence theorized. This thesis’ primary focus is why Jobbik and Golden have not been relegated to electoral insignificance like other extremists. I do not speculate upon the reasons these parties are formed initially.

Another area of far right study is concerned with the factors that determine the continued success of radical parties after their initial electoral breakthrough. While this is an important question to consider in order to fully understand these parties, it goes beyond the scope of this thesis, which is concerned only with the reasons Jobbik and Golden Dawn were elected, not how they performed once in parliament. That said, because relevant details about both parties have emerged in the wake of their electoral successes, there is some discussion of the post-breakthrough experiences of Jobbik and Golden Dawn. However, the fates of the parties are only given passing comment, and not subjected to detailed analysis.

Ultimately, in this thesis I explore an issue that has been inadequately addressed in far right scholarship. In doing so, I provide the key aspects of any piece of scholarship on the radical right: a definition, an explanation, and relevant case studies. Fundamentally, I call for a reevaluation of a significant new development in European politics and identify and fill a theoretical gap.
Chapter 2. Nationalist Extremists – A New Party Family

In this chapter I address and solve the problem of classifying Jobbik and Golden Dawn by showing that they are vanguards of a new party type – nationalist extremists – whose place on the right-wing spectrum lies between the radical right and the interwar fascists. In order to elucidate the nationalist extremist position in the right-wing landscape, I evaluate scholarship on the radical right to show that nationalist extremists do not fit into previously established party families. I then present my definition of nationalist extremists, which demarcates the boundary between this new group and the radical right and clearly establishes a new party family. After clarifying my term, I contrast it with definitions of fascism in order to show that nationalist extremists are also poor fits for that moniker. Finally, I briefly evaluate several possible cases of nationalist extremism in Europe to determine whether present membership in this group is limited solely to Jobbik and Golden Dawn.

Although no two political parties are ever identical, it is nonetheless useful to organize them into international groups in order to study trends that transcend borders. As of yet, the comparative eye has not been turned on Jobbik and Golden Dawn. Though the two parties are often given classifications by the press, these are inevitably shallow buzzwords with little to no theoretical consideration behind them. Even in the academic realm, there has been no work that attempts to place Jobbik and Golden Dawn together in their appropriate wider framework. This chapter explains the shortcomings of the theoretical approaches that have been applied to Jobbik and Golden Dawn and provides a clear indication of the parties’ place in the wider arena of far right parties. Understanding Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s party family is crucial to elucidating the factors behind their surprising electoral successes.
Although I consider nationalist extremists to be fundamentally different from radical right parties, it is nevertheless useful to go through the rudiments of scholarship on the radical right in order to make the distinctions between the two groups more clear. Additionally, Jobbik and Golden Dawn have often been alleged to be members of the radical right party family, so a breakdown of its definitions will help to demonstrate why Jobbik and Golden Dawn cannot be considered radical right parties. A somewhat smaller body of scholarship exists on other European extreme right-wing parties that have never been elected, but since this thesis is focused on Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s electoral successes, it makes more sense to analyze what has been written about radical right parties’ successes rather than what has been written about other extremists’ failures.

Since radical right parties first began to achieve widespread electoral success in the early 1980s, more scholarly research has been devoted to the study of modern European right-wing parties than any other party family in Europe. Although the majority of this work has been dedicated to conceptualizing the reasons for the radical right’s sudden success, before a scholar can theorize about the radical right’s breakthrough, he must first define the group in order to justify the study. In other words, it must be demonstrated that the radical right has certain characteristics that suggest it constitutes a distinct party family. Though the main question in radical right scholarship is why these parties are successful, the exact nature of the radical right party family must be addressed before this can be answered. This is also the approach I adopt in studying Jobbik and Golden Dawn.

The nomenclature in radical right scholarship is so convoluted and decentralized that most scholars feel compelled to preface their research with a condemnation of the terminological muddle before then adding to it. Indeed, one of the most prominent far right theorists, Cas
Mudde, wrote an entire article dedicated to sorting out the name confusion. Unfortunately, his efforts were in vain; scholars continue to use different terms to describe the same things. Because of this terminological confusion, authors writing about the radical right are obliged to first give their own term, its definition, and its justification before moving on to the more substantive aspects of their research. Indeed, the term ‘radical right’ is just one of many used by scholars to refer to a party family that is alternately called extreme right, populist radical right, right-wing extremist, right wing populist, anti-immigrant right, and much more. Because I conceptualize Jobbik and Golden Dawn as being parties outside of this family, I will not provide a review of these terms and the reasons certain scholars prefer particular ones to others. Rather, background on a general definition of this many-named right-wing party family is presented only in order to clarify why I have chosen to create my own, new term for what I argue is a new type of party.

Because there are numerous designations used to categorize the radical right party family, any definition presented here will inevitably be unable to accommodate itself to all of them. However, as a tool to make the distinctions between the radical right and nationalist extremists more clear, I give a rudimentary outline based on the works of several different scholars of what many consider to be the primary features of the radical right. Though definitions are varied, most focus jointly on attitudes about the political structures of society and views on inclusion and exclusion of certain groups from the state.

Many definitions begin by delineating the most prominent part of the radical right agenda: the parties’ views on the composition of the state. Borrowing from Hans Georg Betz and Mudde, David Art defines the radical right as parties that, “reject individual and social equality, oppose the integration of marginalized groups, and make xenophobic appeals,” noting that, “Neoliberalism is the economic dimension of the ideology, while nativism forms its cultural
Mudde describes ‘radical’ as “opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities,” and ‘right’ as “the belief in a natural order with inequalities.” Another feature of Mudde’s radical right parties is their anti-elitism and populism. What is key about these parties is that they tend to do well when they present a moderate ideology, which, as chapters four and five demonstrate, is not the case for Jobbik and Golden Dawn.

In a definition similar to Mudde’s, Elisabeth Carter defines the ‘extreme’ aspect of right-wing extremists as “a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state” and the ‘right-wing’ aspect as, “a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality.” Her analysis breaks down five different types of right-wing extremist actors; neo-Nazi parties, neo-fascist parties, authoritarian xenophobic parties, neo-liberal xenophobic parties, and neo-liberal populist parties. By her definitions, neo-Nazi parties are radically xenophobic, adhere to classical racism, and reject outright the existing democratic system. Neo-fascists are neither xenophobic nor racist, but reject the democratic system. Authoritarian xenophobes are radically xenophobic and culturalist, demand less democracy, less pluralism, more power for the state, and want to reform, not overthrow, the democratic system. Neo-liberal xenophobes are essentially the same as authoritarian xenophobes except they demand more democracy and less state influence. Neo-liberal populists demand more democracy and less state influence but are not xenophobic or racist. Carter’s definitions classify what others have defined as the radical right (parties like the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party) as authoritarian xenophobes because they place immigration as a central issue in their party platforms, but do not embrace classical racism. Of Carter’s five party types, the neo-Nazi model fits Golden Dawn and Jobbik best, but as will be discussed
below, the nationalist extremist type is a bit more complicated than Carter’s three-factor definition. Further, chapters four and five demonstrate that neither Jobbik nor Golden Dawn adhere to a purely neo-Nazi ideology, so the application of this classification would be a misnomer.

Other definitions of the radical right seek to more fully explain certain aspects of right-wing ideology. Ruth Wodak sees a comment trait of the radical right in the use of “some kind of ethnic/religious/linguistic/political minority as a scapegoat for all current woes,” which is then used to, “subsequently construe the latter as dangerous and a threat ‘to us’.”\(^{21}\) She states further that right-wing populist parties are “primarily defined by the construction of common enemies: ‘They’ are foreigners, defined by ‘race’, religion or language. ‘They’ are elites not only within the country but also on the European and global level. Cleavages within a society such as class, caste, religion, gender and so forth, are neglected or are interpreted as the result of ‘elite conspiracies’.”\(^{22}\) In fomenting a “mobilization of resentment against a set of clearly defined enemies,” the radical right is able to “claim to speak for the unarticulated opinions, demands and sentiments of the ordinary people.”\(^{23}\) As will be seen in their specific chapters, these features are very much aspects of Golden Dawn and Jobbik, both of which aimed to tap into latent nationalist sentiment and adopted the dual classification of ‘enemies’ that Wodak describes. Additionally, both parties ignore many social divisions within their countries in favor of seeing the nation as a united whole, with any breaks caused by the influence of non-national enemies conspiring against the nation. However, to go by Wodak’s categorization alone would ignore several important aspects of nationalist extremists.

Though I define a new party type, the idea that Jobbik and Golden Dawn are members of a party group distinct from the radical right has already been addressed somewhat in far right
scholarship. Art uses the term ‘far right’ to refer to a broad group of parties further to the right than established center-right parties and ‘radical right’ to refer to a subset of more moderate parties within this far right umbrella (e.g. the French National Front and the Austrian Freedom Party).\textsuperscript{24} He also lays out the differences between the radical right and what he calls right-wing extremist political actors.\textsuperscript{25} The former party group is that which has received so much scholarly attention, while the latter, due to its general electoral failure, has not been studied nearly as extensively.

Art’s radical right is a group of parties that respects the institution of democracy and rejects paramilitarism, but whose views on ethnic differences place them to the right of the established conservative parties.\textsuperscript{26} Though they may appeal to voters on a range of issues, these parties are mostly defined by their anti-immigrant stances.\textsuperscript{27} While they are farther to the right than other parties in their respective countries, for the most part they reject fascism, Nazism, and other legacies of WWII\textsuperscript{28}. Art contrasts radical right parties with right-wing extremists, who reject and seek to replace liberal democracy, engage in and condone political violence, and embrace biological racism and other ideologies of a fascist interwar past.\textsuperscript{29} Similarly, Mudde argues that the radical right is nominally democratic, despite opposition to some aspects of liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{30} He contrasts this group with what he calls the ‘extreme right’, “which is in essence antidemocratic.”\textsuperscript{31}

Up until Jobbik’s electoral breakthrough in 2009, scholars of the far right had mainly written off these more extreme parties and were confident in declaring that, “the parties that explicitly carried Nazi or fascist baggage were marginal and insignificant,”\textsuperscript{32} and that, “radical right parties that . . . cling to fascist ideas have done very poorly at the poll,”\textsuperscript{33} because this was the observable phenomenon for about three decades. Whereas most who studied these more
extreme parties had the luxury of simply writing them off as unelectable, Art, writing in 2013, was forced to acknowledge an abnormality of traditional radical right scholarship. For the few decades from the radical right’s initial successes in the early eighties until Jobbik’s breakthrough, it was generally accepted that parties such as the French National Front (FN) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) were only able to win elections because they took pains to distance themselves from the views and tactics that define Art’s right-wing extremists. Parties such as Jobbik and Golden Dawn are exceptional cases because the reality of their recent successes directly contradicts much of what has been written about the radical right. The success of one such party could perhaps be written off as a flash response by the electorate of a country in crisis (although this is further belied by the fact that Jobbik and Golden Dawn have each performed well in more than one election), but the emergence of two such parties united mainly by their extremist rhetoric and actions, makes it clear that there exist hitherto unexplored factors that make the election of such parties a possibility.

Though it is unfortunate to have to add yet another term and definition to the already cluttered far right vocabulary, the circumstances demand it. Although Art’s ‘right-wing extremist’ term covers many of the aspects defining the new party type represented by Jobbik and Golden Dawn, it has two important flaws. First, though the definition describes many of the stances that nationalist extremists hold, it has not been fleshed out to the point where these various expressions of extremism have been explained as reflections of a basic party family ideology. Essentially, Art provides an account without a significant clarification. The second problem with this term is that it is too easily confused with ‘extreme right’, which has been used extensively to refer to parties such as FN and FPÖ. For these reasons, I present the nationalist
extremist party type and examine its particular ideological features as well as its differences from the radical right and other far right groupings.

As implied by the name, nationalism and extremism constitute the two ideological features of nationalist extremist parties; they are committed to race-based nationalism, openly engage in paramilitarism and rhetoric that honors a fascist past, and are anti-democratic. In this context nationalism has a distinctly ethnic overtone, in which membership in the nation is only attainable by birth. Nationalist extremists see the nation as a group of a defined race that adheres to a certain religion. Members of the nation who do not practice the religion or do not honor the cultural heritage of the nation are not excluded from the national group on these grounds because national identity is considered an unalterable characteristic that cannot be revoked or denied based on one’s actions. However, those individuals who act in a way that nationalist extremists consider a betrayal of the nation – for instance, those who facilitate the activities of international financial organizations within the state – are considered internal enemies of the nation.

A demonstration of the way in which nationalist extremists emphasize the racial component of the nation can be seen in the extent to which Golden Dawn and Jobbik attempt to appeal to expatriates. Whereas radical right parties agitate on the basis of conditions in the homeland, nationalist extremists seek to mobilize the entire nation in the struggle for the renewal of national greatness. They want to engage their countrymen on the basis of more than just contemporary social and economic issues – they wish to fundamentally reform the organization and foundation of the state to emphasize the role of the national family.

This nationalism sees the members of the nation as the latest generation in a glorious tradition, and the nationalist extremist party sees it as its duty to defend the nation and this tradition from internal and external forces that conspire against it. Because these parties extoll
ideas of national greatness, they are not only forced to account for the fact that their countries are experiencing economic hardships, but the still harsher reality that even in rosy economic times, their states would nonetheless be relatively insignificant players on the world stage. To do this, nationalist extremists place blame jointly on a minority ethnic group within the state and on the traitors to the nation who betray their heritage and aid international forces conspiring to keep the nation down. Inscribed in the very names Jobbik\textsuperscript{34} and Golden Dawn, one can see the language of a new and brighter future in which the nation is restored to its rightful and powerful position.

The extremism of nationalist extremists is featured in their ideology, rhetoric, and actions. As discussed above, nationalist extremists appeal on issues that are very different from those advocated by the radical right. Nationalist extremists believe in and advocate an ethos that is much more world-altering than that suggested by other contemporary European political parties, none of which seeks to disrupt the status quo nearly as profoundly. Though they may participate in the democratic system, nationalist extremists are anti-democratic and enemies of a pluralistic society. The rhetoric they produce goes well beyond the xenophobic appeals of the radical right; they frame the battle between the nation and its enemies as an existential struggle. This rhetoric often crosses the line into explicitly racist appeals and does not hesitate to advocate violence and the mentality that any means are justified in pursuit of the national ends.

Related to their extremist rhetoric, another feature of nationalist extremist parties is their willingness to associate themselves with and glorify a fascist past. Whereas other parties are intent on distinguishing themselves from interwar fascists, nationalist extremists (despite what they might claim) encourage these connotations through their actions, ideology, and rhetoric. This is a key way in which nationalist extremists are more extreme than radical right parties.
Though nationalist extremists go much farther than other electorally successful rightists in their rhetorical approach, it is the extremism of actions that most sets nationalist extremist groups apart from other parties. It is easy to use extremist language, but what is crucial about nationalist extremists is that they demonstrate their commitment through actions by organizing into paramilitary formations. In the case of Jobbik, the role of the paramilitary is limited to intimidation (likely out of a fear of being banned as a political party). For Golden Dawn, violence is routine and encouraged. The use of supra-political tactics – actions that go beyond the purview of normal activities for a political party – is a key extremist element of the nationalist extremists.

Another fundamental difference between radical right parties and nationalist extremists is their stance towards Enlightenment liberalism. FN, for instance, opposes immigration and Islam on the grounds that they pose a threat to a French culture that is inherently tied to tolerance and intellectual freedom. FN and parties like it battle against immigration in the name of protecting a heritage grounded in ideas – in the Enlightenment thought that produced the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Whereas radical right parties see themselves as superior to immigrants on the basis of their traditions and beliefs, nationalist extremists consider themselves better by merit of their ethnic background. Nationalist extremists – whether they oppose immigration or domestic forces considered outside of the national group – are fundamentally opposed to the liberalism that radical right parties seek to defend. Like the interwar fascists, they conceive of the nation as being based on racial lines rather than ideas or attitudes.

Though they may initially resemble radical rightists, nationalist extremists are opposed to the radical right because of these profoundly contrasting views on cultural liberalism and the nation. Indeed, Márton Gyöngyösi, Jobbik’s Deputy Parliamentary Leader and one of the party’s
main spokesmen, has made this very argument when citing how Jobbik is different from the parties of Geert Wilders (leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom) and Marie Le Pen (leader of FN). He has even gone so far as to accuse them, and other anti-Islam parties of being tools of Zionists. Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the leader of Golden Dawn, has also distinguished his party from western European radical right parties, which he refers to as, “reactionary petty bourgeois political formations created by the presence of illegal immigrants and nothing beyond that.”

Jobbik and Golden Dawn are not just more extreme manifestations of radical rightism, but the forerunners of a party family with basic and incompatible differences from the radical right. Perhaps the greatest evidence for the distinction between nationalist extremists and radical right parties is the fact that Wilders and Le Pen announced that because of “anti-Semitic and anti-Roma rhetoric,” Jobbik will not be invited to join the pan-European alliance of Eurosceptic parties in European Parliament. Nationalist extremists are too extreme for radical rightists.

What also sets western radical right parties and nationalist extremists apart is the way the two groups challenge the state. Whereas parties of the radical right respect the institutions of the state and are satisfied operating within the confines of the political system, nationalist extremists use their paramilitary forces to challenge the monopoly on violence claimed by the state. The positions of nationalist extremist parties extend beyond simple rejection of elite parties in the state, to a questioning of the legitimacy of the democratic system itself. Nationalist extremists self-identify as non-democrats, and their desire for political transformation surpasses that of the radical right. They clamor for intense change beyond the mere curbing of immigration, and view participation in the democratic system as a means rather than an end.

Another demonstration of key differences between nationalist extremists and radical right parties is demonstrated by the friendly stance of Jobbik towards Islam. Mudde asserts that in the
view of radical right parties, Muslims represent the conscious rejection of modernity, and this is why they are so fiercely opposed. Jobbik and the radical right both conceive of the Muslim world as a threat to the liberal democratic tradition represented by the west, but because of fundamental differences between the ideology of Jobbik and the radical right, Jobbik views Muslims as allies, not foes. In the Muslim world, Jobbik sees an opportunity for cooperation and collaboration against a shared enemy: the West. Mostly, the international press is too distracted by Jobbik’s extremist rhetoric and actions to report its orientation towards Islam. Whenever Jobbik’s attitude towards Muslims is mentioned, it is brushed aside as a peculiarity – not a puzzle that merits closer scrutiny and holds clues about the party’s more basic outlook. Though Jobbik’s position on Islam is just one aspect of its thought, it betrays a fundamentally differing ideology from the radical right and shows that the one of the party’s defining features is its anti-liberalism.

Though the preceding section provided detail about the particular manifestations of nationalist extremist ideas, in short, what defines the party family is a commitment to a racial concept of the nation, rejection of liberal democracy, rhetoric that intentionally recalls a fascist past, and embrace of paramilitarism. Because these parties have been often been alleged to be fascist or neo-fascist, it is necessary to address these charges and clarify what exactly makes Jobbik and Golden Dawn ‘Thirties Throwbacks’. Although fascism was the only new political ideology to emerge from the twentieth century (or one of two, if you count environmentalism), its very status as an ideology has been challenged by scholars who feel that its lack of consistent application and clearly formulated principles do not allow it to be a defined political ideology. These challenges have been acknowledged and set aside by scholars of fascism, in favor of an approach that seeks to give structure to fascist ideology despite the difficulties caused by its
relatively brief lifespan and its dissimilar manifestations in different countries. This is also the approach that one necessarily adopts when arguing whether or not a modern-day party is ‘fascist’ or ‘neo-fascist’. For my purposes here, I also assume another position of these scholars, and consider Nazism a manifestation of fascism.

The references in the following discussion to ‘fascists’ and ‘fascism’ refer to the group of political movements that had their genesis with Benito Mussolini in Italy in 1919. The definitions of fascism I borrow are based primarily on the Italian and German cases, but other fascist movements that appeared between 1919 and 1945, such as those in Hungary and Spain, are also implicit in any reference to ‘fascists’. Because of this, ‘fascists’ here appear as a distinct historical group that existed within a specific time (1919-1945) and place (Europe). Fascism was inherently an outgrowth of the First World War, and any attempt to extricate it from its time period will ultimately fail – hence the use of the term ‘neo-fascist’ to describe a kinship of ideas and also clearly delineate between two necessarily different occurrences. Ultimately, the term ‘neo-fascist’ does not accurately describe Jobbik and Golden Dawn, but it is close enough that confusion is understandable.

One key reason that parties of the present are by definition excluded from being true fascists, is that the original fascists were not working with the knowledge of a precedent. The symbols and rhetoric they employed were not taboo because they had yet to be formulated: what they did was new. Because parties like Golden Dawn and Jobbik purposefully evoke these groups, they are embracing a sense of history that was never present in fascism. One of fascism’s main features was innovation. It was an untested solution to society’s ills, and that is why it garnered so much support. Jobbik and Golden Dawn are merely throwbacks to that legacy, and it
is partly for this reason that, despite whatever electoral achievements they may have, they are incapable of becoming phenomenal successes like the fascists.

To discover the more nuanced differences between these two party groups, it is necessary to compare definitions of fascism with my definition of nationalist extremists. As described by Robert Paxton, fascism is “marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensating cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants . . . abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.” Though Jobbik and Golden Dawn share with fascism the “belief that one’s group is a victim,” they do not use this to “justif[y] any action, without legal or moral limits, against enemies both internal and external,” in the same way that the fascists did. Golden Dawn more than Jobbik shares fascism’s “need for authority by natural chiefs (always male),” and a belief in the “superiority of the leader’s instincts over abstract and universal reason,” but both parties lack the fascists’ extreme follow-through. Though nationalist extremists and fascists share important ideological features such as “a sense of overwhelming crisis beyond the reach of traditional solutions,” a belief in the “primacy of the group, towards which one has duties superior to . . . the individual,” and a “dread of the group’s decline under the corrosive effects of individualistic liberalism . . . and alien influences,” there are fundamental ideological and practical differences between the two groups.

Paxton is not the only scholar to offer a closer look into the peculiarities of fascism. An easier definition to dissect and compare nationalist extremists and fascists with is that offered by Michael Mann, who defines fascism as “the pursuit of a transcendent and cleansing nation-statism through paramilitarism.” Evaluating Jobbik and Golden Dawn based on their
nationalism, statism, transcendence, cleansing ethos, and paramilitarism, it is clear that although the parties share a number of similarities with fascists, nationalist extremists are ultimately of a different nature.

The nationalism of Jobbik and Golden Dawn is clear, and in their conception of the nation as “essentially one and indivisible, a living and breathing entity,” they are identical to the fascists. To Jobbik and Golden Dawn, to be Hungarian or Greek means “much more than just living in a geographical space . . . something outsiders could not experience, involving a basic identity and emotion beyond reason.” Because nationalist extremists consider ethnic heritage the primary and immutable facet of a person’s identity, they are able to have such allegiance towards the concept of the nation, and also such animosity towards minority groups viewed as inferior.

Though Jobbik and Golden Dawn both argue for increased nationalization of industry and the retreat of the international market, their statist aims are not nearly as explicit nor as central to their ideologies as statism was to the fascists. For the fascists, the answer to the ills of liberalism was the power of the nation united in the state. Jobbik and Golden Dawn certainly promote the return to an economy dominated by state industries, but their statist tendencies are more an expression of their nationalism than a defining feature of their ideology. This difference may simply be due to context. Whereas the original fascists operated in a time in which the nation state was the highest form of political organization, Jobbik and Golden Dawn were born in a world of international organizations in which the ideas of autarkic statism as expressed by the fascists are unrealistic. Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s struggle against the European Union can be seen as the first step towards some sort of statist political order, but the realities of international cooperation and supranational organizations make the fascist conception of statism an antiquated
ideology. Additionally, fascism was animated by opposition to international communism, but the fall of the Soviet Union means that modern parties like Jobbik and Golden Dawn – though they can and do oppose communism – cannot truly share this essential aspect of fascist ideology.

Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s transcendent qualities are also substantially less than those of the fascists. A key feature of the fascists was their desire and ability to transcend traditional societal cleavages, and they “originated from the political right, center, and left alike and drew support from all classes.”47 Though political exigencies sometimes forced fascists into alliances with certain segments of the population, they appealed to and aimed to attract support from more than just a single portion of the population adhering to one side of the left-right spectrum. Jobbik and Golden Dawn, on the other hand, are clearly movements of the extreme right. Jobbik does have a bit more appeal to those of the center-right than does Golden Dawn, but – despite claiming to be the true representatives of the people – neither party can pretend to have the sort of broad appeal the fascists had. Moreover, Michaloliakos said of his party, “We do not aim at a large membership base,”48 in stark contrast to the interwar fascists, who made a point of trying to create mass social movements with membership extending to many different sections of the state. This also further delineates nationalist extremists from the radical right, since populism is a feature cited by many as a defining characteristic of the radical right.49

The cleansing ethos is an aspect of fascist ideology to which Jobbik and Golden Dawn both adhere in some senses and differ from in other respects. Fascism sees those who oppose it as enemies who must necessarily be ‘cleansed’ from the nation. It does not cooperate nor compromise with its enemies. Though different fascists stressed them to different extents, these foes are twofold and correspond somewhat with Wodak’s classifications; there are the racial enemies – those who reside within the boundaries of the state but are not members of the nation
– and political enemies – members of the nation who betray it ideologically. The racial enemies and political enemies of Jobbik and Golden Dawn are clear, but what separates these parties from the fascists is their use of violence in accomplishing this cleansing. Even Golden Dawn, which is more violent than any modern-day European political party, does not come close to approaching the level of violence that fascists perpetrated when they reached position of power similar to what Golden Dawn has now. Golden Dawn may create terror for the immigrant community in Greece, but it has not carried out mass political assassinations. The small number of murders that can be attributed to Golden Dawn makes it look reserved in comparison to the fascists.

Another key difference is the extent to which fascists and nationalist extremists think that cleansing must occur. Unlike the fascists, Jobbik and Golden Dawn do not necessarily object to other races on principle. Whereas the fascists saw it as their duty to spread imperially, Golden Dawn and Jobbik merely wish for those they consider outside of the national family to leave the national territory. Golden Dawn stresses that it has no inherent objection to Pakistani culture per se, but that it wants it to only be practiced in Pakistan, and not in Greece.

Finally, paramilitarism would seem to be an area of similarity for the fascists and the nationalist extremists, but there are key distinctions between both the character and uses of paramilitarism by the two groups. Mann makes clear that fascism was fundamentally an outgrowth of WWI and evolved from economic, political, ideological, and military crises. In Greece and Hungary there have only been economic and political crises. Though in the view of Jobbik and Golden Dawn, there have also been ideological crises, certainly neither country has experienced a military crisis. Although this may seem a minor distinction, it is one of the reasons that fascist paramilitarism and nationalist extremist paramilitarism are so dissimilar. For the fascists, paramilitarism was both a key value and a key organizational feature. The fascists
were bands of armed men before they were parties, and this remained an essential feature of their organizations. The idea that not only could the party create the paramilitary (as in the case of Jobbik), but that a person could be a member of the party and not a member of the paramilitary, would be anathema to the fascists.

In this sense there is a key distinction between the fascist characteristics of Golden Dawn and Jobbik. Even Golden Dawn’s MPs are on the streets busting down immigrant vendors’ stalls and harassing minorities. There is no distinction in Golden Dawn between the political aspects of the party and its street activities – all members must be willing to show their commitment to Golden Dawn through actions. Though in this sense Golden Dawn shares a trait of the fascists that Jobbik does not, the violence levels of Golden Dawn’s paramilitary activities and the fascists’ are extremely dissimilar. Because violence was such a large part of fascist activity, it would be inaccurate – for this among the other reasons already discussed – to label Golden Dawn a fascist party. Similarly, though Jobbik and Golden Dawn embrace violence and advocate irredentism, there is nowhere near the same relish for war in these parties as there was in the fascists.

Another major difference between the fascists and Jobbik and Golden Dawn is their relationship to intellectuals. While fascism was certainly an anti-intellectual ideology, it nevertheless was able to gain a significant following among philosophers and the intelligentsia. Jobbik and Golden Dawn are completely unsupported by intellectuals, and this relates back to the fact that they are unable to transcend societal limits like the fascists were.

This deconstruction of the similarities between the fascists and the nationalist extremists begs the question of what exactly ‘Thirties Throwbacks’ is meant to indicate. This phrase signifies two key features of nationalist extremists: that they are the closest parties to the fascists
to achieve electoral success since the actual fascists themselves, and that they gain inspiration from the fascists. Undoubtedly Jobbik and Golden Dawn have borrowed elements of fascist ideology and practice – paramilitarism being the feature that most prominently displays their fascist ties. Another ‘throwback’ is their “territorial revisionism or aggression towards other nations, as was the case with interwar fascism.” Jobbik and Golden Dawn are the first parties since 1945 to bring back these fascist legacies and have success with them. Though they themselves do not comport exactly with fascist ideology and practice, they do share a number of key similarities. Jobbik and Golden Dawn are putting forth the same sorts of ideologies that the interwar fascists did in a basic sense. Key traits of both movements are the emphasis on a glorious past betrayed by internationalism and capital (both associated with the Jews), a potentially horrible future invaded by dangerous outsiders (Roma and immigrants), and the possibility of a bright and glorious future based on nationalist lines. However, despite these basic ideological similarities, there are a number of important differences between fascists and nationalist extremists in practice. Jobbik and Golden Dawn must be conceptualized as constituting a distinct party group from the fascists.

Until this point, the only nationalist extremists mentioned have been Jobbik and Golden Dawn. It is not unreasonable to question whether these are the only cases of nationalist extremism in Europe. Although the Western European radical right has been addressed and dismissed, the post-Soviet countries of Europe also have far right parties. The Central and Eastern European far right is different from the Western European radical right in several important ways. Firstly, because immigration from Muslim countries is miniscule in Central and Eastern Europe, the post-Soviet far right parties do not have share the Islamophobia and anti-immigrant stances that characterize the radical right. Additionally, many Central and Eastern
European rightists are more explicitly racist than the Western Europeans, and they also are not as wary about associating themselves with a fascist past. The dissimilar confrontations with the legacies of World War II that occurred on the different sides of the Iron Curtain are most likely responsible for this latter distinction.

I will go through a few examples of the more successful extreme right parties in the post-Soviet sphere in order to demonstrate why they are not in fact nationalist extremists, though they possess characteristics that could lead one to assume they are. The most important distinction, which out of hand eliminates the possibility that these parties could be considered nationalist extremists, is that Jobbik is the only party in the former Soviet Union that embraces paramilitarism. Though there are a number of small paramilitary bands in the post-Soviet countries, none is associated with a significant political party.

The Slovak National Party (SNS) shares many of the characteristics of nationalist extremism aside from an embrace of paramilitarism. The party is explicitly racist, engages in virulent rhetorical attacks on Hungarians and Roma, advocates irredentism, and has honored Jozef Tiso, the Nazi puppet who led the First Slovak Republic for the duration of WWII, but it has no paramilitary associations. The Greater Romania Party also engages in anti-Hungarian rhetoric and praise of wartime leaders who collaborated with the Nazis. Interestingly enough though, the party has recently taken on what its leader calls a “philo-Semitic” approach. The Bulgarian party Ataka (Attack, in Bulgarian), despite its name, does not choose to engage in extra-political violence. It is satisfied with the mere espousal of hate speech against perceived enemies of the Bulgarians, with a particular emphasis on Free Masons. Svoboda, or the All-Ukrainian Union, is a party with neo-Nazi roots that espouses anti-Semitic and anti-Russian hate
speech, but falls short of the nationalist extremist criteria because it does not engage in organized violence.

Aside from these four parties – the most successful parties in the post-Soviet sphere that have some of the characteristics of nationalist extremism – there is one small party that does qualify for the label of nationalist extremist: the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). NPD is an organization with deep neo-Nazi leanings. Though the party has never made it into the Bundestag, it has had some success at the regional level in the former East Germany, where the communist regime did not effect the same reckoning with the complicity of the German citizenry in the Holocaust as the West German government did. The party is certainly nationalist and heaps praise on its fascist past, but what qualifies it for inclusion in the nationalist extremist party family is the fact that it engages in extra-political violence. NPD does not have an official paramilitary wing as Jobbik did, but operates instead along the lines of Golden Dawn, where every party member is liable to engage in violent activities. NPD set up so-called ‘no-go zones’ for foreigners in certain cities years before Golden Dawn did the same in Greece. Unlike Golden Dawn and Jobbik, the party’s marginal status means that it mostly attracts disaffected youths. NPD is certainly not as well-structured and organized as Golden Dawn or Jobbik, and it lacks the number of members these parties have. Though NPD meets the criteria for inclusion in the nationalist extremist party family, the application of this label is not particularly enlightening since NPD is and always has been a marginal party. Its relative insignificance in the German political scene makes it unworthy of the interest that Jobbik and Golden Dawn warrant.

Both the character of nationalist extremists and their position in the wider far-right party family are clear. Nationalist extremists are distinguished by their ethnic nationalism and extremism in rhetoric, actions, and beliefs. Because they are fundamentally different from
fascists and the radical right, it follows that theories about why nationalist extremists have been successful will have to be distinct from theories that have been put forward in the past to explain the electoral success of fascists and of the radical right.
Chapter 3. Explaining Nationalist Extremist Success

The rash of radical right successes that began in the 1980s prompted the growth of scholarship seeking to account for these surprising electoral victories. The newfound success of nationalist extremists similarly merits an examination of the unique factors behind this unexpected electoral feat. This chapter fills this theoretical gap and provides a theory to elucidate the causes of nationalist extremist success. In order to do this, I first present a catalogue and evaluation of many prominent theories of radical right success in order to determine their applicability in explicating nationalist extremist cases. After this assessment I present my theory of the reasons for the electoral breakthroughs of nationalist extremists and a detailed explanation of the processes that lead to the rise of a nationalist extremist party. In particular, I highlight the importance of legitimation through supra-political actions given the presence of certain social, political, and economic conditions.

The previous chapter demonstrated that Jobbik and Golden Dawn belong to a party family distinct from the radical right, but it is not necessarily the case that theories about radical right success are irrelevant to nationalist extremist success. The vast body of literature that grew in the wake of FN and FPÖ’s electoral breakthroughs can be informative for studying nationalist extremists because it seeks to explain how established democracies gave significant vote shares to parties more radical than any since the 1940s. The emergence of the radical right in Europe as an electable party group a few decades ago was just as baffling as the success of Jobbik and Golden Dawn is today – perhaps even more so, since at the time these parties had scarcely a precedent outside of the interwar years. Though a straight application of theories that explain the electoral breakthroughs of the radical right would prove inadequate to explain the success of
nationalist extremists, some of these theories – supplemented with ideas more specific to nationalist extremism – help to elucidate the ways in which Jobbik and Golden Dawn managed to achieve electoral success.

A number of scholars have theorized about the radical right, and Roger Eatwell does an excellent job of summarizing ten of the most widely applied theories on the rise of the party family. Because the radical right is not the focus of this thesis, Eatwell’s helpful condensation – rather than a complete appraisal of the extensive radical right literature – is sufficient. For their purposes here, it is simplest to evaluate these theories individually, even though Eatwell acknowledges that they are not usually presented separately, but combined and stressed in different ways by different scholars. Eatwell divides the ten theories into two argument groups: demand and supply. Demand arguments are those that “focus primarily on socioeconomic developments such as the impact of immigration, unemployment, or rapid social change,” and supply arguments are those that stress the messages that reach voters, i.e. leadership programs of the insurgent and mainstream parties, and the role of the media. Though most of these models are insufficient to explain nationalist extremist success, and some are wholly irrelevant, it is useful to go through them to demonstrate the differences between the factors contributing to electoral victories of the radical right and of nationalist extremists. It is worthwhile to evaluate these arguments if only to demonstrate why I feel the need to create an entirely new theory to explain nationalist extremist success.

The demand side arguments Eatwell presents are the single-issue thesis, protest thesis, social breakdown thesis, (reverse) post-material thesis, and economic interest thesis. The single-issue thesis, as its name implies, advances the theory that radical right parties receive votes merely because they stress one topic. For the radical right, that issue is almost always
immigration. However, as Eatwell points out, this simplified theory is easily belied by the fact that most parties campaign on more than just one issue.\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, increased radical right votes do not usually correlate directly with single factors such as increased immigration.\textsuperscript{58} This theory holds little weight for nationalist extremists since these parties express multi-faceted ideologies that – while they may be animated primarily by a single issue – cannot be simplified in the way this thesis suggests.

Related to the relevance of a single issue, Herbert Kitschelt, one of the earliest and most prominent political scientists studying the radical right, put forth the thesis in the mid-1990s that radical right parties would only be electorally successful if they combined their reactionary ideology with free market principles.\textsuperscript{59} Others, such as Simon Bornschier, have rejected this premise, arguing that cultural preferences trump economic concerns for radical right voters.\textsuperscript{60} Kitschelt’s hypothesis is particularly unsuitable to the cases of Jobbik and Golden Dawn, both of which explicitly argue for nationalist and protectionist economic polices and against organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s economic ideas are in keeping with Cas Mudde’s contention that populist radical right parties “defend a nativist economic program based upon economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism.”\textsuperscript{61} Indeed, a 2012 study of party viewpoints found Golden Dawn’s economic profile to be significantly left-wing rather than neo-liberal.\textsuperscript{62}

The protest thesis argues that radical right parties lack any serious ideology and merely receive votes from people who wish to reject established parties.\textsuperscript{63} This theory has been largely disproven by studies of radical right voter profiles and the more obvious fact that most successful radical right parties do have a degree of ideological coherence. The protest thesis especially does
not fit Jobbik or Golden Dawn, whose very explicit ideologies are covered in chapters four and five respectively.

The social breakdown thesis posits that as traditional societal structures (especially those based on class and religion) are eroded, individuals turn to ethnic nationalism for a sense of efficacy and self-esteem. This theory, which presents the idea that the electorate of radical right parties is made up of so-called “modernization losers”, has already been discredited in regards to Jobbik and does not have much relevancy for Golden Dawn either. Greece has experienced globalization and modernization for decades, but Golden Dawn languished in obscurity since the 1980s and has only risen to prominence within the last few years. While societal shifts have occurred in Hungary and Greece as the result of political and economic crises, profiles of the parties’ voters are different from what the social breakdown thesis would suggest.

Related to the social breakdown thesis, the economic interest thesis argues that radical right support typically “comes from the losers in the competition over scarce resources and/or those who suffered from some form of relative deprivation.” Mudde argues that periods of high unemployment can actually be detrimental to the electoral chances of radical right parties because voters are more inclined to turn to established parties, which are seen as better qualified on economic issues. However, he also notes that if a radical right party is able to combine unemployment and high immigration in the minds of the voters, it can potentially benefit from high unemployment. These theories do not hold well for Jobbik, which receives a large proportion of its voters from the educated and employed. Further, because unemployment is so astronomically high amongst the Hungarian Roma population, it is impossible to conceive of members of the Magyar population feeling they have lost out anything to Roma. Golden Dawn’s rhetoric, which declares that every immigrant in Greece represents an unemployed Greek,
supports the economic interest thesis. Though the relationship between immigration and unemployment in Greece is dubious at best, it is certainly true that Golden Dawn’s rise is correlated with unemployment.

Connected to this economic theory, Bornschier argues that because governing parties are constrained by international agreements to continue the pace of economic liberalization (and therefore globalization), they cannot meet the concerns of voters who feel that an increasingly globalized market effects them negatively. Because new parties are unburdened by the reality of conflicting interests between what a governing party is able to do and what it wants to do, radical right upstarts can rail against internationally-set economic policies without consequence. Jobbik definitely used this lack of responsibility to argue against all of the prevailing economic policies in Hungary. This theory has less explanatory power for Golden Dawn’s electoral success, since it was neither the only party espousing radical anti-austerity policies nor the most successful one to do so.

The (reverse) post-material thesis maintains that the so-called post-material agenda, which deemphasizes traditional class and economic interests in favor of lifestyle concerns, such as feminism or environmentalism, is rejected or considered irrelevant by certain segments of the population who then vote for the radical right. This theory suggests that those places where post-material values have developed most strongly, i.e. rich metropolitan areas, would also be those with the highest proportion of radical right voters. Conversely, more rural areas, where traditional societal structures maintain sway, would be less supportive of the radical right. However, in Hungary, it is Budapest that shows the least support for Jobbik, while the countryside is its stronghold. In Greece, there is a similar trend for Golden Dawn support; the
areas of Athens that vote for Golden Dawn are those that have the highest levels of immigrant populations and poverty.

In a vein similar to the post-material thesis, Bornschier contends that the “populist right’s ideological core consists of opposition to the process of societal modernization that has accelerated since the 1960s.” The success of a radical right party would therefore depend on the extent to which traditional cleavages retain their hold on voters, and the responses of the established parties to these grand societal changes. For both the Greek and Hungarian cases, an adapted version of Bornschier’s theory is attractive. Although Greece’s 1967-1974 military dictatorship meant that the country missed out on much of the initial liberalization Bornschier emphasizes, westernization followed quickly after the junta’s fall. Hungary, behind the Iron Curtain until 1989, was unable to experience the so-called societal modernization that swept through Western Europe. This is not to say that the country did not change dramatically and along western lines after the Soviet Union’s fall, but rather that these changes occurred much more rapidly. Bornschier was writing specifically in reference to Western European countries – which experienced modernization as a process over the course of decades – and though the timing may be different than that which Bornschier describes, the reaction against modernization is certainly a large component of the ideology of Jobbik and Golden Dawn. Implicit in an orientation that glorifies a fascist past and emphasizes the noble, but betrayed, heritage of the nation, is a rejection of modern, liberal, western ideals.

Overall, demand side arguments presented about the radical right do not have much relevancy to cases of nationalist extremist success. Of the theories discussed, only Bornschier’s societal modernization theory can be applied effectively to the experiences of both Greece and Hungary, and even this can only be done with accommodations that account for the differing
historical developments of Hungary and Greece from Western Europe. Even given the relevancy of this theory, on its own it can only account for a small aspect of nationalist extremist appeal and does not address the sudden and phenomenal breakthroughs that Jobbik and Golden Dawn experienced. While the demand side theories are mostly lacking in explanative power, the supply side theses are more helpful in accounting for nationalist extremist success.

The arguments Eatwell identifies as supply side are the political opportunity structure thesis, the mediatization thesis, the national traditions thesis, the programmatic thesis, and the charismatic leader thesis. The political opportunity structure thesis holds that when mainstream parties stay towards the center of the ideological spectrum and do not attempt to appeal to voters on issues such as immigration, a new party can do well by focusing on what the parties of the center right ignore. An upstart party takes away votes from the more moderate conservative parties because it provides something voters desire, which other, established parties lack. This theory does not apply well to Greece, where the main established parties made a point of emphasizing immigration issues in the election campaign that saw Golden Dawn’s breakthrough. In Hungary, Jobbik was preceded by an established right-wing party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), and the main center-right party, Fidesz, strays more to the right than the center.

Another part of the political opportunity structure theory is the legitimization, implicit or otherwise, that an established party gives a new party. The main example of this is when a well-known party backs a position held by a newcomer right-wing party in an effort to coopt voters that may be attracted by the new party’s views. Whether or not the established party later retracts their support for the position, the right-wing upstart benefits. If support is withdrawn, the right-wing party appears to have integrity that the established party does not, and voters who care
deeply about the issue will therefore choose to abandon the established party. If the support is maintained, it legitimizes a position of the untested right-wing party, and shows thereby that the new party has ideas of such merit that they can become official positions of a major party. Further, this creates a situation in which the right-wing party is seen as owning a certain issue on the basis that they were the first ones to recognize and vocalize it. As demonstrated by their respective chapters, issues of legitimization by established parties are at play in the cases of Jobbik and Golden Dawn.

Somewhat in contradiction to the political opportunity structure, it has also been theorized that radical right parties are more likely to be successful “when their mainstream right-wing opponents are more moderate.” However, the proponents of this theory also stress that rightist parties will do better “when they themselves are more moderate.” Meanwhile, other theorist hold that if the established center right party is further to the right, there is less room for an upstart right-wing party. Chapters four and five show that regardless of how the established parties attempted to shift their allegiances and ideologies to squeeze out Jobbik and Golden Dawn, these upstarts proved immune to the effects of political maneuvering because they decisively established ownership of the Roma and immigrant issues respectively.

The mediatization theory, as its name implies, highlights the ways in which the radical right manipulates the resources at its disposal in such a way that it gets disproportionate attention from the media. Television media is increasingly replacing print media as the main news source for many, and by its very nature, television encourages sensationalism and a focus on interesting personalities – both of which play directly to the strengths of the right. Additionally, Eatwell states that, “a sudden increase in coverage of a fringe party also seems likely to create a sense that the party is on the move, creating a form of bandwagon.” The extensive domestic
and international media coverage of Jobbik that accompanied the formation of its paramilitary wing, the Magyar Gárda, only slowed once the party had been in government for some months. Golden Dawn’s Greeks-only food handouts and general street violence attracted similar levels of coverage.

Both parties’ actions and rhetoric ensured sustained media attention. Wodak theorizes that the radical right “intentionally provoke[s] the media by violating publicly accepted norms,”79 which forces media coverage. If the media did not register its outrage at these provocations, it would be seen as tacitly accepting them. Furthermore, this coverage supports itself, because the party is invited to comment on its actions, and invariably the justifications for the original offences are just as newsworthy. This serves to keep the party in the media spotlight, because, “other parties and politicians as well as the media are, in turn forced to react and respond continuously to ever-new scandals.”80 Further, Antonis Ellinas states that media exposure can dispel doubts voters may have about the electoral viability of newly-created parties, creating what he terms a “validation effect”.81 Even if this coverage is overwhelmingly negative – as it was in the cases of Jobbik and Golden Dawn – the fact that these parties are constantly in the spotlight raises their visibility and can convince voters who support extreme views but doubt a party’s electability, that electoral success is feasible.

The national traditions thesis “holds that extreme right parties are most likely to be successful when they can portray themselves as in some way a legitimate part of the national tradition.”82 Though Eatwell goes on to specify that explicit identification with Nazism or fascism is detrimental to a party,83 this theory nevertheless has applicability since Jobbik and Golden Dawn positioned themselves so that certain voters saw them as part of the ‘true’ national tradition precisely because of their associations with a dark past. As nationalistic parties, Jobbik
and Golden Dawn presented the viewpoint that they were the groups that cared most about their country’s heritage.

The programmatic thesis holds that although radical right parties may use specific issues to attract support, their issue agendas are relatively unclear, and populism is what actually garners their votes.\footnote{84} Though Golden Dawn and Jobbik do occasionally make populist appeals, populism is by no means a defining characteristic of these parties, and they are too ideologically clear for this thesis to hold weight. To follow this theory would be to completely ignore the more substantive platforms these parties propose in favor of a simplistic view of them as unremarkable populist agitators.

The charismatic leader thesis states, unsurprisingly, that far right parties are held together and attract voters on the basis of a single magnetic persona.\footnote{85} Though Jobbik and Golden Dawn do have strong leaders, they also have notable and important underlings who make headlines in their own right, indicating that the charismatic leader thesis is too simplistic. Expanding on this basic thesis, Carter suggests that, “parties with strong charismatic leaders, centralized organizational structures and efficient mechanisms for enforcing party discipline are likely to perform better at the polls.”\footnote{86} This elaborated hypothesis more accurately characterizes the structures of Jobbik and Golden Dawn, and explains the ability of the parties to achieve ideological coherence.

Of the supply side theories, all but the programmatic thesis hold at least some explanatory weight in relation to nationalist extremists. However, none of these theories can adequately explain why Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to achieve electoral breakthroughs as nationalist extremist parties where all others had failed. Factors such as media exposure and
coherent leadership and party structure certainly aided both parties, but such factors do not answer the greater mystery of nationalist extremist success.

Because different scholars combine these many demand and supply theories in different ways, it is unsurprising that none of the models catalogued by Eatwell contain definitive answers to the successes of Jobbik and Golden Dawn. One such comprehensive theory, advanced by Mudde, states that four main factors are at play in radical right success; the crisis of the welfare state, growing immigration, modernization, and anti-establishment attitudes. While anti-establishment attitudes are relevant to my theoretical framework and rising immigration is an issue in Greece, the other factors are not applicable. In Hungary, there is no great immigration problem. Furthermore, it has been found that voters for Jobbik and Golden Dawn generally have moderate to high levels of education, meaning that they are not the groups most vulnerable to the negative effects of modernization.87

Eatwell also offers his own multivariate theory that sees extremist success as resultant from “growing perceptions of ‘extremist’ legitimacy, rising personal efficacy and declining political trust.”88 Personal efficacy in this sense refers to “an individual’s belief that she/he can affect what happens politically,”89 and is not relevant to nationalist extremist success because notable changes in perceptions of voter efficacy were not seen Greece and Hungary. However, my own theory does adopt Eatwell’s ideas about extremist legitimacy and a decrease in trust for established parties. While these variables are integral to my theoretical framework, I argue that they can only produce nationalist extremist success when combined with certain economic and ethnic conditions in a country. Of comprehensive theories, Eatwell’s comes closest to explaining nationalist extremist success, but it fails to include a number of important factors. Other detailed and multifaceted hypotheses for radical right success are similarly incapable of accounting for
nationalist extremist breakthroughs because they do not address the features unique to nationalist extremists.

Before presenting my own theory of nationalist extremist success, it is useful to first briefly turn to what has been put forward by scholars about Jobbik and Golden Dawn specifically. Though there has been no comparative research on the rise of Jobbik and Golden Dawn, there have been efforts to analyze the parties’ successes separately. In the case of Golden Dawn, focus is usually placed on the flux created by the Euro crisis and the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment – which is stronger in Greece than in most European countries.\(^90\) Predictably, most studies point to the effect of the Euro crisis as the definitive factor.\(^91\) As a result of the crisis, the already decaying and increasingly discredited main political parties in Greece were unable to support their large patronage networks, leading to an increased loss of power. Drawn from this is the belief that Golden Dawn’s ideological steadfastness and outsider status allowed it to take advantage of latent nationalist sentiment in the wake of the delegitimization of the mainstream parties. Most of the studies that highlight the Euro crisis as a cause of Golden Dawn’s success do not address the counterexample of Spain, which has been similarly damaged by the crisis but has no successful right-wing party. Though the Euro crisis and its attendant consequences were certainly factors in the rise of Golden Dawn, a more complicated framework is needed.

In the case of Jobbik, some emphasis has been placed on the tensions between the Roma and Magyar populations that began in 2006 and continued for several years in a series of high-profile attacks involving Roma.\(^92\) Also of note is the role played by the center-right party Fidesz in providing legitimization for Jobbik through the adoption of issues and legislation important to the extreme right. There have also been efforts to discredit some of the demand-side arguments
about the radical right that could apply to Jobbik, and it has been found that far from being so-called ‘modernization losers’, Jobbik’s voters are comparatively well-to-do. The unemployed are less likely to vote for Jobbik, and low qualifications, poverty, and lack of social capital were not found to have a significant impact on one’s likelihood of voting for Jobbik. Though attention has been drawn to economic dissatisfaction, studies of Jobbik voters have found that support for the party is based on cultural and ideological grounds, not economic ones; the factor with the most predictive capacity for determining if one would vote for Jobbik was an anti-Roma attitude.

The theories that have been advanced to explain the success of Jobbik and Golden Dawn are inadequate for several reasons. Firstly, though some papers written specifically in reference to Jobbik and Golden Dawn acknowledge that the parties have exceptional characteristics not shared with the radical right, none of the studies accurately place the parties into a party family. These papers generally fall into one of three categories in reference to party classification; they categorize Jobbik or Golden Dawn as mere iterations of the radical right, they acknowledge the differences these parties have without creating a new category for them, or they ignore the question of classification altogether. Declining to place Jobbik and Golden Dawn in a distinct party family or ignoring questions of party family causes analytical flaws. Precisely what makes Jobbik and Golden Dawn interesting cases is that they are so far beyond the previously established electability profile. Failing to acknowledge that their successes present significant anomalies causes little innovation in the theories explaining their breakthrough.

This is the other problem with existing scholarship on Jobbik and Golden Dawn: the novelty of their electoral feats has not caused any corresponding invention in the theoretical realm. When successful radical right parties first became mainstream in the 1980s, it was only
natural that new theories – involving variables different from those of theories about why people vote for the center right – were presented to explain this electoral sensation. Because the main question in party analysis is why people vote for a certain party, the explanations for nationalist extremist success necessarily stem from the same basic reasons; how voters view the world, why a certain party’s message is more appealing than another, etc. Because Jobbik and Golden Dawn are the forerunners of a new party type, it follows that although the reasons they have done well may be similar to the reasons the radical right has been popular, these explanations are inevitably distinct.

As demonstrated by Jobbik and Golden Dawn, nationalist extremist success is contingent upon two things: the presence of certain political, economic, and social conditions within the country and a demonstration of legitimacy by the party. In and of themselves, these criteria do not necessarily represent a break from radical right scholarship. Indeed, some of the conditions that I argue are necessary to make nationalist extremist success possible are very similar to those posited by radical right theorists. What is unique and counterintuitive about my theory is that I argue that instead of making a party unelectable, paramilitarism and other supra-political actions lend legitimacy to a party that espouses extremist rhetoric and allow an electoral breakthrough. As shown in the Hungarian and Greek cases, given specific conditions within a country, a well-organized nationalist extremist party that backs up its rhetoric with actions can gain a significant share of the vote and usurp the place of more traditional radical right parties.

Before the role and nature of a national extremist party’s supra-political actions can be explained, it is necessary to have an overview of the circumstances that make these activities both possible and attractive. Primary among these preconditions is economic turmoil. Poor and deteriorating economic conditions are nothing new to scholarship about the right. National
economic conditions directly relate to the lives and well-being of every member of the nation and, because all other societal factors are necessarily impacted by economic circumstances, economic success and development are primary amongst the goals of government. If non-ideologically aligned voters are completely or mostly satisfied with the way the incumbent party is handling economic affairs, there is little reason to vote for another party. Even if some voters were partially dissatisfied, this would be reason to vote for the incumbent’s main established opponent party. Under ordinary circumstances, there is little desire for a party as outside of the system as nationalist extremists. There is always a certain fraction of the electorate that will stump for nationalist extremists no matter the greater societal conditions, but this group is generally miniscule and cannot on its own account for vote shares like those received by Jobbik and Golden Dawn. However, when economic conditions are increasingly poor with no better end visible, voters can become disillusioned with the incumbent government and also with established parties in general.

Poor and worsening economic conditions cause people to fear for their stations in life. If things are going poorly, the conventional logic is that it must be someone’s fault. The usual and most obvious target of blame is the government, which, if not directly responsible for the economic turmoil, is expected to fix it. Should the government prove unable to do this, it follows that the governing party should be abandoned. The obviousness of this point has been borne out empirically in recent years by the fact that only one European Prime Minister in power at the outbreak of the Euro Crisis has been able to retain this office: Angela Merkel. Economic dissatisfaction can take on new dimensions when extreme conditions occur in a country with ethnic tensions between a minority ethnicity group and the majority ethnicity.
Contrary to what the economic interest thesis would suggest, it is not necessary that this ethnic conflict be directly related to the economic problems. Rather, it is enough for a nationalist extremist party to take advantage of existing economic unrest and turn this anger, frustration, and search for someone to blame on a scapegoat. For this strategy to be effective, the nationalist extremist party must focus on a minority group that is already widely disliked within the country. It is also helpful if the established parties have proven either unable or unwilling to address these widespread concerns about the minority ethnic group. By emphasizing resentment against this group, the nationalist extremist party is able to conflate economic problems with issues with the minority group, and in doing so offer an implicit solution: solve the ethnic problem to fix the economy. By establishing itself as the most legitimate party on the minority issues, the nationalist extremist party is also able to argue that it holds the answer to economic problems.

Because of the flux caused by economic uncertainty, new solutions that may seem extreme in more calm economic settings can gain traction. This is not to say that severe economic turmoil directly causes political extremism (again, Spain is the archetypal counterexample to this). However, given existing ethnic tensions, poor economic conditions serve only to further increase conflicts. As established parties lose legitimacy in the eyes of voters as a result of the economic situation, the mainstream’s calls for moderation in ethnic conflicts also lose credence amongst a certain segment of the population. As extreme parties blow ethnic frictions out of proportion, they add to the tasks of a government already struggling to control the economic situation.

The deteriorating economic situation therefore causes two serious and related problems. It leads directly to a loss in confidence and trust in the established parties and indirectly to a heightening in ethnic antagonisms. Though a nationalist extremist party will not necessarily pick
up all the votes that would have previously gone to the established party, as voters turn away from established parties, they are increasingly open to new possibilities. Even those voters who support the mainstream opposition are forced to make the judgment call that the opposition will be more able to solve the country’s problems than the incumbent. This reevaluation of priorities leaves open the possibility that there are other parties that may prove more effective at handling these problems.

Another key precondition for nationalist extremist success is radical change in the country’s political landscape. As previously well-established parties crumble due to their inability to adapt to severe economic stress, space is created for upstart parties who challenge the increasingly delegitimized political system. In both Greece and Hungary, the major center-left parties collapsed shortly before Golden Dawn and Jobbik’s electoral breakthroughs. As the established political parties became discredited, these nationalist extremist parties were able to offer a radical alternative to politics as usual. Their supra-political actions further demonstrated a commitment to principles that was seen as lacking amongst the distrusted establishment parties.

Financial turmoil and the delegitimization of established parties leads to an indirect heightening of ethnic tensions is by giving increased credibility to the platform of nationalist extremists. Nationalist extremists are anti-system by nature, so as the country plunges into economic distress, authority is given to some of their views about the need for radical change within the state. This in turn opens up the possibility in the minds of some voters that the party may be right about their more extreme, nationalistic views. Economic crisis makes nationalist extremists more vocal, and they support their words through actions. These actions serve to validate their claims in a circular way. Nationalist extremists assert that ethnic minority groups are one of the main causes of the declining economic situation, and as they do so more
vociferously and with violent and menacing actions, ethnic tensions do increase along with economic ones. In this way, economic crisis serves to indirectly increase ethnic tensions.

What becomes crucial at this junction is the failure of the incumbent government to solve the country’s increasing economic and ethnic problems. Failing to alleviate the growing tensions in the country, the incumbent government loses much of its previous support and alternative parties begin to look more and more attractive. Both Greece and Hungary experienced the collapse of major political parties, creating an uncertainty about established parties more generally that Golden Dawn and Jobbik benefitted from. Additionally, the rhetoric of the nationalist extremists – which poses solutions to solve both the country’s ethnic and economic problems – looks increasingly alluring. It has been theorized that only a certain minority segment of a country can ever be induced to vote for a party such as Jobbik or Golden Dawn. Even if we ignore the rise of fascists in the interwar period and assume that this proposition is true, this portion of the population, though a minority, is still large enough to be significant.

Nationalist extremists are the most radical parties serving in European parliaments today, and severe economic conditions and ethnic tensions alone are not enough to get them elected. What is crucial to nationalist extremist success given these conditions is that the party legitimizes itself in the eyes of the voters. There are several factors that lend legitimacy to a party, but the most important and unique to the nationalist extremists is that they demonstrate their worth by other means than rhetoric alone. Because what they propose is so extreme, it would be inconsistent with their character for nationalist extremists to follow the established paths of regular political parties. Even, radical right parties are careful not to trespass beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior for a major political force. The appeal of nationalist extremists, however, lies precisely in their extremity.
Because parties like Jobbik and Golden Dawn inveigh against the empty political rhetoric employed by elites, they choose to demonstrate their value in a way that is both most consistent with their messages of nationalist solutions and more immediately effective than the opaque political workings of an already-discredited political machine: supra-political tactics. In keeping with their bellicose nationalistic demeanor, nationalist extremists establish paramilitary wings that operate on a tier deemed unacceptable by other political parties. Both Jobbik and Golden Dawn directed their paramilitaries so that their effects would be felt primarily by those voters who are most inclined to support these parties’ viewpoints. It is precisely these paramilitary tactics that lent Jobbik and Golden Dawn legitimacy in the eyes of a small, but significant, portion of the electorate. These actions demonstrate commitment to all elements of nationalist extremist rhetoric. They show that the parties understand, take seriously, and have the solutions to the ethnic problems, and that they do not trust the political system. Voters who may have had some sympathy to the extremist rhetoric of Jobbik and Golden Dawn were shown the utility these parties could have before they were even elected. Therefore, in the eyes of certain voters, Jobbik and Golden Dawn were not just seen as legitimate, but as the only parties that cared about the situation enough to actually do something about it.

Another effect of paramilitary activities is that they dramatically increase the recognition of the party. Whether they loved them or hated them, almost every Hungarian and Greek knew about the street activities of Jobbik and Golden Dawn. This meant that these small parties were not only able to dramatically increase their memberships in the run-up to the elections, but that they were able to change themselves from obscure groups with no history in government, to the most discussed parties in their respective countries. When deciding whom to vote for, the rational voter takes into consideration not only what a party says it will do if given the chance,
but also what it has done in the past. This can make it hard for new, untested parties to gain traction in the electoral market. Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to overcome this obstacle by creating a concrete image of what they would do in office without having to first be elected. This allowed them to compete with and overcome the established radical right parties in their respective countries. What Jobbik and Golden Dawn had that these parties did not, was a proven history of accomplishments and a demonstrated willingness to fundamentally change the political system.

Also important not only to their electoral success, but to their ability to effectively coordinate supra-political actions were the organizational hierarchies and coherent ideological programs of Jobbik and Golden Dawn. Organization is key to a nationalist extremist party because it allows for actions across a country to be directed and timed effectively. Further, because of their tiered structures, Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to respond quickly and coherently to new issues as they arouse. The hierarchical nature of the parties also meant that their ideology was clearly presented, allowing voters to view the parties as legitimate and serious organizations, rather than hodgepodge of extremist rhetoric.

In summation, nationalist extremist parties are able to achieve electoral success only when they target their rhetoric and actions in a way that takes advantage of preexisting ethnic tensions during a time of political and economic turmoil. Key to this is caveat that nationalist extremists can only appear as viable alternatives once widespread uncertainty about established parties has gripped the country. In the cases of Hungary and Greece, this happened as the result of the collapse of major political parties that caused voters to doubt the political system more generally. In the face of severe economic, social, and political crises, voters will sometimes turn to a well-organized nationalist extremist party if it can demonstrate its worth through supra-
political actions. The use of paramilitary tactics is key because it demonstrates the legitimacy of the party and gives people confidence in the nationalist extremist upstart despite a history of poor electoral showings.
In June 2009, Jobbik won three seats in European Parliament. Though opinion polls in the run-up to the race suggested the party would win anywhere from three to eight percent of the vote, it ended up getting just shy of fifteen percent. In April of the next year, Jobbik continued its electoral accomplishments by garnering almost seventeen percent of the votes in the first round of the Hungarian parliamentary elections. It eventually earned forty-three seats in Hungarian Parliament, making it the third largest party. Given that Fidesz won more than half of the votes in both of these elections and held over two-thirds of the seats in Hungarian Parliament, Jobbik’s gains may seem marginal. However, if one considers that in the 2006 Hungarian Parliamentary elections, Jobbik – in an alliance with the established radical right party MIÉP and a small agricultural party – was barely able to garner two percent of the vote, the 2009 and 2010 electoral victories represent unparalleled electoral gains for a party in an established European democracy.

In this chapter, I present the empirical case of Jobbik and demonstrate not only that the party fits the nationalist extremist mold, but that its electoral breakthrough was a result of the causal pathway outlined in the previous chapter. This analysis is broken down into two main parts: first an explanation and catalogue of Jobbik’s ideology and actions, followed by a clarification of the factors that allowed the party to win as many votes as it did. The first section demonstrates both Jobbik’s nationalism and the party’s extremism of tactics and beliefs. Because Jobbik markets itself as a party deeply dissatisfied with the status quo on everything from the local to the global scale, this section also covers the rudiments of Hungarian history that are necessary to understand the positions Jobbik takes. In addressing Jobbik’s views, I also discuss
the degree to which these opinions are popular in Hungarian society. The second section explores the party’s electoral breakthrough and stresses the importance of Jobbik’s paramilitary activities in legitimizing the party and making it an attractive option given the political and economic situation in Hungary.

A Profile of Jobbik

Jobbik is first and foremost a nationalist party. It states that its “fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests,” which it does by standing “up against the ever more blatant efforts to eradicate the nation as the foundation of human community.” While these descriptions demonstrate Jobbik’s nationalism, the party’s rhetoric and actions demonstrate its extremity. Calling itself a “principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party,” Jobbik has revealed that some of the other principles it holds are antiziganism, anti-Semitism, irredentism, Turanism, and a belief in the use of paramilitarism. Gábor Vona, the party chairman, has stated, “we are not democrats.” Unlike successful parties of the radical right in Western Europe, Jobbik makes no effort to hide its associations with interwar fascism and does not temper its appeals to appear moderate. Instead, Jobbik has constructed a unique ideological position that has gained it a solid base of support amongst the Hungarian electorate.

Though to an unacquainted observer it may appear that Jobbik’s ideas are little more than a potpourri of extremist reactionary stances, the party’s ideology – though based in part on disproven theories and biological racism – is coherent and, for the most part, consistent. Given the proper context, some of Jobbik’s seemingly bizarre positions, such as its favorable stance towards Islam (in contrast to the anti-immigrant and anti-Islam sentiment that dominates the radical right) or its encouragement of closer ties with Russia at the expense of the West (despite
the fact that Hungary spent four decades under oppressive Soviet rule) make sense when one understands the major ideological tenets Jobbik proposes. To understand Jobbik’s beliefs, it is necessary to examine the reasons the party was formed.

Jobbik was originally founded in 2002 as a right-wing Christian student group at a Budapest university. Its transformation into a political party the following year was motivated by dissatisfaction with political and cultural conditions in Hungary. Initially the student group was supportive of the center-right Fidesz – Vona even served on a Fidesz civil association committee with the party’s leader, Viktor Orbán106 – but, members quickly became disillusioned with the stagnation of Fidesz and decided to form a party correlating more closely with their anti-system views. Jobbik was not just dissatisfied with Fidesz, but with the entire Hungarian political system that had emerged in the wake of independence.

Youth was naturally a defining feature of the student group that eventually became Jobbik, and is still an important aspect of the party’s support base. Young Hungarians could not recall the suffering their parents and grandparents endured under Soviet rule, but they could harken back to high levels of employment in state industries and an economy that was not subject to the vagaries of the world market. Whereas the older generations of Hungarians were more willing to accept a difficult transition to western-style democracy on the grounds that it meant an escape from authoritarian communism, the younger generation conceived of westernization as an economic mistake and the accompanying multicultural liberalism as a threat.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989, Hungary gained its independence and Hungarians were hopeful that the new era of democracy would usher in prosperity and growth. However, the transition to a market-oriented economy from a centrally planned one entailed
harsh restructuring measures. Austerity, implemented to encourage investment and curb inflation, led to recession and a sharp decline in living standards in the short term. Hungary’s citizens, shielded by the Soviet Union from the adverse effects of capitalism for two generations, felt these effects especially hard. Short-term disaffection with the temporary pains of adjustment gave way to deep-seated resentment as successive Hungarian governments of both the right and the left promoted economic liberalization along western lines, but did not significantly improve the domestic economic situation.

The genesis of Jobbik stemmed from disappointment with the way the established parties handled Hungary’s political and economic transition. Vona has asserted that the main parties “deliberately and completely destroyed the country,” and that the two main reasons for the transformation of the student group into a political party were the “crippled state of the conservatives following the unexpected defeat of the 2002 elections,” and the “failure of the entire Hungarian political elite in managing the economic transition of the 90’s.” Although the post-communist transition to capitalism was presented as being for the benefit of all Hungarians, economic power remained largely in the hands of the pre-1989 elite, which had managed to take advantage of the chaotic transition period. Even Fidesz refers to the period after the fall of the Soviet Union as one of “wild capitalism.” Evidence of Hungarian disappointment with this period can be gleaned from a 2010 Pew survey that reported that 72% of Hungarians said they were worse off in 2010 than under communism – a higher percentage than any other post-Soviet country polled.

Although not in favor of a return to communism, Jobbik is against western institutions, and this distrust is apparent among its supporters. In a survey of Jobbik’s Facebook fans, 68% said that to them the EU meant “the loss of cultural and national identity,” whereas only 5% of
the total Hungarian population responded this way. Speaking about foreign investment in Hungary, Gyöngyösi claimed, “We have basically lost all of our national wealth and our national property. We have basically nothing in Hungarian hands at the moment. It is all in the hands of foreign entrepreneurs and investors.” In this vein of thought, Jobbik argues that, “Global capitalism . . . has broken down,” and the party therefore advocates “orienting our external economic trade eastwards thereby decreasing our homeland’s dependence on the West.”

Jobbik, sees the West as a pariah that seeks to suppress the country’s cultural heritage as part of a wider plot to exploit Hungary for economic gain.

In 2008, the International Monetary Fund, European Union, and World Bank agreed to an emergency loan to bolster Hungary’s finances, realizing Jobbik’s fears about international capitalism. The loan, which eventually totaled twenty billion Euros and was implemented in March 2009, was contingent upon, among other things, cuts in public sector wages, pensions, social benefits, and other government spending. This indicated not only that the modernization and westernization of the Hungarian economy after 1989 had been a failure, but, that – in the view of some – Hungary was dependent on the very organizations that had been responsible for its disastrous transition in the first place. This can be seen as one of the main reasons that by 2009 the proportion of Hungarians in favor of marketization had dropped to 40%, down from 80% in 1991.

Because of these degenerating economic conditions, large segments of the Hungarian population began to question not only the utility of western economic and social liberalism, but also the legitimacy of the native elite implementing this change. As all the major Hungarian parties coalesced in agreement on the necessity of this transition, the voice of those who felt Hungary was being led down a detrimental path was marginalized. Jobbik was created to address
this absence of opposition – to give voice to those who felt not only that the country’s economic future was being sacrificed at the expense of the Hungarian people, but also that Hungarian culture was being obliterated in favor of western multiculturalism. Further compounding dissatisfaction with the established parties, the younger generation of Hungarians had no memory of Viktor Orbán as the hero who demanded the pullout of the Soviet army from Hungary. They therefore evaluated him and his Fidesz party on the grounds of present economic conditions and were not willing to make allowances for Orbán’s present difficulties on account of his historic role in gaining Hungarian independence.

Though Jobbik’s formation stemmed from dissatisfaction with what it saw as the related decline in Hungary’s economy and traditions, the party had relatively little authority in the economic sphere and was able to mobilize more easily on cultural issues. One of the first major and well-publicized activities Jobbik engaged in was a countrywide effort in the winter of 2003 to reemphasize what it saw as the diminished role of religion in the celebration of Christmas. To do this, the newly organized party erected wooden crosses across the country in prominent public spaces. This unusual act – backed by the national catholic and protestant churches – brought Jobbik media coverage throughout the country. Despite the recognition it gained from these Christmas activities, Jobbik had yet to gain significant support among the Hungarian electorate. Therefore, for the 2006 parliamentary elections it allied with MIÉP and an agricultural party in an electoral coalition. In spite of the coalition’s failure at the ballot box, a high-profile scandal shortly after the election allowed Jobbik to gain both relevance and popularity.

Shortly after the 2006 election, the victorious Socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány gave a speech at a private celebration in which he said that he and his party “lied throughout the last year-and-a-half, two years,” boasting that, “we lied in the morning, we lied in the
evening.”117 During the obscenity-laced address, he went on to note of his government’s tenure in the previous four years, “you cannot quote any significant government measure we can be proud of,” and continued that “no European country has done something as boneheaded as we have.”118 The speech – which was secretly recorded and released to the media – set off a wave of protests calling for the resignation of Gyurcsány and his government. These demonstrations, which lasted a little over a month and took place all over the country, became the largest and most violent instance of civil disobedience in Hungary since the 1956 Revolution. Though Fidesz, the main opposition to Gyurcsány’s Socialist party (MSZP), played the largest role of any political party in organizing protests, Jobbik also led rallies and encouraged its supporters to demonstrate.

Vociferous denunciation of the Socialists gained Jobbik some clout and recognition amongst the Hungarian public. Ultimately, Gyurcsány refused to resign and stayed in office for another three years, further damaging his party’s reputation. Gyurcsány became an especially appealing target for Jobbik’s ire, because during the political transition of the early 1990s, he had amassed a large private fortune and become one of the wealthiest people in Hungary. The Socialists also suffered a number of smaller scandals during Gyurcsány’s tenure. The head of the youth organization (who was also an MP) was arrested for embezzlement in 2007, and by 2010 two Socialist district mayors were charged with financial crimes.

In the midst of the 2006 protests, an unrelated incident allowed Jobbik to further boost its popularity and profile. On October 15th in the tiny village of Olaszliszka, an ethnic Magyar man and his two daughters were driving through a Roma neighborhood when a young Roma girl ran in front of their car. Although the girl fell, she was not seriously injured, and the man stopped his car. Assuming she had been killed, several members of the girl’s family set upon the car, broke
the windshield, dragged the driver from his seat, and beat him to death in front of his daughters. The shocking nature of the crime ensured that it received extensive news coverage throughout the country. Though eight of the attackers were arrested and eventually given jail sentences, Jobbik promoted the episode as an example of “gypsy crime” and as evidence of the problem posed by the Roma population in Hungary. The Olaszliszka incident marked the adoption of the Roma issue as one of Jobbik’s main party tenets, and although this matter was not originally one of the reasons for the foundation of the party, anti-Roma activism fit naturally with Jobbik’s general nationalist ethos. While the Olaszliszka case was not explicitly given as the motive for the foundation Jobbik’s paramilitary wing, the Magyar Gárda, the group’s creation in August of the following year was certainly influenced by the long-term uproar Olaszliszka caused.

The Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) is an organization created by Vona that was “set up in order to carry out the real change of regime and to rescue Hungarians,”\textsuperscript{119} and “prepare youth spiritually and physically for extraordinary situations when it might be necessary to mobilize the people,”\textsuperscript{120} because Hungary lacks “physical, mental or spiritual self-defense.”\textsuperscript{121} In a press release from 2011, Jobbik clarified that it set up the Gárda “with the objective of bringing about public security in the countryside, something that the state and police could no longer guarantee.”\textsuperscript{122} Jobbik views the police and army as deficient because they are non-ideological, non-partisan forces. The party was determined to create a group that would correct the perceived moral deficits of these forces. Like the interwar fascists, it was attracted by the idea of having an armed wing that could serve as a force to advance the Jobbik agenda through supra-political means.

Magyar Gárda began with the induction of fifty-six members (an effort to symbolize the ties between the Gárda and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution) on August 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2007 outside Buda
Castle, the historic seat of the Hungarian royalty. The ceremony was presided over by Lajos Für, the former Minister of Defense in Hungary’s first post-communist government, and attended by Mária Wittner, a hero of the 1956 Revolution and, at the time, a Fidesz MP. The inductees, clad in uniforms of black boots, vests, and pants, white shirts, red and white scarves, and black caps emblazoned with red and white stripes, were blessed by priests from Hungary’s Catholic, Calvinist, and Protestant churches.

Despite equivocations made by Vona and other Jobbik members about the purposes and appearances of the Gárda, it is apparent that the group, which eventually reached a membership of several thousand, was in essence a paramilitary organization. It is important to note, and Jobbik is adamant in pointing out, that the Gárda was never armed and none of its members were ever directly linked to violent attacks. However, the implications of the organization and its activities were clear. While it is true that the Gárda uniforms resemble traditional Hungarian folk costumes, marching in formation, saluting, and chanting in unison are certainly not customs of the Hungarian folk tradition.

Even the Gárda uniforms have been a source of controversy and contention. The red and white striped crests on the front of the Gárda vests and hats recall the flag used by the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party, the national socialist party founded in 1939 that was put in power by the Nazis in 1944 and led Hungary until its defeat in 1945. During their reign, the Arrow Cross Party murdered thousands of Jews and deported tens of thousands more to Auschwitz. The party’s flag featured the Árpád stripes, the red and white stripes of the Árpád Dynasty that founded Hungary in the ninth century. However, the Arrow Cross flag used nine stripes, whereas the Gárda’s crest only has eight. On Jobbik’s website as part of a section called “Arpad-striped flag”, the history of the flag is given extensive treatment, and it is noted that the stripes are used not only in
Hungary’s official coat of arms, but also in the crests of several municipalities. While the Árpád stripes – despite their associations with the fascist Arrow Cross Party – are not themselves fascist symbols, it is hard to miss the symbolism inherent in a group of uniformed right-wing Hungarians advocating the protection of the Hungarian nation and marching in formation through Roma neighborhoods. Despite their efforts at plausible deniability, it would be naïve to miss the Gárda’s homage to the numerous European fascist groups that marched against ethnic minorities in the interwar period.

In the roughly sixteen months between Magyar Gárda’s founding and its disbandment in December 2008 by order of a Budapest court, the group held numerous marches and demonstrations in Roma neighborhoods, receiving extensive coverage from Hungarian media outlets of all political persuasions. The group was outlawed on the grounds that its marches through Roma villages were acts of deliberate intimidation not covered by the right to freedom of assembly. Though none of these rallies ended in violence against Roma, their implication – some night marches took place by torchlight – was clear, as was their similarity to historical fascist groups. It was not uncommon for marches to culminate in rallies where speakers argued for the segregation of the Roma from the rest of society.

Magyar Gárda activities were not confined only to marches. In some remote rural areas, the Gárda acted as a secondary police force. In parts of northeastern Hungary with large Roma populations, there were phone numbers Magyar residents could call to receive a visit from Gárda members if they had been the victims of “gypsy crime”. A local newspaper survey in one northeastern village found that 80% of residents trusted Magyar Gárda to ensure their security more than the national police. The Magyar Gárda demonstrated that Jobbik was not satisfied
with merely espousing rhetoric, but was willing to take the necessary steps to validate their commitment to the protection of the Hungarian people.

The mainstream media, both in Hungary and internationally, vociferously condemned the Magyar Gárda, but this only served to increase both the popularity and recognition of Jobbik. Despite its relatively brief existence and negative press, the Gárda put Jobbik on the political map; many Hungarians heard of the Magyar Gárda before they had heard of Jobbik itself. Nor did the ban on Gárda activities accomplish much. The ostensibly different but in reality merely renamed, New Hungarian Guard was formed almost immediately after the original organization was outlawed. However, in the interest of escaping arrest, the new organization toned down its high-profile rallies in favor of more benign activities such as food distribution and flood disaster assistance.129

The persistence of the Gárda after its banning further demonstrated Jobbik’s anti-establishment nature and its willingness to challenge a system it viewed as morally bankrupt. A month after the ban was issued, over a hundred and fifty people, including Vona, were cited for holding an induction ceremony for new Gárda members.130 In further defiance of the ban, Vona wore the official Magyar Gárda vest (the display of the Magyar Gárda uniform was also outlawed) to his first session of Hungarian Parliament, following up on a promise he made during the campaign. Additionally, all three of Jobbik’s MEPs wore partial Gárda uniforms to their first session in European Parliament.131 These moves can be seen as a nod to Zoltán Meskó, one of the early national socialist leaders in interwar Hungary, who wore the SA uniform to Hungarian Parliament in 1931.132 Furthermore, on the cover of Jobbik’s 2010 electoral manifesto, Radical Change, Jobbik MP Sándor Pörzse is pictured wearing the Gárda vest and scarf.
Magyar Gárda also inspired the foundation of numerous copycat groups that patrolled Roma neighborhoods with more violent results.\(^{133}\) Far from distancing themselves from these paramilitary groups, Jobbik officials chose to embrace them. In 2009, György Budaházy, the leader of one such group called the Hungarian Arrows National Liberation Army, was arrested on charges of planning attacks on parliamentarians. His band also claimed responsibility for throwing Molotov cocktails at a Socialist MP’s house and beating up a television host. Despite all this, Jobbik has called Budaházy and his group the “victims of political injustice,”\(^{134}\) and Krisztina Morvai, a Jobbik MEP and the party’s second most prominent personality after Vona, regularly attended sessions of the European Parliament wearing a shirt that read “Freedom for Budaházy.”\(^{135}\) Further support for violent groups can be inferred from statements Jobbik MP György Gyula Zagyva made to a conservative Hungarian daily: “Just as there was a time in the United States for the Ku Klux Klan, the time has come for the emergence of a Hungarian Ku Klux Klan.”\(^{136}\) While Jobbik may not have gone so far as to have its own paramilitary group commit violent attacks, its support for this sort of behavior is clear.

It is clear that the Magyar Gárda was created as an answer to the Jobbik-popularized problem of “gypsy crime”. Though no explicit references to Roma were made in the founding documents of the Magyar Gárda, the organization’s creation coincided with the most sensational Roma-Magyar confrontation in years and the majority of its assemblies (aside from inauguration ceremonies which were held mostly in important public squares in Budapest) took place in the form of marches through Roma villages. Despite Jobbik’s protestations to the contrary, the notion of “gypsy crime” – which posits that the Roma population is a characteristically criminal element that engages in “a unique form of delinquency, different from the crimes of the majority in nature and force”\(^{137}\) – is inherently a biologically racist idea. Although Jobbik states that it is
“simply beyond dispute . . . that certain specific criminological phenomenon are predominately and overwhelmingly associated with this minority [Roma],”\textsuperscript{138} it claims to blame the Roma community’s “peculiar socio-cultural background, not genetic pre-determination.”\textsuperscript{139} This caveat was most likely inserted to distance Jobbik’s position from that of the Nazis, who saw Gypsy criminality as “a transmitted genetic disease”.\textsuperscript{140} Though Jobbik may not go as far as the Nazis did, the party uses language and tactics in regard to the Roma that are closer to the Nazis than any other group since.

Jobbik’s attitude towards the Roma is by no means unique in Hungary. A 2002 study found that over half of Hungarians agreed, “The tendency to commit crime is in the Roma nature.”\textsuperscript{141} In 2009, this idea was given credence by the police chief of Hungary’s fourth largest city Miskolc, who said in a speech that the majority of criminals are Roma and that all robberies in the months preceding his speech could be attributed to Roma.\textsuperscript{142} Although he was initially removed from office for his comments, he was reinstated shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{143} Also in 2009, the Hungarian Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights stated his belief in the existence of gypsy crime and contrasted Roma and Magyar society.\textsuperscript{144} Jobbik’s rhetoric is just one outgrowth of Hungary’s deep-seated antiziganism, and in this one can see why the party’s popularity rose so dramatically once it began accompanying its anti-Roma speech with Magyar Gárda patrols.

In addition to encountering extreme racism in Hungarian society and being subject to virulent rhetoric even at the hands of supposedly mainstream politicians, the vast majority of Roma in Hungary subsist in conditions of dire poverty that rival the third world. During the communist era, Roma were heavily integrated into the workforce due to Soviet policies requiring full employment. The official communist program was the “dispersal of compact Roma communities, resettlement, mandatory education and compulsory wage labor,”\textsuperscript{145} all with the
intention of assimilating them into socialist society. However, after the fall of Soviet rule in Hungary, the communist principles of full employment were abandoned, and Roma – the vast majority of whom were unskilled workers – were often the first to be fired by their Magyar bosses. The Roma in Hungary – despite forced integration under Austrian Empress Maria Theresa, her son Joseph II,\(^{146}\) and more recently under Hungary’s Soviet rulers – maintain increasingly poor and marginalized communities that are largely separate from those of ethnic Magyars. Almost since their arrival in Europe roughly a half millennia ago, the Roma have been a persecuted group. Though the Soviets suppressed antiziganism as part of their policy of creating a unified socialist society based on class solidarity, anti-Roma feeling never really subsided in Hungary. This became evident as soon as communist rule in Hungary came to an end. Magyar prejudice against Roma is alarmingly widespread and has increased dramatically in the last two decades.

The Hungarian Roma population, thought to comprise anywhere from eight to ten percent of Hungary’s ten million citizens, has an estimated unemployment rate of around seventy percent and a high school graduation rate of less than five percent.\(^{147}\) This latter statistic is unsurprising given that Roma children in Magyar-majority schools are often put into remedial classes and most Roma-majority schools use simplified curriculums.\(^{148}\) A 2005 World Bank study reported that 26.3% of the Hungarian Roma population lived in poverty, while the figure for non-Roma was only 3.6%.\(^{149}\) However, a 2011 Hungarian study estimated that “out of Hungary’s 750,000 Roma, 500,000 to 600,000 live in disadvantaged regions and in conditions of extreme poverty.”\(^{150}\) A 2007 report found Roma unemployment to be around 40% overall and up to 90% in many nondeveloped areas.\(^{151}\) These problems will likely only be exacerbated as the Roma population continues to grow.
The Roma populace's high birth rate is projected to increase the proportion of Roma to fifteen percent of the Hungarian population by 2050, and many Magyars view this transition warily. In 2002, 55% of Hungarians were found to agree that, “The growth in the Roma population threatens the security of society.” In 2009, as Deputy Chairman of Jobbik, MEP Csanad Szegedi said that, “Our money is being used to fund gypsy breeding under state supervision.” Negative and conspiratorial views about the growth of the Roma population are not confined to Jobbik. In 2009 a Fidesz parliamentarian and local mayor stated during a press conference that, in the interest of receiving increased financial aid, pregnant Roma women hit their stomachs with rubber hammers and take harmful medications. Initially Fidesz labeled the comments a “local issue,” but under increased pressure the mayor was dropped from the 2010 election list. This sort of prejudice against Roma only exacerbates the problem. A 2009 State Department report on human rights in Hungary cited “discrimination against Roma in education, housing, employment and access to social services.” Additionally, there have been spates of random hate crimes perpetrated against the Roma in recent years.

All Hungarian political parties acknowledge the Roma problem as one of the most pressing issues in the country, but only Jobbik describes it as “a threatening demographic catastrophe” that “is also being exacerbated by an ethnic proportional shift.” The party contends that “the coexistence of Magyar and Gypsy is one of the severest problems facing Hungarian society,” and has suggested that, “We need new solutions if we are to avoid civil war.” One of the “new solutions” given by Szegedi is the construction of so-called public order zones, which would be “cordoned off area[s] where residents would be registered and kept under surveillance by a local gendarmerie,” with special schools where Roma children would be segregated. The similarities between Szegedi’s public order zones and the Nazi’s ghettos are
apparent, and the language Jobbik uses in describing the Roma problem shows that the party intended the Magyar Gárda as a force to control and intimidate the Roma population.

Jobbik’s views of the Roma problem are reflected to a significant degree in Hungarian public opinion. In 2002, 18% of Hungarians were found to agree with the statement “Roma should be completely separated from the rest of society as they are not capable of coexistence,” and 33% agreed “It would only be right if there were still places of entertainment where Roma were not allowed.”\(^{164}\) A 2005 study showed that 80% of Magyars think the Roma problem would be solved if the Roma “would finally start working,”\(^{165}\) while a 2011 survey indicated that 60% thought that the “inclination to criminality is in the blood of Gypsies.”\(^{166}\) Until the appearance of Jobbik, the far right in Hungary did not tap into this deep current of anti-Roma sentiment that runs through Hungarian society.\(^{167}\) It is also not hard for Jobbik to combine its anti-Roma activism with its opposition to foreign influence. Almost all advocacy for Roma rights comes from the EU and non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, which are perceived as interfering with Hungarian sovereignty. Thus, the Roma are painted as enemies of the nation who not only steal from the majority, but also perpetuate outside intrusions into Hungary.

Though Jobbik knows better than to state so officially, the candid remarks of some of the party’s officials show that another historically persecuted group, the Jews, are seen as the ultimate cause of the ‘Roma problem’. In May 2011, Jobbik MP Lőránt Hegedüs said that, “The time has come to state it clearly: Israel is bent on conquering Hungary. This is a fact; as evidence, it is enough to look at all but the total monopoly of Israeli investments and real estate developments. And the Gypsies are a kind of biological weapon in this strategy. They are used as a means against the Hungarians just as, to use a simple analogy, a snow plow is hitched to a
He elaborated further on this idea by saying that, “Currently in this country we are witnessing what happened in the U.S. in the 1960s; various Zionist circles incite the Gypsies against the majority population, just as they did in the 1960s in respect to the blacks in the U.S. And as a result of this goading, the Gypsies, an alien race, try to occupy living-space against which we have to react in the spirit of healthy self-protection.” In this same vein, Jobbik’s former chairman Jozef Biber said in 2008, “What is gypsy crime? Let’s not deceive ourselves: it’s a biological weapon in the hands of the Zionists.” This language from high-ranking members of Jobbik demonstrates not only the anti-Semitic dimensions of the party, but also the way in which it seeks to connect the Roma to other groups perceived as being tools of foreign interest.

While the anti-Semitic nature of these comments is undeniable, it is important to note that rather than referring directly to Jews, blame is placed on “Zionists”. This is a rhetorical trick Jobbik employs in an effort to deflect accusations of anti-Semitism. Indeed, former Jobbik members have claimed that party candidates underwent training in which they were instructed to replace references to “Jews” with allusions to “international capital.” The party asserts it is not anti-Semitic, but rather anti-Zionist and anti-Israel. While anti-Israel sentiments can certainly be legitimate and are not necessarily anti-Semitic in nature, the actual content of Jobbik’s so-called anti-Zionism, along with its incessant conspiratorial hypotheses (such as the Shimon Peres obsession addressed below) demonstrate that the party is in fact anti-Semitic. Jobbik merely dresses its rhetoric up with the use of more acceptable terms in order to maintain deniability, however implausible, as to its anti-Semitism.

The best example of the extent to which Jobbik focuses on and exaggerates the threat posed to Hungary by Zionism, is the amount of attention given by the party to an offhand
comment of Israeli President Shimon Peres at an investment meeting in 2007, in which he said that “we [Israeli real estate investors] are buying up Manhattan, Hungary, Romania, and Poland.”\(^\text{172}\) To the ordinary listener, it is obvious that Peres was merely congratulating Israeli investors on purchasing real estate in good markets, but Jobbik has interpreted this as an admission that Israel is attempting to colonize Hungary. In a section on Jobbik’s website called “Frequently Refuted Lies”, the Peres speech is highlighted as proof that Jobbik is merely stating the truth about Israel’s intentions.\(^\text{173}\) The piece goes on to allege that a conspiracy involving “the lowliest council functionary, up to the highest levels of government” has allowed the success of the Israeli takeover of Hungary.\(^\text{174}\) Gyöngyösi warned that “if Peres is supporting colonization it is a natural reaction for people to feel that Jews are not welcome here,”\(^\text{175}\) and went even further to state that he thought it, “timely to tally up people of Jewish ancestry who live here, especially in the Hungarian Parliament and the Hungarian government, who, indeed, pose a national security risk to Hungary.”\(^\text{176}\) Due to accusations of anti-Semitism, Gyöngyösi backtracked slightly, clarifying that he was referring only to those Jews who hold dual Israeli-Hungarian citizenship.\(^\text{177}\) However, months later at the Jobbik protest rally against the meeting of the World Jewish Congress in Budapest, he said, “Our country has become subjugated to Zionism, it has become a target of colonization while we, the indigenous people, can play only the role of extras.”\(^\text{178}\) At that same rally, Vona stated that, “These Israeli conquerors, these investors, should look for another country in the world for themselves because Hungary is not for sale.”\(^\text{179}\) Despite mostly sticking to the rule of substituting anti-Zionist phrases for explicitly anti-Jewish ones, the anti-Semitic nature of Jobbik is beyond reasonable doubt. One cannot deny that the party is comprised of truly committed nationalists – for, only people who actually view Hungary and the Hungarians as the most important entities in the world can see a small, landlocked,
economically-depressed country with few natural resources and little to no regional or global power as the object of a vast and complicated Zionist colonization plot.

Even conspiratorial anti-Semitic sentiments such as these are by no means uncommon in Hungary. In a 2002 study, over a fifth of respondents agreed that, “There exists a secret Jewish collaboration which limits political and economic developments,” and in a 2009 survey, more than half of respondents agreed that “during the crisis powerful financial circles joined forces to destroy Hungary’s economy in an effort to colonize the country.” More than two-thirds of Hungarians agreed with the claim that, “we never find out the truth from the media and the news, and everything important happens behind the scenes.” Though not as popular as its antiziganism, Jobbik’s anti-Semitic appeals certainly do give the party some traction with the Hungarian electorate. Anti-Semitic sentiment amongst the Hungarian populace, which had remained between ten and fifteen percent from 1993 to 2006, jumped to 28% shortly before the 2010 election. Whether this sudden spike was the result or cause of Jobbik’s rhetoric cannot easily be determined. Regardless, it shows that anti-Semitism was certainly an asset to Jobbik.

Despite attempts to camouflage anti-Semitism as anti-Zionism, not all Jobbik officials are so careful with their words. In 2011 during the Jewish holiday of Passover, Jobbik MP Zsolt Barath made a speech in Hungarian Parliament in which he criticized the verdict of an 1882 blood libel case where the Jewish defendants were found not guilty. The case, known as the Tiszaeszlár Affair, set off a wave of anti-Semitic sentiment in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the explicit anti-Semitism of the original trial and of Barath’s comments are evident. Another example of unambiguous anti-Semitism is an email sent by Jobbik’s current Deputy Chairman Előd Novák, who said of Szegedi, “If we had known he was Jewish, we would never have let him become vice president.” Jobbik’s Deed of Foundation, which states, “We hold national
identity and Christianity to be two inseparable concepts,” further makes clear that the party cannot accept Jews as legitimate Hungarians. These overt examples of Jobbik’s anti-Semitism make explicit what Jobbik’s so-called anti-Zionism implies.

Just as Jobbik relates its antiziganism to anti-Semitism, Hungary’s unique experiences under communism make it possible for the party to conflate anti-Semitic sentiments with anti-Soviet ones. Due to the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, negative feelings towards the Soviets are particularly strong in Hungary. While many European states outlaw expressions of Nazism and the use of Nazi symbols and iconography, Hungary is the only country in the world to similarly outlaw the use of Soviet symbolism. Jobbik’s anti-Semitism is aided by the fact that many of Hungary’s historical communist leaders were Jewish. Béla Kun, who passed a number of radical reforms during his brief tenure as the head of a Hungarian communist regime immediately following WWI, was Jewish and thirty-two of his forty-five commissars were also Jewish. Additionally, Matyas Rakosi, the Stalinist who led Hungary from 1949 until 1956, was Jewish. Because of this, it is not difficult for Jobbik to associate the worst and most chaotic periods of communist rule in Hungary with Jews. In a statement directed at the “others” in Hungary whose “beloved boss” is Shimon Peres, Morvai referred to the period of Soviet rule as “your communism.” She took as evidence for the continued Jewish domination of Hungary the fact that Jews in Hungary had not “voluntarily moved out of [their] stolen … villas.” She even declared triumphantly that “our kind,” referring to true Hungarians, “shall take back our homeland from those who have taken it hostage,” in clear reference to the Jews who have put their “grubby hands on the Hungarian people’s property, our factories, our industrial plants, our hospitals.” Though Jobbik’s ideology may tie Jews, communists, and
Roma together in different ways, these groups’ fundamental commonality in the eyes of Jobbik is that they are enemies of the nation.

The way Hungarian history was taught by the USSR is also partly responsible for the persistence of anti-Semitism in Hungary. The communist regime in Hungary did not emphasize Hungary’s role in the Holocaust and tended to portray Hungarians as victims of the Nazis rather than collaborators. The resonance of this educational policy can be seen in a 2002 study that found 57% of Hungarians agreeing, “Hungarians suffered as much as the Jews (during World War II).” Even when there were attempts by the Soviets to address the horrific realities of the Holocaust, it was all too easy for Hungarians to brush off the number of victims as yet another Russian propagandistic amplification and falsehood. This is reflected in the fact that only 52% or respondents to the same 2002 study disagreed with the statement “The number of Jewish victims [of the Holocaust] was much lower than is generally alleged.” The difficulty of separating truth from exaggeration from lie in a Soviet education was especially difficult, and this legacy has facilitated a common form of modern Holocaust denial that involves challenging the death tolls involved as being inaccurate. An example of both the extent to which Jobbik minimalizes the suffering of the Holocaust and sensationalizes the problems of the post-Soviet transition is Gyöngyösi’s statement that, “this country has suffered more in twenty five years [since the collapse of the USSR] than in two world wars.” This hyperbolic statement about the terribleness of the democratic transition both hyperbolizes the difficulties of the post-Soviet period and casually minimizes the empirically greater misery of the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century. Gyöngyösi’s comment demonstrates the degree to which Jobbik simultaneously overstates issues that are important to the party and dismisses things that do not fit its agenda.
Though Jobbik denies its anti-Semitism, it makes no attempts to obscure its acceptance of the discredited idea of Turanism, which was mainly espoused by committed anti-Semites during the interwar period. Turanism posits that there existed a race of people somewhere in central Asia comprising a nation called Turan. According to the theory, a branch of the nation migrated to what is now Hungary and founded the Hungarian nation. By the same principle, other Turanic peoples include Turks, Russians, and even Japanese and Koreans. The theory originally emerged in the late nineteenth century when the origins of the Hungarian people were still disputed. The Hungarian language is very dissimilar to any of the language families spoken in the region around Hungary, and it is believed that semi-nomadic peoples roughly a millennium ago founded the original Hungarian dynasties. Because of the murky origins of the Hungarian peoples and their language, Turanic theories were at one point plausible counter-theories to Finno-Ugric language theories, which posited that the Hungarian language was related to those of the Finns and other Baltic peoples.

Turanism was condemned not too long after its initial formulation in the late 1800s. However, as the scientific community abandoned Turanism, it morphed from an anthropological theory into a political ideology. In the early twentieth century, Hungary was isolated in a sea of pan-Germanic and pan-Slavic feeling. Nationalists in Hungary set upon Turanism as an ideology that situated the Magyars in a wider ethnic group, hopefully giving them strength beyond their small numbers. Indeed, Vona uses this very rhetoric when speaking of the appeal of Turanism. He stated that if Hungarians, “profess that we are the descendants of Attila we would suddenly find hundreds of millions ready to form a common basis for alliance.”\(^{193}\) After World War I and the unfavorable terms imposed upon Hungary in the postwar settlements, Turanism became increasingly popular as a rejection of the West in favor of the East – the alleged area of origin for
the Magyars. Increasingly, Turanism became a central part of Hungarian fascist and racial thinking, and it developed an anti-Semitic character despite the fact that the original formulator of the theory was Jewish. Ferenc Szálasi, the leader of the Arrow Cross Party, posited Turanism as one of the central pillars of his particularly Hungarian fascist ideology.

After World War II, Turanism, already shunned scientifically, was tainted by fascism and discarded politically as well. Today the main proponent of Turanism is Jobbik, which has officially embraced it as a part of its party platform and has served to repopularize the idea in wider Hungarian society and abroad. The party states that, “In the case of Central Asian nations, we shall reinforce the development of political and economic relations on the basis of cultural relationships, given our ancient kinship with the peoples of that region.” Vona has gone so far as to take trips to Russia and Turkey expressly designed to strengthen the ties between Turanic peoples, and Jobbik sells maps of Turan and other invented Turanic memorabilia.

The uniquely Hungarian ideology of Turanism explains many of Jobbik’s more puzzling stances and also sets it far apart from the broader European radical right trend. Through the lens of Turanism, Jobbik sees Magyars as a Turkic people – in Vona’s words Magyars are “connected by our common blood” to Turks – and therefore encourages friendly relations with Turkey. Turanism is thoroughly anti-Western, which serves to partly explain Jobbik’s advocacy of a turn away from Europe towards the East, and a rejection of the EU, NATO, and the United States in favor of Hungary’s former Russian overlords. There is evidence that such anti-internationalism is growing in Hungary. In the period from 2003 to 2007, anti-foreigner sentiment in Hungary grew from 37% to 55%, and from 2003 to 2009, distrust of the UN increased from 5% to 15%.

Despite being a resolutely Christian party, Turanism allows Jobbik to be pro-Islam. In the article “The Background of Real Conflict in the World”, published on the party website, Jobbik
argues that the “real distinction is not between different religions, countries and cultures, but between communities attempting to preserve traditions and anti-traditional global liberalism. If you look closely, you can see it is the Muslim world that still can best resist the monopolar world order dominated by the United States.” This stance may seem strange given the intensely anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant nature of radical right parties in Europe. However, Hungary’s relative paucity of both Muslims and immigrants allows for a peculiarly Hungarian ideology that is friendly towards Islam to serve as the backbone for an extremist party. Jobbik argues that its stance towards Islam is consistent with the party’s Christian nature, because although their religions may be different, both are ultimately fighting for the conservation of traditional values. Jobbik’s 2010 electoral manifesto argues that “Today Hungary practically exists under a form of liberal dictatorship,” and Turanism can be seen as one way of trying to resist westernization in favor of the ‘traditionalism’. Turanism is also a way for Jobbik to distinguish itself from Fidesz as a right-wing party and to emphasize its dedication to the Hungarian nation and its traditions.

In addition to Turanism, another uniquely Hungarian appeal Jobbik makes is Trianon irredentism. In 1920, following World War I, Hungary was forced to sign the Treaty of Trianon and lost seventy-two percent of its prewar land area and sixty-four percent of its prewar population. These staggering changes left an indelible effect on the collective Hungarian psyche. During the interwar period, one of the main rallying cries of the fascists was the recovery of lands taken from Hungary and redistributed to the host of small states that emerged from the breakup of the Habsburg Empire. Indeed, by allying with Hitler during WWII, Hungary was given significant land gains at the expense of countries conquered by the Axis: its eastern border extended well into present-day Romania, not too far from the Black Sea. Of course all of these
expansions were erased when the Nazis lost the war and Hungary was reduced again to its present size. Nonetheless, Jobbik makes its allegiance to the spirit of these times clear.

In Budapest, on the 75th anniversary of the signing of a wartime accord that gave Hungary much of its pre-Trianon territory back, Jobbik unveiled a bust of Miklós Horthy, who led Hungary from 1920 to 1944 and, as an ally of Hitler, instituted anti-Jewish laws in 1938 and deported hundreds of thousands of Jews to Auschwitz. Reform Church minister and Jobbik MP Hegedüs – who has publicly feted American Holocaust denier David Irving, and whose wife has sponsored a screening of the infamous Nazi propaganda movie Jud Süß199 – presided over the bust’s unveiling. This move demonstrates that Jobbik staunchly defends Horthy’s legacy as a defender of the Hungarian nation and sees no issue with honoring him despite his role in the Holocaust. Nor is the party alone in venerating Hungary’s fascist past; in 1999, a plaque was put in the Budapest Military History Museum honoring the gendarmes under Horthy who cooperated with the SS in rounding up Jews to send to Auschwitz.200

Despite a succession of territorial setbacks, the hope of reviving Hungary along pre-WWI lines has not fully died. One of the main complaints of nationalists at the time of Jobbik’s founding in the early 2000s was an accord concluded with Slovakia and Romania (the two countries with the largest populations of Magyars outside of Hungary), in the interest of gaining Hungarian membership to the European Union. Nationalists thought that the present-day borders of Central Europe were drawn disadvantageously to Hungary, and that rather than signing agreements legitimizing the boundaries of neighboring countries, Hungarian officials should be fighting for the repatriation of foreign lands that contained significant minority populations of Magyars.201
Rejection of the Trianon Treaty is a central tenet of Jobbik’s ideology. In addition to calling for the creation of a Trianon museum, the party refers to present-day Hungary as “rump Hungary” and “the territorially-maimed mother-country.” Jobbik regularly uses maps showing the borders of Hungary at its height under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and refers to the Trianon Treaty as a “catastrophe” and a “diktat.” In its manifesto, the party states its aims clearly: “Jobbik considers its most important task to be the reunification of a Hungarian nation unjustly torn apart during the course of the 20th century. It is our most fundamental moral duty to represent the interests and defend the rights of Hungarian communities. We will strive, perpetually, for the collective rights of the Hungarians of the Carpathian basin, and for the realization of their territorial, economic, and cultural self-determination.”

Despite the extremism inherent in calling for a redrawing of international borders to give Hungary territory at the expense of all of its neighbors, Trianon irredentism was once common among Hungarian political parties. Upon taking power as the first democratically-elected Prime Minister of post-communist Hungary, József Antall declared that, “although by the constitution I am the prime minister of ten million Hungarian citizens, in my heart I would like to be the prime minister of 15 million Hungarian people,” a clear reference to the ethnic Magyar populations that form minority communities in Hungary’s neighboring countries. Jobbik’s electoral manifesto echoed this sentiment saying, “Jobbik’s political horizons are not defined by the borders of our country but by the borders of our nation.” During the first Orbán government in the early 2000s, a law guaranteeing rights for Hungarian minorities living abroad passed Hungarian Parliament with ninety-five percent support. While in government, Fidesz opened a private Hungarian university in Romania and in 2004 the party initiated a referendum that would grant dual citizenship to Hungarians living abroad.
Successive governments, however, have retreated from such irredentism, and bilateral agreements between Hungary and Slovakia and Romania have made clear that the established parties consider the matter of the Hungarian borders settled. MIÉP often displayed maps of greater Hungary, but after its collapse in 2006, Jobbik became the last remaining political party to seriously advocate a restructuring of the postwar settlement, a redrawing of the borders, and a disruption of relations with neighboring countries. Jobbik states that it “considers Hungarian populated territories beyond the border to be part of a unified protected Hungarian economic zone.”209 The party also advocates a mandatory education policy requiring elementary schools to take trips to areas separated from Hungary.210 On its website, Jobbik periodically publishes articles about the alleged oppression experienced by Hungarians beyond the country’s borders, and the party regularly sends a delegation to demonstrate alongside the Hungarian enclave in Romania.211 Magyar Gárda even set up a branch in Romania,212 and in March 2014, this agitation resulted in the Romanian government instituting a ban against Jobbik members and officials from entering the country. Jobbik’s active irredentism is certainly a popular stance; in 2009, 61% of Hungarians surveyed completely or mostly agreed that, “there are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us.”213

Trianon is also informative as to why Jobbik’s protestation against international organizations and other perceived international forces (the Jews) have resonance in Hungary. The combined legacies of the Treaty of Trianon and Soviet rule in Hungary have demonstrated to some that supranational movements – such as communism – and international political organizations – like the League of Nations or the U.N. – are harmful to Hungary. This leaves nationalism as the ideology that has Hungary’s interest at the forefront, and makes an economy based on national self-sufficiency an attractive option. By complaining about loss of sovereignty
at the hands of Brussels, it is not difficult for Jobbik to conflate the European Union and the tragedy of Trianon in the minds of voters.

Jobbik is also able to tie this anti-internationalism back to other perceived enemies beyond the Roma and the Jews. Like many other nationalist parties, Jobbik is homophobic. The party’s electoral manifesto demonizes the outside influences it holds responsible for acceptance of homosexuality, calling for the “promotion and protection of the institution of the family, particularly from attacks by a liberalism whose objective is to put the family unit on an equal footing with every conceivable alternative arrangement or deviant lifestyle.”214 The same document also advocates for the “dissolution of the legal recognition of civil partnerships,” in order to “return the institution of marriage to its rightfully unique status.”215 Jobbik’s homophobia is merely another aspect of a mindset that posits a struggle between the forces of traditionalism and westernization.

Though the Roma problem is the issue Jobbik stresses most prominently, it is clear that the party has a litany of other concerns it uses to appeal to voters. The party’s 2010 electoral manifesto, a twenty-five page document that devotes a mere four paragraphs to discussion of the Roma, can be viewed as an attempt to diversify its appeal. The manifesto shows that Jobbik does not want to be thought of as merely a band of anti-Roma thugs or as a one-issue party, but as a force for national renewal with plans for everything from agriculture to foreign affairs to transportation.216 Additionally, though antiziganism is the issue on which Jobbik is most active and around which the Magyar Gárda was founded, Jobbik is by no means a party that only exists because of this one stance. Indeed, Roma issues were not even among the party’s founding tenets. Rather, Jobbik is defined fundamentally by a nationalism that causes the party to conceive of an interconnected group of enemies of the nation (Roma, Jews, homosexuals, international
Examining Jobbik’s views and actions comprehensively, it is clear that the party meets the nationalist extremist criteria. Jobbik sees itself as the defender of the Magyars in Hungary and abroad and uses extremist tactics and rhetoric against the perceived enemies of this national group. Jobbik’s anti-Roma activism in the form of Magyar Gárda rallies demonstrates the party’s extremism and its anti-Semitic speech and veneration of a interwar figures show that the party is not afraid to associate itself with some of the discarded legacies of fascism. Additionally, Jobbik’s Trianon irredentism and Turanist ideology demonstrate Jobbik’s anti-liberal nature and further qualify the party for placement in the nationalist extremist group.

Jobbik’s Electoral Breakthrough

Jobbik’s extremism is clear. Its use of paramilitary tactics, advocacy of irredentism, and espousal of Turanism, anti-Semitism, and antiziganism set it far apart from the radical right stream. Though the previous section demonstrated that all of these positions are supported by at least a large minority of the Hungarian electorate, the mere advocacy of certain issues is not enough to get a newcomer party a large vote share. In this section I evaluate many possible sources of Jobbik’s surprising victory and conclude that ultimately the most important factor was the legitimacy the party gained as a result of its paramilitary activism. The Magyar Gárda crystallized Jobbik’s place as the party most concerned with and active on the Roma issue and helped it to gain an inordinate amount of press. At the time of Jobbik’s electoral breakthrough, Hungary was experiencing a major political and economic crisis, and ethnic tensions between Magyars and Roma had intensified in a series of high profile incidents. Because of its Gárda
activism, Jobbik was able to position itself as an outsider party with practical experience and clear ideas for solving Hungary’s problems.

While Jobbik’s Magyar Gárda activities were the main source of the party’s electoral breakthrough, other factors certainly helped the party to perform as well as it did. Jobbik was boosted by the legitimacy that the popular Fidesz party conferred on it by attempting to coopt its voters. Fidesz ran several joint mayoral campaigns with Jobbik, and in response to initial protests to the foundation of Magyar Gárda, Fidesz officials defended the group’s right of assembly and accused its critics of posturing for votes. Additionally, during Orbán’s first term—years before Jobbik’s existence—Fidesz members tried to steal votes from MIÉP by referring to “traitors,” “cosmopolitans,” and “communist Jews” during campaigns. This legitimized future Jobbik talking points and drew criticism from the U.S. Ambassador, who accused the Orbán government of “supporting anti-Semitic manifestations.” While these and other Fidesz actions already mentioned certainly were a factor in making Jobbik appear more legitimate in the eyes of voters, Fidesz eventually retracted all official support it had given to the party. However, though official Fidesz rhetoric attempted to discredit Jobbik, the conservative party nevertheless adopted a number of Jobbik’s issues, thereby lending the fledgling party legitimacy. That said, it is unlikely that Fidesz’s legitimization had an impact significant enough to account for Jobbik’s large vote share.

Jobbik was also indirectly aided somewhat by the media, which concentrated on certain sensationalist stories concerning Roma. This helped to legitimize Jobbik’s anti-Roma rhetoric and made the party—which had established itself as the expert on Roma issues—seem especially relevant. In the run-up to the European Parliamentary elections, there were a number of high profile cases involving Roma as perpetrators of violent crime. Although there were an equal
number of incidents in which Roma were the victims and Magyars the perpetrators, these crimes received much less coverage by the Hungarian media than Roma-on-Magyar assaults.\textsuperscript{221} Shortly before the European Parliamentary elections, polls showed that more Hungarians felt that the fatal stabbing of a Romanian handball player by Roma in a nightclub fight was an important issue than felt that the elections were significant.\textsuperscript{222} Additionally, the Socialists made opposition to Jobbik such a large issue in their campaigns, that it allowed the party to gain increased media coverage it likely would not have otherwise. The mediazation effects described by Ellinas were certainly at play in Hungary, as widespread condemnation of Jobbik only served to raise the party’s national profile.

Another source of legitimation for the party was Jobbik’s collaboration with the police union Ready to Act Hungarian Police (TMRSZ) in the run-up to the European Parliamentary elections. The cooperation involved an agreement by which the union – which represented about 5,500 police officers, or roughly fifteen percent of the total national force – would be allowed to draft some of Jobbik’s party platform upon its election. Judit Szima, the secretary general of the union was placed fourth on Jobbik’s election list, just missing her chance to become an MEP. During the campaign, she wrote in a union newsletter that, “Given our current situation, anti-Semitism is not just our right, but it is the duty of every Hungarian homeland lover, and we must prepare for armed battle against the Jews.”\textsuperscript{223} She stated further that, “A crumbling country, torn apart by Hungarian-Gypsy civil war, could easily be claimed by the rich Jews,” elaborating, “That is why we should expect a Hungarian-Gypsy civil war, fomented by Jews as they rub their hands together with pleasure.”\textsuperscript{224} An internal investigation carried out by the National Police Department ultimately ruled that TMRSZ’s cooperation with Jobbik violated the political neutrality that police organizations in Hungary are obliged to maintain. Nevertheless, TMRSZ’s
support of Jobbik demonstrates why some came to see the party dedicated to national security and fighting ‘gypsy crime’, and also hints at the reason the Magyar Gárda was allowed to become a police surrogate in some areas.

Jobbik also used was the professionalism of some of its more prominent representatives to gain legitimacy. Vona, the young leader of the party who was voted as the “sexiest politician in the country” by an online poll of readers of a Hungarian tabloid, almost always makes appearances in a suit. Morvai, who was Jobbik’s most visible candidate in the 2009 elections, is western-educated and has worked for both the European Commission for Human Rights and the Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee at the U.N. Her high-profile international human rights work lent a guise of acceptability to the party. However, upon closer examination of her record, it becomes clear that she used her previous work on Palestinian issues as fuel for anti-Semitic rhetoric. In an open letter during the Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2009, Morvai wrote, “The only way to talk to people like you [Israelis] is by assuming the style of Hamas. I wish all of you lice-infested, dirty murderers will receive Hamas’ ‘kisses’.” In another communiqué she said that the, “So-called proud Hungarian Jews should go back to playing with their tiny little circumcised penises instead of slurring me.” Gyöngyösi, Jobbik’s spokesman, is the son of a diplomat and grew up in Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, and India. He received his higher education in Germany and Ireland, and up until 2010 he worked at Ernst and Young, one of the ‘big four’ accounting firms. Vona, Morvai, and Gyöngyösi are Jobbik’s three most visible representatives, and despite their virulent rhetoric, they all display high levels of competence, seriousness, and respectability. In this way they have taken away some of the taboo that would ordinarily be associated with voting for an extremist party like Jobbik. They certainly do not look like the type of people one would stereotypically expect to be leading a nationalist extremist party.
Another possible reason for Jobbik’s attractiveness lies in Hungarian relations with neighboring Slovakia and Romania. The SNS and the Greater Romania Party (both discussed in chapter two) are fiercely anti-Hungarian, and it is possible to view Jobbik, especially the Magyar Gárda, as a Hungarian counter threat to keep these parties from being too aggressive. Ján Slota, the longtime leader of SNS, has called Hungarians “the cancer of the Slovak nation, which we need to remove from the body of the nation without delay,”228 and in 2009, Slovakia passed a language law specifically targeting Hungarians. Jobbik’s ideology and activism make it the party that appears to care the most about protecting Magyars living abroad from majority populations who view Hungarian minority communities as a nuisance.

The degeneration of MIÉP, which only received a pitiful 0.03% of the vote in the 2010 Hungarian Parliamentary elections, was also a factor in Jobbik’s electoral success. MIÉP was only able to clear the five percent threshold to enter Hungarian Parliament in 1998, but campaigning on “an interrelated set of anti-globalization, anti-Semitic, anti-communist, and anti-Israel issues,”229 it just barely missed entering parliament in 2002. Although MIÉP was the most extreme party in Hungary until the appearance of Jobbik, the two parties are different in a number of ways. Rather than focus Roma issues like Jobbik, MIÉP made explicit anti-Semitism its main platform (in an article written a year before he founded the party, István Csurka called for “a return to ethnic purity”230), and consequently it achieved only marginal success.

Jobbik has coopted the far right space in Hungary, and because MIÉP was no longer a viable electoral force after the disastrous showing of 2006 (although one could argue that the fact that MIÉP even had to enter into an electoral alliance in the first place shows how weak the party was even before the 2006 elections), anti-Semitic voters from the party have gravitated towards Jobbik. Though Jobbik tries to make its anti-Semitism a bit less apparent than MIÉP did, for the
Hungarian anti-Semite, Jobbik became the clear choice. Though Jobbik mobilizes principally on antiziganist rather than anti-Semitic lines, 65% of Jobbik’s electorate was found to harbor anti-Semitic prejudices. What MIÉP’s collapse also demonstrated is that anti-Semitism cannot form the main platform for a successful party in Hungary. Antiziganism is a much more relevant appeal to Hungarian voters and is one of the reasons Jobbik has become so much larger than MIÉP ever was.

Jobbik has also been able to take advantage of a societal shift that occurred in Hungary during the last decade. In 2003, the Derex Index suggested that 10% of the Hungarian population were potential right-wing extremists. By 2009, this figure had more than doubled to 21%. Similarly, the number of xenophobic voters shot up from 37% to 52% in this same period. An even more significant jump occurred in the proportion of those with anti-establishment sentiments, going from 12% in 2003 to 46% in 2009. These views are in line with Jobbik platforms, and demonstrate how the pool of voters receptive to the party’s messages increased dramatically in the years just before Jobbik’s electoral breakthrough. Unsurprisingly, the most defining characteristic of Jobbik voters was their nationalism. Although one might expect to find religious belief as a main typifying factor of Jobbik supporters, the ratio of atheists among Jobbik members is higher than any other party’s. Another quality that sets Jobbik supporters aside from the main voting trends for other parties is gender: two-thirds of Jobbik voters were men. It also appears that Jobbik’s attacks on the mainstream parties were effective. In a study of Jobbik voters in 2010, only 4% said they had voted for Jobbik in 2006, whereas 37% said they had voted for Fidesz and 21% for MSZP.

Another unique feature of the Jobbik constituency is its youth. While only 27% of Jobbik voters were over 50, 29% were between the ages of 18 and 29. Jobbik also receives a large
share of first-time voters, and polling data suggests that almost a quarter of its voters were too young to vote in the 2006 elections.\textsuperscript{239} In keeping with this trend, Jobbik is the most popular party amongst Hungarian students in higher education.\textsuperscript{240} The party’s youth is not just a product of its voter base; whereas the average Hungarian MP is 47 years old, Jobbik MPs’ average age is only 38.\textsuperscript{241}

The young character of the party causes a number of interesting features. For instance, three quarters of Jobbik supporters say they regularly use the internet.\textsuperscript{242} Gyöngyösi stressed the vital importance of digital communication for Jobbik saying, “The Internet has been and remains very important to us. It is not only on account of our limited access to the traditional media, but also because a major part of our supporters and voters are young people who we can best reach via new media.”\textsuperscript{243} Indeed, evidence of Jobbik’s disproportional presence on the web is emphasized by the number of followers the party has on iwiw (a Hungarian equivalent of Facebook that is slightly more popular in Hungary than Facebook is). As of 2010, Jobbik had 40,000 followers on iwiw – more than four times the combined totals of Fidesz, MSZP, and Politics Can Be Different (LMP, a green party founded in 2009).\textsuperscript{244} Like LMP, Jobbik advocates green issues, though this is a much more minor issue for Jobbik than LMP.\textsuperscript{245} LMP dominates in terms of Facebook supporters because it attracts more educated and westernized Hungarians who are more likely to use the international site Facebook over iwiw, since the latter can only be used to communicate with other Hungarians. Indeed this attribute of Facebook is underlined by the fact that 22% of Jobbik’s Facebook fans have university degrees, compared with only 15% of Jobbik’s voters.\textsuperscript{246} Whereas Fidesz and MSZP largely ignored iwiw in the campaign, Jobbik was active on the site and was able to garner a large online following. Additionally, Jobbik had more followers on twitter than any other party in the run-up to the elections, although Fidesz had more
tweets.\textsuperscript{247} Further reaching out to younger voters, Jobbik made a series of short YouTube videos critiquing Fidesz and MSZP during the 2010 election.\textsuperscript{248} Jobbik’s outreach to the youth through the use of new media certainly played a role in getting the party’s message out to a large cohort of potential supporters. While net activity may be responsible for Jobbik’s large turnout amongst the youth, this mobilization effort cannot fully account for the level of support Jobbik received from the wider Hungarian electorate. Further, what is more significant than its internet savvy is the fact that Jobbik had a message that was broadly appealing to the youth to begin with.

Additional youth outreach for Jobbik occurred in the form of the nominally independent 64 Counties Youth Movement. The organization’s title – a reference to the 64 counties of pre-WWI Hungary – reflects the group’s animating ideology: Hungarian irredentism in the mold of Jobbik. Although the 64 Counties Youth Movement was founded before Jobbik, its leader and founder is a Jobbik representative on the county level, and its honorary head is Jobbik MP Zagyva. The group holds an annual music festival and its general purpose is to involve younger generations in nationalist and irredentist politics that are identical to those of Jobbik.

One of the reasons Jobbik has made such extensive use of the internet is because it does not think it gets enough attention from the media; the party even sent a letter of complaint to the EU Commissioner for Digital Agenda to complain about its comparative lack of coverage.\textsuperscript{249} Though it may be ignored somewhat by traditional news outlets, Jobbik benefits from a network of far right websites that advance pro-Jobbik viewpoints alongside explicitly anti-Semitic content. The largest and most popular of these sites, kuruc.info, is ostensibly a separate entity from Jobbik, but the close ties between the two are apparent. Novák admits that he “maintains good relations with the editorial staff” of the website, and said that, “sometimes I use my cell phone to send them material straight out of parliamentary meetings.”\textsuperscript{250} However, he denies
being a writer on the website saying, “If I admitted that, I would obviously go to jail.” One can also see the connection between Jobbik and the more violent paramilitary activists such as Budaházy in kuruc.info. In the months leading up to Budaházy’s 2009 attack on a former Socialist MP, the website ran a vicious campaign against the MSZP representative, calling him a “Jewish rat.” The website also has sections on both “gypsy crime” and “Jewish crime”, and alleges that Fidesz is a Jewish-controlled party. The website allows Jobbik to get away with saying things that are too inflammatory to be associated officially with the party (although Jobbik’s party magazine Barikád does advertise on the site), but still disseminate the message to a core audience of extremists who know that the rhetoric is coming from Jobbik. During the 2010 elections, kuruc.info was the third-most widely read news website in Hungary, demonstrating both the effectiveness of this strategy and the currency of Jobbik’s attitudes amongst the Hungarian public.

Though things such as internet outreach and legitimation from established sources certainly played a role in Jobbik getting as many votes as it did, these variables are ultimately not the base causes of Jobbik’s success. The party only became an electoral force once it tapped into widespread anti-Roma sentiment and backed up its commitment to this principle with the actions of the Magyar Gárda. It is clear that a significant degree of agreement with Jobbik’s nationalist sentiments existed among the Hungarian populace, but up until the party made the Roma issue its main platform in 2006, no Hungarian party had adequately utilized this latent nationalist feeling for political ends. After the collapse of MSZP, there was desire in Hungary for a political alternative, but as Fidesz’s huge electoral gains show, there was also a strong desire for continued rule by established parties. To achieve the electoral success that it did, Jobbik had to
do more than advocate its opinions on the web or ally with police unions. What put Jobbik on the
electoral map was the Magyar Gárda.

The Magyar Gárda was a doubly effective force for Jobbik. First, the shocking fact that a
twenty-first century political party had a paramilitary wing ensured that Jobbik received a large
amount of coverage from the media. This media attention circulated Jobbik’s message and also
demonstrated the unique nature of the party. The second effect of the Magyar Gárda was its role
as a demonstration of Jobbik’s legitimacy. Given the distrust of politicians caused by the
Gyurcsány scandal, it was essential that Jobbik establish itself as a legitimate political force that
did not rely on rhetoric alone. Magyar Gárda showed that Jobbik was willing to literally put
boots on the ground in an effort to solve the Roma problem. While this forthright paramilitarism
may have repulsed more mainstream voters, a large minority appreciated the effort Jobbik made
and the demonstration of commitment to principles that it showed. While there may have been a
reaction against Jobbik because of the Magyar Gárda, the rapid expansion in party offices and
membership in the run-up to the elections demonstrate that any taboo against supporting Jobbik
was ignored by a large percentage of the population. The easing of taboo was also helped by the
legitimation Jobbik received from Fidesz and the police union TMRSZ. While the international
press may have decried Jobbik as dangerous, a significant minority of Hungarian voters showed
their trust for the party.

Jobbik also only became relevant once it shifted its focus from the revival of Hungarian
tradition through Christianity to the protection of the Hungarian nation from the threat of the
Roma. This change was key, because there was a large current of anti-Roma sentiment that
existed in Hungary that had not been taken advantage of politically. Further, as a nationalist
party, Jobbik’s focus on non-national forces was natural, and its selection of a scapegoat in the
Roma was timed perfectly with a spike in conflict between Magyars and Roma. Of course Jobbik’s ideology spans more than just the Roma issue, and encompasses a much broader anti-liberal and anti-democratic nationalism. However, anti-Roma activism gave Jobbik wider relevancy in Hungary and helped the party rise from obscurity.

Though some of the evidence presented in this chapter is taken from the period after Jobbik’s initial electoral breakthrough, the party’s nationalist extremism was clear well before its election. Details that have emerged in the wake of the party’s election are offered merely to give the reader a fuller idea of Jobbik and its ideology. The Hungarian electorate was certainly aware of Jobbik’s character when the party was elected.

Evaluating Jobbik and its electoral success, it is clear that the party fits the nationalist extremist framework. Although Turanism and irredentism are obviously not essential aspects of nationalist extremist parties, these ideologies are further indicators of Jobbik’s anti-liberal nativism. Though Magyar Gárda was not armed and did not commit violence, its activities fit the mold for nationalist extremist supra-political paramilitarism nonetheless because they effectively communicated an extremist threat of violence. Although the Gárda is not identical to interwar fascist groups, there is certainly a similarity of purpose.

The nationalist extremist model also accurately illustrates the factors that allowed for Jobbik’s electoral breakthrough. The evacuation of the radical right space caused by the collapse of MIÉP and the implosion of the Socialist party created a situation in which an upstart party like Jobbik could appear as an attractive option for disillusioned voters. Jobbik was able to take advantage of poor economic and political conditions in Hungary and achieve success with an extremism that would have relegated the party to electoral failure under normal circumstances.
Chapter 5. Golden Dawn and Greece

In 2010, Golden Dawn competed for seats in four major municipalities in the Greek local elections. In three of them, Golden Dawn candidates failed to garner more than two percent of the vote, but in Athens, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, the party’s leader, got a little over five percent. In certain neighborhoods he received almost a fifth of the vote. This performance was enough to earn Michaloliakos a seat on the Athens City Council, and Golden Dawn its first elected post.

The party’s success in Athens was part of a concerted effort to focus its resources on a smaller election in order to raise its profile to mount a successful parliamentary campaign in the coming years. Of the approximately twenty grassroots right-wing groups that emerged in downtown Athens in the year or so before the municipal elections, Golden Dawn was able to gain influence with over half of them. Additionally, Golden Dawn concentrated its energies on particular neighborhoods, such as Agios Panteleimonas, that had high levels of both crime and immigration. The party set up ‘no-go’ zones in certain public squares where it made clear that it would be unsafe for immigrants to walk. Golden Dawn also clashed with local anarchist groups, which helped it became well known throughout the Agios Panteleimonas neighborhood especially. The reason Golden Dawn chose to focus its extremist tactics on rough neighborhoods of Athens is clear; in May 2011, a survey found that 80% of residents of downtown Athens “had been victims of a mugging, theft or burglary” and 75% said they “lived in fear of crime.”

In 2012, the party built off of its success in the local elections and mounted a nationwide effort to win seats in the Greek Parliamentary elections using the media attention it gained from the municipal victory as a jumping off point for its national campaign. The party received almost
seven percent of the vote, up from less than a third of a percent in the 2009 parliamentary elections. It won eighteen seats in Hellenic Parliament and became a national political force.

Like the chapter on Jobbik, this chapter is segmented into two parts: one on Golden Dawn’s ideology and actions and another on the specific reasons for the party’s success. The first section demonstrates that, like Jobbik, Golden Dawn qualifies for the nationalist extremist label based on the definition given in chapter two. The second section shows that Golden Dawn’s paramilitary and other supra-political activities were the factors that allowed the previously obscure party to become a national electoral force in a relatively short period of time. Both sections place the party in the wider Greek context and provide the necessary background to fully understand the phenomenon of Golden Dawn.

A Profile of Golden Dawn

Like Jobbik, Golden Dawn was not originally founded as a political party. Golden Dawn began in 1980 as the title of a national socialist magazine that declared in its first issue, “We consider politics a filthy affair and ourselves too pure to be involved in it.”259 This inaugural issue also stated that, “the democratic way of governance has no place in our movement,”260 but since Golden Dawn’s official registration as a political party in 1993, the group claims to have changed many of its original positions. Upon forming as a party, Golden Dawn says it became merely a nationalist organization, dropping its socialism.261 However, Golden Dawn’s own statements about this transformation belie its sincerity; a 2006 edition of the Golden Dawn magazine stated, “the fact that we now use the terms ‘nationalism’, ‘popular nationalism’, and ‘social nationalism’ does not mean that we have changed our ideas. It is simply that we consider
it more acceptable to use these terms, for the fact is that the term ‘national socialism’ invites misunderstanding, given the ocean of propaganda over the last 60 years.”

Other previous Golden Dawn platforms, such as a dedication to paganism, have fallen by the wayside in favor of staunch support of Greek Orthodoxy. Though religion does not play as large a role in Golden Dawn’s ideology as it does in Jobbik’s, religion has nonetheless become a constituent part of what Golden Dawn considers to be characteristic of true Greeks. However, the Orthodox Church’s support of Golden Dawn has been ambivalent. While there are certain officials who are ardent Golden Dawn supporters – such as Bishop Seraphim of Piraeus who has spoken out against Jews and homosexuals – many bishops think Golden Dawn is incompatible with Christian beliefs. At any rate, the party has not received the level of official sanction by church officials that Jobbik has.

Despite claims to the contrary, allegiance to national socialism has not been jettisoned by Golden Dawn the way that paganism has. The party adheres to and espouses an adapted Nazi ideology in which the idea of the pure and noble Aryan has been replaced with that of the vigorous Greek. Whereas Jobbik makes somewhat of an effort to obscure its embrace of a fascist past, Golden Dawn takes no such pains to hide these associations. As late as April 2012 – a month before the first round of the Greek Parliamentary elections – copies of Adolf Hitler’s infamous treatise Mein Kampf were available for purchase at the party headquarters in Athens.

Other headline-grabbing instances of Golden Dawn’s Nazi associations are numerous. To start with, the party’s symbol, while certainly distinguishable from a swastika, is drawn in black and set on a red background in the party’s official flag. Golden Dawn members claim the symbol is simply a classical Greek meander, but it is widely called an adapted swastika by the media. Though the Nazi and Golden Dawn flags are distinct, the kinship is obvious. The meander may
be a legitimate Greek symbol, but Golden Dawn’s color scheme purposefully evokes Nazi connotations. Further, at party functions, and even a few times on the floor of Greek Parliament, Golden Dawn members saluted each other in a way remarkably similar to the infamous Hitlergruss. Michaloliakos even made a point of giving the salute in one of his first sessions after being elected to the Athens City Council in 2010. Though Golden Dawn officials claim they are merely reviving an ancient Grecian salute in which the arm is raised higher than in the Nazi salute, the similarities between the two gestures are undeniable. Another Nazi tribute can be found in the Golden Dawn slogan, “Blood, Honor, Golden Dawn”, which does nothing more than add “Golden Dawn” to the Hitler Youth slogan “Blut und Ehre”. While the meander and the salute do have their geneses in ancient Greece, the insinuations of Golden Dawn’s party symbol, salute, and slogan are clear. By choosing these specific symbols from the pantheon of ancient Grecian symbols, Golden Dawn makes its dual heritage apparent.

In denying its Nazi and fascist roots, Golden Dawn claims Hitler and Mussolini copied “Greco-Roman ideals and certain Spartan principles.” While this is true, Golden Dawn posits this point in an attempt to argue that resemblance to these figures is merely incidental. Because Hitler, Mussolini, and other interwar fascists did appropriate many symbols that were originally Greek, Golden Dawn can argue that in using these symbols, it is merely being consistent with its nationalistic nature. The party makes a point of not avoiding such similarities because it believes it should be able to appropriate ancient Greek icons no matter their connotations. While it is possible that Golden Dawn is only adopting ancient Greek symbols that emphasize its dedication to the national tradition, the numerous instances of Nazi-sympathizing by high-ranking Golden Dawn members point to the likelihood that the party is purposefully taking advantage of the
double legacy of these symbols and evoking interwar fascist regimes in addition to ancient Greece.

The evidence of Nazi associations and activities in Golden Dawn are too strong to deny. To make this point clear, I present here a relatively short list of some of the more explicit connections between Golden Dawn and the Nazis. An early Golden Dawn magazine article states “We are Nazis,” and that, “in the miracle of the German Revolution of 1933 we saw the Power which will free mankind from Jewish rottenness.” Panayiotis Iliopoulos, a Golden Dawn MP, has “Sieg Heil” tattooed on his arm, but claims he knows nothing about Hitler and got the tattoo merely because he liked the font (though he offered no explanation as to where he originally saw the words in German and in Fraktur script). Ilias Kasidiaris, a Golden Dawn MP and the party’s official spokesman said of the Holocaust, “The main view in Europe is that six million Jews were killed. History has shown that this is a lie.” Kasidiaris also read aloud a passage from the classic anti-Semitic tract The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in an address to Greek Parliament. In 1983, on the 38th anniversary of the fall of the Third Reich, Christo Pappas, now a Golden Dawn MP, wrote an article that praised Hitler as more a deity than a man. In 1992, Michaloliakos published a book – in circulation and distributed by Golden Dawn until at least 2012 – that praises Hitler and the Nazis. An article he wrote for the Golden Dawn magazine in 1987 began “Hitler for a thousand years,” and closed “Heil Hitler.” Until January of 2013, books of Hitler’s speeches were available for purchase through the official Golden Dawn website. The party also maintains close relationships with the German neo-Nazi group Free South Network (Freie Netz Süd, FNS), and Golden Dawn MPs have gone so far as to host FNS’s leadership to a visit of Hellenic Parliament.
Like Jobbik, Golden Dawn harkens back to a glorious national past, but unlike their Hungarian counterparts who have to cling to the memory of Attila and a mythical Turanic people, the great figures of Greece’s history are well known and their influence is undoubted. In particular, Golden Dawn tries to place itself as the defender of a great civilization that produced the fierce Spartan warriors. What is important to note is that while the party likes to harken back to a glorious Greek past, because of its anti-democratic nature, Golden Dawn plays down the influence of ancient Athens by pointing out that democracy was just one system among many that existed in ancient Greece. The party states that “The core ideals of Golden Dawn are based primarily on that of ancient Sparta,” but references a fascist legacy, continuing, “and to a lesser extent taking inspiration from more modern figures of our history such as . . . Ioannis Metaxas,” an interwar leader in Greece who modeled his governance style on Mussolini’s. Golden Dawn’s veneration of Metaxas further complicates the task of distinguishing Golden Dawn’s Greek nationalism from expressions of nostalgia for fascism. Metaxas was both a strong national leader and an admirer of Italian fascism, and just as Jobbik cannot honor Horthy without also sanctioning his associations with Nazism, Golden Dawn cannot esteem Metaxas’ nationalist legacy and discard his fascist leanings.

In keeping with its nationalist ethos, Golden Dawn is fiercely anti-western and anti-EU. A piece on the Golden Dawn website refers to internationalism-Marxism-socialism and globalized capitalism-neoliberalism as “two . . . sides of the same Zionist coin,” and the party’s manifesto states that, “The right and left solutions supposedly fighting each other are just a fake theater of two partners who perpetuate the dominance of cosmopolitan internationalists, anti-national and anti-social forces.” Anti-international sentiments such as these gained a
wider following in the wake of the financial crisis. In less than a year, the proportion of Greeks who trusted the EU fell from 60% in November 2009 to a mere 19% in June 2010.\textsuperscript{282}

Economically, Golden Dawn, like Jobbik, advocates the renationalization of industries, saying that, “The economy should be planned so that it serves the national policy and ensures the maximum self-sufficiency without dependence on international markets and control of any multinational companies.”\textsuperscript{283} Additionally, the party calls for the nationalization of Greek banks that receive any state support and the nationalization of the country’s natural resources.\textsuperscript{284}

Golden Dawn harkens back to what, in the party’s conception, was the golden age of economic development under the junta, which in this view was corrupted by the liberal forces of the center-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and social democracy who sold out the Greek nation to the banks who now want “our whole Nation, our people, and our future.”\textsuperscript{285}

As with Jobbik, irredentism also forms a part of Golden Dawn ideology. The party calls for the “liberation of northern Epirus,”\textsuperscript{286} (a section of southern Albania with a large Greek-speaking population) and has also made claims to present-day Turkey. Speaking at an election meeting in 2012, Michaloliakos said, “We will take Istanbul, Izmir as well as the Black Sea back,”\textsuperscript{287} and other Golden Dawn MPs have made clear that they regard Istanbul as the Greek capital.\textsuperscript{288} Further, Golden Dawn has a very close relationship with the National Popular Front (ELAM) in Cyprus, a group that advocates the removal of the Turks from Cyprus. Although the two groups are nominally distinct, they share many members, and ELAM functions essentially as a Cypriot offshoot of Golden Dawn.\textsuperscript{289}

Although Golden Dawn became successful with the promulgation of anti-immigrant rhetoric, the party did not always place such a premium on the issue of immigration. Golden Dawn first began to gain attention as a political party during the Macedonian conflict of the
1990s. After the breakup of Yugoslavia, the newly independent state of Macedonia attempted to declare its statehood, but this move was objected to by Greece. The Greek government felt that the very name ‘Macedonia’ was an impingement on Greek sovereignty, because the name is shared with the northernmost Greek state, which borders the republic of Macedonia. Mass popular protests objecting to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM, the name by which Macedonia is still forced to go by in the UN) occurred in Greece, the largest of which took place in 1992 when over a million people marched in Thessaloniki.\textsuperscript{290} A distinct rightist element was present in these protests, but despite its activism on the issue, Golden Dawn’s involvement did help its parliamentary chances. The Macedonia issue nonetheless remained salient in Greek politics past the 1990s. An oil embargo was declared on Macedonia in 1992 and this was followed two years later by an embargo on all goods except food and pharmaceuticals.\textsuperscript{291} Even in 2007, New Democracy (the main center-right party in Greece) used its veto power to block Macedonia from joining the EU.\textsuperscript{292}

Also in relation to the former Yugoslavia, there have been allegations that Golden Dawn members were involved in the Srebrenica massacre.\textsuperscript{293} A 2004 book published by the former number three in the party states that when Golden Dawn first began its militant activities, “[s]olidarity with the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and the involvement of Golden Dawn volunteers in the massacre of Srebrenica were very high on the list.”\textsuperscript{294} Though it is still uncertain whether or not Golden Dawn members actually took part in organized violence outside of Greece’s borders, there is no doubting that the party was involved in violence within Greece.\textsuperscript{295} For instance, in 1998, Antonis Androutsopoulos, at the time Golden Dawn’s second-in-command, was part of a group that fatally assaulted a left wing student outside of Athens’
main courthouse. The attack marked the first time Golden Dawn received national attention for its violence.

Golden Dawn’s violence shows that the party is not satisfied with the mere espousal of hateful rhetoric. Groups of Golden Dawn members have clashed with leftist communities in Greece for decades, but it has only been in the years since the Euro Crisis that Golden Dawn has presented a more coherent and pronounced street presence that emphasizes violence against immigrants. Clad in black, tight-fitting Golden Dawn t-shirts, bands of party members organize patrols in immigrant neighborhoods and commit attacks with impunity. One of the most vicious of these incidents occurred in May 2011. On May 10th, a Greek man was fatally stabbed during a mugging while he was taking his pregnant wife to the hospital to give birth. On May 12th, twenty-five minorities were hospitalized and one Bangladeshi man died after a series of random attacks on the streets of Athens. In reports compiled by various human rights groups, immigrants invariably cite Golden Dawn members as the perpetrators of assaults. In 2012, there were 154 racist attacks in Greece, and reports indicate that almost all of them can be attributed to Golden Dawn.

Oftentimes, these nefarious activities occurred in the presence of police, who are not only loth to stop illegal or questionable Golden Dawn undertakings, but offer implicit and sometimes explicit support to the party. In an incident shortly after the 2012 elections, Golden Dawn members and a few MPs were videotaped using clubs to demolish stalls where minorities were selling goods while the MPs’ police details watched and did nothing. In the run-up to the 2012 elections, citizens complaining to Greek police about immigrants were sometimes given the phone number of the local Golden Dawn chapter. Additionally, there have been numerous allegations from both immigrants and left-wing activists that when they are arrested or attempt to
report crimes, officers in the police station assault them. Charalambos Vourliotis, Deputy Prosecutor of the Greek Supreme Court stated that, “in certain cases, whose number could be higher, members of the Greek police assisted, or in the best case tolerated, members of the organization [Golden Dawn] who were committing criminal offenses.” The Minister of Public Order and Citizens’ Protection went even further, saying that, “some police officers in districts with sizeable immigrant populations have gone beyond colluding with local neo-Nazis to set up political cells within their units.” Indeed, investigations found ten Greek police officers to have direct or indirect links with Golden Dawn’s criminal activities, and two have been arrested because of this.

Police support for Golden Dawn is further evident in voting statistics. In the 2012 elections, the party received more than 20% of the vote in a police voting district, while in the neighboring civil district it received only 6%. Initial reports indicated that as much as half of all Greek police voted for Golden Dawn in the 2012 elections, and this number was widely cited in the international press. However, a detailed analysis found that while police voted for Golden Dawn more than average citizens, the proportion that did so was closer to a fifth, rather than a half. Police support for Golden Dawn can be seen as a way to compensate for the extreme cuts made to the police budget as a result of the Euro Crisis.

In some poorer rural areas, where government basically ceased to function in the wake of austerity cutbacks, Golden Dawn emerged as a replacement, making up for many police and welfare functions. In addition to its patrols, Golden Dawn has initiatives in which it intimidates local businesses with immigrant employees into hiring only Greeks as rural workers and shop assistants. The party has even gone so far as to publish on its website the details of businesses that do not initially comply with its pressures.

This activism is combined with visits
by Golden Dawn members to the homes of unemployed Greeks to tell them about the new hiring opportunities the party has created.\textsuperscript{311} Additionally, Golden Dawn has attempted to spread its influence to Greeks abroad. In an effort to reach out to Greek emigrant communities, Golden Dawn has set up branches in the U.S., Canada, and Australia. There have also been reports that Golden Dawn uses its contacts with far right groups in Germany to reach out to the large number of Greek expatriates who have moved there in order to find work.\textsuperscript{312} Golden Dawn’s emphasis on connecting with ethnic Greeks regardless of where they live is indicative of how the party attempts to mobilize more on the basis of nationalism than on political or economic issues within Greece. Parties that are not motivated by nationalistic concerns do not make efforts to gain the support of people who cannot help them at the ballot box.

Whereas Jobbik primarily focuses its ire on the Roma, immigrants are the main targets of Golden Dawn’s violence and rhetoric. Golden Dawn claims to “fight against altering our racial demographics by the millions of illegal immigrants,”\textsuperscript{313} and Kasidiaris has even suggested that Greece should plant a minefield along its border with Turkey in order to, “clearly define an area that would stop anyone from thinking of accessing the country.”\textsuperscript{314} In a documentary produced in 2012, a Golden Dawn candidate was filmed calling immigrants “parasites.”\textsuperscript{315} Describing immigrants further, he said, “They are primitive. They are miasma: subhuman. We don’t care about their existence,” and he even casually referenced the Holocaust, laughing “We are ready to open the ovens . . . We will turn them into soap . . . We will make lamps from their skin.”\textsuperscript{316} Michaloliakos’ wife, also a Golden Dawn MP, has also been quoted calling immigrants “subhuman.”\textsuperscript{317} In a clear statement of biological prejudice, Golden Dawn literature mentions the “spiritual, ethnic, and racial inequality of humans.”\textsuperscript{318}
Though the numbers of immigrants coming into Greece in the last couple decades has remained relatively stable, the profile of the immigrants has shifted dramatically in recent years. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were large waves of immigration to Greece from post-Soviet countries. At first, many of these immigrants had some ethnic ties to Greece and were coming to the country now that they were allowed to emigrate out from behind the Iron Curtain. Ensuing flows of immigrants came mostly from Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia, with a large number coming from neighboring Albania. Although most of these later immigrants had no ethnic ties to Greece, many nevertheless claimed such a background in an attempt to assimilate.

Patterns of immigration to Greece changed considerably in more recent years, as the main sources of immigration shifted from Europe to Africa and Southeast Asia. Differences in skin color alone made it readily apparent to the average Greek citizen that a demographic transition was occurring in Greece. Immigration became more visible and this was exacerbated by the fact that the freshness of this immigration trend meant that there were not large expatriate communities of Southeast Asians and Africans in Greece. Whereas new Albanian immigrants, for example, were close to home and could rely on a large and established support network, the non-European immigrants found themselves extremely far from their homelands and without any system in place to help them set up a normal life. While Golden Dawn is certainly no friend of the Albanians or any other non-Greek ethnic group residing in Greece, the party’s attention only transitioned towards problems of immigration as a result of this second, more apparent immigration trend.

Greece has proportionally many more immigrants than most other European countries due to two related geographical features. Firstly, its archipelago border with Turkey is an easy
point of entry. In 2010, Frontex, the EU’s external border agency, found that, “Greece accounted for 90% of all irregular border crossings into the EU.” Further compounding Greece’s immigration problem is an EU regulation that allows member states to return asylum seekers to the country where they first entered Europe. Because this country is often Greece, many states farther to the west and the north are able to send immigrants back to Greece. This means that in addition to facing a constant inflow from outside Europe, Greece is returned many of the immigrants who already passed through it (for many immigrants, Greece is merely a way station to get to a desired final destination somewhere in western Europe). A 2011 assessment put the number of migrants in Greece at a maximum of 390,000, but Greek authorities in 2012 estimated that the country had as many as one million undocumented migrants. Though there is a huge disparity between these numbers, even the lower estimate would represent a large ratio of migrants, considering the country’s population is less than eleven million.

Though Golden Dawn may be the most vociferous and violent anti-immigrant force in Greece, its viewpoints are not uncommon. Eurobarometer data from the early 2000s indicated that nearly seventy percent of Greeks “think that immigrants are a threat to their way of life,” – by far the biggest percentage among the other fifteen EU member states surveyed – and these numbers have only grown in recent years. 2009 Eurobarometer data found that 81% of Greeks agreed, “the presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in Greece.” Of the thirty countries surveyed, only Cyprus agreed with this statement more. 78% of Greeks felt the presence of immigrants was a cause for insecurity, up 15% from 2006. Data also indicates that residents of only two countries, Malta and the UK, feel more negatively towards immigrants than do Greeks. From 2006 to April 2012, the percentage of Greeks who viewed immigrants as the cause of problems jumped from 10% to 21%. From 2004 to 2010, the
number of Greeks who felt that Greece should allow no immigrants to enter the country rose from 27% to over 40%, while the number who felt immigrants are bad for the economy went from a little over 10% in 2004 to almost 20% in 2010.328 Similarly, the number of Greeks who said that immigrants make Greece a worse place to live rose from a little over 10% to about 17% from 2004 to 2010.329 In 2012, 68% said “immigrants from less developed countries had better not come to Greece at all,” up from 59% in 2011.330 The appeal of a Greek party committed to fighting immigration is clear.

Obviously anti-immigrant attitudes are prevalent in Greece. The Council of Europe’s Commission Against Racism and Intolerance put the issue of institutionalized racism in Greece most succinctly:

[M]any of the problems encountered by groups exposed to racism and intolerance [in Greece] stem directly from the majority populations’ attitude towards them. When national authorities contemplate taking measures conducive to ethnic or religious tolerance, the majority’s reaction is often so vehement that authorities prefer to desist or even backtrack. Despite efforts of Greek authorities to alert the public to the dangers of racism, media, politicians, civil servants, religious leaders, including those of the dominant religion [Greek Orthodoxy], and the general public still too often make racist remarks about immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers, including Roma, Jews, and anyone not of Greek origin or not professing the dominant religion in Greece.331

The Commission also criticized the framework for dealing with racist violence in Greece as being totally ineffective. Evidence of official sanction of popular anti-immigrant sentiment can be seen in the March 2012 comments of the Greek Minister of Civic Protection, who, seeking to explain a 10% increase in muggings and robberies in 2011 said, “The main problem is the presence of thousands of people who live here illegally. What exists is petty crime linked to foreigners.”332 Comments like these serve to legitimate the rhetoric of Golden Dawn and justify negative views of immigrants.
Because Greek citizenship is based on the principle of jus sanguinis, there are a number of people in Greece who have not been granted Greek citizenship although their families have lived in the country for generations. This further contributes to prejudice and makes the assimilation of immigrants into Greek society particularly difficult. Compounding these problems is the fundamental unpopularity in Greece of the idea of a diverse society. The mainstream ND argues multiculturalism is not a positive phenomenon and laments that, “the granting of citizenship to second-generation immigrants will encourage more immigration to Greece.”\(^{333}\) Golden Dawn representatives have gone even farther, stating that there is no such thing as ‘legal’ immigration, and promising to expel all immigrants from Greece.\(^{334}\)

Dissatisfaction with illegal immigrants in Greece at the official level is further demonstrated by the fact that the pejorative term ‘illegals’ began to be used in Greek government documents instead of the more politically correct term ‘undocumented immigrants’.\(^{335}\) In the spring of 2012, PASOK Health Minister, Andreas Loverdos, even blamed the rise in HIV infections on illegal immigrants, ignoring the possibility that infections could have risen due to the collapse of social services in Greece.\(^{336}\) The degree to which anti-immigrant sentiment had come to reflect the policy of the main political parties was demonstrated by Operation Zeus, which took place shortly after the parliamentary elections. During the maneuver, about 85,000 suspected immigrants were detained in newly built detention centers as part of a national sweep. In the end, 94% of those detained were found to be in Greece legally.\(^{337}\)

The main reasons for the government’s increased focus on immigration issues has been to distract from Greece’s economic crisis. As a result of fiscal hardships, the Greek economy has shrunk by 18.6%, and the country’s unemployment rate has skyrocketed.\(^{338}\) In April of 2012, the jobless rate in Greece was a whopping 23.1% – up from the already high 16.2% in April of the
previous year, and more than twice the Euro Zone average of 11.2\%.\textsuperscript{339} Youth unemployment was even worse – well over double the Euro Zone average of 23\% at an astoundingly high 54.1\%.\textsuperscript{340}

While the government and the established opposition parties did eventually begin to address immigration issues, they did so relatively late and well after Golden Dawn had already established itself as the party that both recognized the problems of immigration and was actively working to solve them. Additionally, because Golden Dawn is animated primarily by nationalism, a stance against immigration came much more naturally to it than it did to other parties. Rejection of immigration was not a position that Golden Dawn had to adopt, but a natural outgrowth of a nationalistic worldview that sees foreigners as the enemies of the Greek nation. More mainstream parties, on the other hand, were not as dedicated to a nationalistic Greece, and were therefore not as credible in their anti-immigration rhetoric as Golden Dawn was.

In the run-up to the parliamentary elections, Golden Dawn began to further position itself as the savior of the Greeks by organizing food and clothing handouts explicitly for Greeks only. The food drives, which required people to show a Greek national identity card before receiving any food or clothing, were especially popular because of Greece’s extreme economic conditions. Thousands of people attended these events, which also served as propagandizing and electioneering opportunities for Golden Dawn. At one of the food handouts, held on the anniversary of the reinstitution of democracy in Greece following the military dictatorship of 1967 to 1974, Michaloliakos gave a speech in which he said that those celebrating the return of Greek democracy were “really celebrating state thievery, scandals, and treason.”\textsuperscript{341} Michaloliakos’ views on the reinstitution of Greek democracy are unsurprising given that in the
early 1990s he was the first president of the youth sector of the party founded from prison by the junta leader Georgios Papadopoulos. Michaloliakos’ address was accompanied by a Greek-language version of the Horst-Wessel-Lied, the official anthem of the Nazi Party from 1930 to 1945. When the mayor of Athens used police to disperse one such food handout, Golden Dawn members, including an MP, attempted to attack him.

Other Golden Dawn activities became urban myths of sorts in Athens. There were stories of party members assisting old Greek women and helping landlords clear apartments of illegal immigrant squatters. Whether or not Golden Dawn actually did these things is still very much a matter of debate. For instance, it was uncovered that the anonymous old woman depicted in a Golden Dawn video being escorted by party members to the ATM in an unsafe neighborhood was actually the mother of one of the members shown. Regardless of whether Golden Dawn actually did all of the activities it took credit for, the impression in the minds of the voters was clear. Because significant portions of the population were able to see Golden Dawn members as protecting figures, it does not really matter whether they were or not. For example, in April 2012, a newspaper published a story about “the little boy scouts of Golden Dawn” helping senior citizens, and the article was picked up nationally. Though the account later proved to be false, the correction was not made in time for the elections. In the summer of 2012, between the two rounds of parliamentary elections, Golden Dawn also started other services such as blood drives for Greeks only and an organization called Medicins avec Frontiers (a play on the international organization Medicins sans Frontiers which provides medical aid worldwide) which provided medical services to Greeks only.

Although Golden Dawn was a constant presence in the headlines in the run-up to the parliamentary elections, much of what we now know about Golden Dawn stems from an incident
that occurred over a year after the 2012 elections. On September 17, 2013 Pavlos Fyssas, a Greek anti-fascist rapper, was stabbed to death in Athens by a lower-level Golden Dawn member in what looked to be a coordinated hit, rather than a random act of violence. Fyssas had been followed from a café and harassed by a large group of around thirty people, when a car pulled up and a man inside, Giorgos Roupakias, stabbed him. Immediately following the stabbing – which occurred while Greek police officers watched the mob descend on Fyssas – an investigation was opened looking not just at the stabbing, but at Golden Dawn’s activities more generally. Roupakias revealed he had placed calls to and received calls from various upper level Golden Dawn members immediately prior to the attack. Currently Greek police are working on establishing an exact chain of who called whom in the run-up to the murder, but it appears that the command for the killing came directly from Michaloliakos himself.

In Greece, it is constitutionally impossible to ban a political party that has been elected to parliament, but following the Fyssas slaying, Greek authorities opened an investigation accusing Golden Dawn of being a criminal organization. If Golden Dawn is found to be a criminal organization, it would be possible to ban the group and remove its members from parliament. The homes of many Golden Dawn members have been raided and their possessions seized. Six of Golden Dawn’s MPs are currently in jail and the rest have lost their parliamentary immunity (in March 2014, one MP resigned from the party citing ignorance of its criminal activities and another MP was expelled from the party under murky circumstances). A great deal of evidence has been collected for the upcoming trial against Golden Dawn and its higher-ups, who are charged with leading a criminal conspiracy.

Some of the more interesting details to emerge from the ongoing investigation concern the sources of Golden Dawn’s funding. Prior to receiving the large sums of cash that all Greek
political parties are entitled to upon entering parliament, Golden Dawn claimed that its rapid expansion of party offices, food handouts, and other programs was financed by the generous donations of Greek citizens. Somewhat incredulously, the party maintained that it supported itself through the sale of t-shirts and other Golden Dawn memorabilia as well as micro-donations from followers. In October 2013, police raided the home of Anastasios Pallis, a Greek businessman who had been accused of, among other things, fraud and supplying weapons for Golden Dawn. Behind a secret door in a closet, police discovered a room with hundreds of items of Nazi memorabilia and dozens of military-grade weapons. An arrested Golden Dawn member has accused the party of having ties to shipping magnates, but the full details of the party’s illicit funding will likely not emerge until the trial against the party begins.

Also as a result of the investigation of Golden Dawn, several high-ranking police officers have been suspended. Whether this is because these men were active helpers of Golden Dawn or because they merely turned a blind eye to Golden Dawn’s activities, is not public information at this point. At a minimum the suspensions indicate some level of connection between the Greek police and Golden Dawn.

It has also been alleged that the criminal activities of Golden Dawn go much deeper than street-level violence. The party has been found to be more utilitarian and less blindly racist than its rhetoric and public actions would suggest. Allegations have emerged that Golden Dawn extorts immigrant business owners by charging protection fees to keep them safe from physical attack and arson at the hands of party members. There have also been accusations that the party engages in money laundering, and a former Golden Dawn member alleges that the MPs of the party are involved in the smuggling of handguns and M16s.
In the course of the investigation details have also surfaced about the party’s internal structure. Far from being an amorphous group of thugs, Golden Dawn is highly organized and regimented, with a strict chain of command along military lines. Testimonies of former members have revealed that the party functions on the basis of the Führerprinzip, in which the leader Michaloliakos is the unquestioned source of authority: “his decisions are compulsory and bind all party organs.” Everyone in the party, even his wife, addresses him as “chief”, and members were expected to stand and salute any time he entered a room. Those who wished to join the party had to be recommended by two existing Golden Dawn members, and even then, they were rigorously trained and tested for their allegiance to the party during a yearlong period in which they were required to be very active members. Michaloliakos even once said of the party, “We have a military organizational model.” Golden Dawn offices are filled with clubs and shields that the party uses during its violent patrols and rallies. Party members receive military training from former members of the Special Forces sympathetic to Golden Dawn’s cause, and photos of Golden Dawn initiates involved in military training have come to light during the investigation. One part of the criminal allegation against the party even details the use of “organized hit squads” to target immigrants and leftists. In addition to using military training, Golden Dawn actively recruited teenagers for its Centaur program and held “national awakening” classes for children.

Given that some of the information about Golden Dawn presented in this chapter emerged after the party’s initial electoral breakthrough, it is important to reiterate what the Greek electorate knew about Golden Dawn when the party was elected. Golden Dawn’s virulent rhetoric, Nazi associations, and street-level violence were all well established in time for the
2012 parliamentary elections. Though Golden Dawn’s criminal activities give a fuller picture of
the party, it sufficiently demonstrated its nationalist extremism well before it was elected.

Although Golden Dawn is certainly composed of criminals, this does not exclude it from
inclusion in the nationalist extremist party family. PASOK officials have been indicted for
various crimes committed during the party’s reign in the run-up to the Euro Crisis, but it cannot
be argued that PASOK is not genuinely a party of the center left. Although Golden Dawn
operated as a criminal organization, it also undeniably acted as a party. Furthermore, Golden
Dawn’s paramilitary structure – in which every party member was prepared to be involved in
supra-political violence – comports with nationalist extremist guidelines, and is even more in line
with the mold of interwar fascists than Jobbik’s Magyar Gárda.

Similarly, expressions of Nazi appreciation do not disqualify Golden Dawn from the
nationalist extremist party family. The party’s fundamental animating force is Greek nationalism,
not neo-Nazism (an ideology associated with supra-nationalist categories such as Aryanism).
Though the party pays homage to the Nazis, Golden Dawn is motivated primarily by
nationalistic concerns and does not talk of itself as the vanguard of anything beyond Greece’s
borders. Golden Dawn’s veneration of Nazism does not stem from a desire to copy the Nazis
directly, but from the admiration of an example of a strong nationalist party that combatted the
forces of democracy and liberalism. In this way, Golden Dawn’s Nazi rhetoric represents a
stance adopted as part of a more fundamental nationalistic and anti-liberal ethos.

Because Golden Dawn is a nationalist party at its most basic level, all aspects of the party
can be understood through this nationalist lens. Its views on immigration, Metaxas, and the Nazis
are all reflections of an ideology that seeks to create a state based on Greek traditions and
composed solely of pure ethnic Greeks. Golden Dawn’s anti-establishment rhetoric is not only an
Outgrowth of its anti-democratic nature, but part of this basic desire to expose Greeks who are perceived as traitors of the nation.

Golden Dawn’s Electoral Breakthrough

In recent years, Greece experienced a severe economic crisis that precipitated political turmoil and ethnic tension. During this period, Golden Dawn shifted its focus to anti-immigrant issues and used immigrants as scapegoats for the country’s poor and worsening condition. Golden Dawn tied its anti-immigrant rhetoric to growing dissatisfaction with international institutions and backed up these positions with visible activism in communities with high immigrant populations and growing unemployment. While some of these activities included food handouts and blood drives, what really garnered Golden Dawn attention was its violence. To understand the circumstances that allowed Golden Dawn to gain legitimation from paramilitarism, it is first necessary to appreciate the Greek political landscape that emerged in the wake of the Euro Crisis.

The 2012 Greek Parliamentary elections are very telling about Greek politics and society, and give an idea of Golden Dawn’s place in the Greek political sphere. Though elections were originally scheduled for late 2013, the exigencies of the Euro Crisis pushed the polling date up to May 2012. In late 2011, the governing PASOK fell apart. George Papandreou, the leader of the party, resigned as Greek Prime Minister in November 2011 to make room for a government of national unity led by a technocrat and supported by PASOK, New Democracy (ND), and the radical right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). The Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) declined offers to join the governing coalition, objecting
to the new coalition’s stated aim of instituting harsh austerity measures to receive a European Union bailout and remain in the Euro Zone.

After about half a year in office, the technocratic caretaker Prime Minister, Lucas Papademos, felt comfortable stepping down and called for new elections to be held in May 2012. In this brief period of time, a monumental shift in Greek politics had occurred. Initially against the bailout, ND flipped its position, causing the expulsion of over twenty dissenting party members and the creation of a new party defined by its anti-bailout stance, Independent Greeks (ANEL). LAOS changed its position in the opposite way, going from being initially for the bailout to speaking out against it. As a result, many of its prominent members abandoned the party for Golden Dawn.\textsuperscript{359} PASOK, like ND, expelled over twenty of its party members, some of whom went on to form new parties or join SYRIZA.\textsuperscript{360} Even SYRIZA, whose position towards the bailout was consistent, lost party members who were more moderate in their opposition. Both ND and PASOK elected new party leaders. The changes in the Greek party landscape produced an outcome in May that broke a decades long trend in Greek politics.

Over the course of ten elections, from 1981 to 2009, ND and PASOK had averaged 83.8\% of the vote between them.\textsuperscript{361} In the May 2012 election, their combined share was a miniscule 32\%. PASOK, which tacked right in its 2012 campaign by suggesting detention centers and infectious disease checks for illegal immigrants,\textsuperscript{362} went from getting almost 44\% of the vote and 160 seats in 2009 to a mere 13.18\% and 41 seats in May 2012. ND, which had won almost 34\% in 2009, ran a campaign focusing on law and order and fell to less than 19\% in May 2012. In April 2012, Samaras, the leader of ND said that, “Greece today has become a center for illegal immigrants. We must take back our cities, where the illegal trade in drugs, prostitution, and counterfeit goods is booming. There are many diseases and I am not only speaking about
Athens, but elsewhere too.” In line with this anti-immigrant rhetoric, in February the government began construction of a fence along the Turkish border and in March built more than thirty new migrant detention centers around the country.

The reason for the tremendous drops in support for the major parties is summed up by Ellinas, who states that, “austerity policies disrupted the clientelist networks that major parties had used to distribute patronage, especially public-sector jobs and limited the resources they had at their disposal. This alienated their political clientele, facilitating the defection of traditional constituencies to other political parties.” LAOS, which had its reputation thrashed by its participation in the coalition government, was not even able to pass the three percent threshold needed to enter parliament. Though it came in second, SYRIZA was arguably the biggest winner in May, seeing its vote share leap from less than 5% in 2009 to almost 18%. The May elections showed the drastic degree to which Greek politics had changed as a result of the crisis. Because no clear winner emerged, new elections were called in June.

In the differences between the May and June elections, one can intuit some of the reasons for Golden Dawn’s success. In May, Golden Dawn received 6.97% of the vote and in June it got 6.92%, an almost imperceptible change. This is in contrast to a host of other small parties, such as KKE and ANEL, which saw their vote shares decrease by several points from one month to the other. As hoped for, there did emerge clear winners in June; support for ND and SYRIZA increased by over ten percent each, and ND was able to form a government.

What is noteworthy is that Golden Dawn – unlike the large band of other untested parties that contested the 2012 elections – did not lose support to its larger competitors. In fact, it went from being the sixth largest party in May to the fifth largest in June, and it only sat two seats back from the fourth-place ANEL. The fact that voters did not abandon Golden Dawn en masse
in the second round of elections indicates that the party’s success was not a flash reaction of a dissatisfied populace voting for an alternative party in an attempt to punish established parties. If Golden Dawn’s May supporters merely voted for the party in order to send mainstream parties a message about their dissatisfaction, Golden Dawn would have lost a significant share of its votes in June. A desire to punish established parties was likely the cause of the great homogenization of votes towards two main parties that occurred from May to June, but if it were also true in the case of Golden Dawn, one would expect its vote share to drop by at least a few percentage points, not a mere 0.05%. This points to the fact that Golden Dawn’s voters truly supported the party’s message, and not just the threat to the establishment Golden Dawn represented.

Additionally, the success of ANEL, a party that “embraced catch-all, nativist and nationalist ideological stances and aspired to attract the conservative anti-Memorandum electorate,” indicates that Golden Dawn’s appeal lay in its ability to demonstrate commitment to its espoused principles. ANEL was composed mainly of exiles from the mainstream parties and its nationalist credentials were nowhere near as strong as Golden Dawn’s. In terms of electoral rhetoric, little separated ANEL and Golden Dawn, but the fact that both parties received significant vote shares indicates that of the segment of voters who agreed with the nationalist policies the two parties espoused, a large portion felt that Golden Dawn was the better representative of these nationalistic views. Golden Dawn distinguished itself from ANEL in both its supra-political violence and its outsider status, and these characteristics allowed it to get votes despite competition from a party with a nominally similar outlook.

Another interesting 2012 electoral phenomenon that helped Golden Dawn was the collapse of LAOS. The established radical right party lost its anti-establishment outsider status by being associated with the bailout. Though never spectacularly successful – the party’s greatest
electoral victory was in 2009 when it received a little over five and half percent of the parliamentary vote – it was nonetheless the main far right outlet in Greece for the first decade of the twenty-first century. Before LAOS, Greece was largely unaffected by the wave of radical right parties that began to sweep over Western Europe in the 1980s. Rightist activity in Greece had mainly been the occupation of ex-junta members and their supporters, and this had never been spectacularly successful. LAOS and Golden Dawn initially had much in common – four current Golden Dawn MPs were representatives on LAOS elections lists in 2002\(^{367}\) – but ultimately LAOS moderated its anti-immigrant rhetoric in favor of anti-Semitism,\(^{368}\) leaving Golden Dawn as the sole far right anti-immigrant voice. In its 2004 manifesto LAOS advocated open militarism, but by the time of its 2007 manifesto, the party “toned down its anti-foreigner rhetoric and deliberately softened its extreme positions on homosexuality and minority rights,” meaning that the space for a party that openly embraced anti-immigrant rhetoric and violence was evacuated.\(^{369}\)

Profiles of Golden Dawn voters that emerged in the wake of the 2012 elections have also disproved some misconceptions about the reasons for the party’s success. In contrast to most radical right parties, Golden Dawn’s supporters, like Jobbik’s, are young. The party came in second with voters eighteen to thirty-four years of age, but seventh for those over sixty-five.\(^{370}\) In addition to appealing to the young, Golden Dawn garnered over twenty percent of all new voters.\(^{371}\) Also like Jobbik, Golden Dawn voters are overwhelmingly male: the ratio of male to female voters for Golden Dawn was much larger than that for any other Greek party.\(^{372}\) Contrary to what might be expected, twice as many of the party’s voters had high levels of education as had low levels, and the majority had moderate levels of education somewhere in between.\(^{373}\) Further, neither data on employment levels nor urban versus rural backgrounds of Golden Dawn
voters betrayed any significant trends.\textsuperscript{374} Although Golden Dawn had “over-proportionate support among employers and the self-employed, private-sector employees, the unemployed and university students,”\textsuperscript{375} the only thing that this hodgepodge group really shows is that support among public-sector employees – who form a large section of the employed in Greek – were not very likely to support Golden Dawn.

Although 29\% of Golden Dawn voters cited their dissatisfaction with the incumbent parties and a desire to punish politicians as the primary reason for their support of the party, 54\% cited immigration concerns, patriotic and national feelings, or agreement with Golden Dawn’s party platform as their main motivation.\textsuperscript{376} Though this first group demonstrates that a significant majority of Golden Dawn’s support came from people whose antipathy for the established parties was more decisive than their embrace of Golden Dawn’s stances, the latter group shows that protest votes alone did not create Golden Dawn’s electoral breakthrough. The majority of people who voted for the party did so because they legitimately felt Golden Dawn to be the best representative of their viewpoints. Voters wishing to support untested parties in order to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the political system had a plethora of other options in the 2012 Greek Parliamentary elections. Golden Dawn’s breakthrough came from those who were motivated by nationalism and a belief in the efficacy of Golden Dawn’s anti-immigration activism.

Support in Greece for a party as xenophobic and anti-democratic as Golden Dawn is not as surprising as it might seem. In 2012, a survey found that 65\% of Greeks viewed “the Greek nation as superior to other nations,” up from 43\% only a year earlier.\textsuperscript{377} In a stark showing of the pervasiveness of authoritarian attitudes in Greece, the same study found that 65\% said “they were willing to support what the country did irrespective of whether it was right or wrong,” up
from 41% in 2011. Moreover, survey data found that 11.7% of Greeks think that a dictatorship could be preferable to a democracy and another 7.7% is indifferent whether there is dictatorship or democracy. These ambivalent opinions towards a democratic system reflect the holdover of those who were satisfied under the junta dictatorship, and suggest some of the sources of support for Golden Dawn.

Through its authoritarian and nationalist character, Golden Dawn established itself as the clear choice for those who felt ND to be too far towards the center and desired a larger voice for right-wing political views. Not only did Golden Dawn become the sole far right voice in Greece, it built an extremist profile that appealed to those who had been dissatisfied with the moderation of the established parties and the stagnation of LAOS. 57% of Golden Dawn’s voters said that they came from either ND or PASOK, while a significant minority, 12%, had previously been LAOS supporters, demonstrating that Golden Dawn appealed to a large spectrum of latent nationalist sentiment. Further, Golden Dawn also acted as the refuge of those who were both right-wing and against the EU. Anti-EU sentiment had been a mainstay of leftist parties like KKE and SYRIZA, but Golden Dawn represented a right-wing outlet for this frustration long before ANEL also emerged to oppose the EU from the right.

Though major Greek television channels did their best to ignore Golden Dawn in the run-up to the 2012 elections, the party’s sensationalist tactics ensured that it received disproportionate coverage in the press and online. One particularly noteworthy incident occurred just over a week before the June elections when Kasidiaris appeared on a live talk show debate with other politicians. After a SYRIZA MP insulted Golden Dawn, Kasidiaris threw water at her from across the table. The KKE MP sitting next to Kasidiaris swiped at him with her newspaper and he responded by hitting her three times in the face. Kasidiaris was detained in a room at the
television station, but he broke down the door and left. Although a warrant for his arrest was issued, he escaped prosecution on the charge. The incident is merely one indication of the way in which Golden Dawn was able to grab headlines in disproportion to its size by doing things that would be unimaginable for other parties.

Additionally, it is likely that the large amount of attention Golden Dawn received from international human rights groups and from domestic leftist organizations only helped to raise the party’s profile. Although the coverage of Golden Dawn from these groups was overwhelmingly negative, it nonetheless made the party well-known and exposed people to some of the extremist tactics it used. Golden Dawn also received legitimation, both explicit and implicit, from the major parties. In addition to being helped by the examples of anti-immigrant rhetoric from mainstream politicians mentioned above, some have argued that police raids in recent years on antifascist and anarchist groups occupying abandoned buildings in Greece have served to legitimize Golden Dawn, which has been attacking these groups for decades.381

Ultimately, the factor that helped Golden Dawn more than any other was the legitimation that the party received as a result of its paramilitarism. While such violence created a taboo around the party, a significant majority of the Greek electorate was able to ignore the stigma attached to these violent tactics and embrace the party as a nationalist answer to the dual problems of immigration and international financial intervention in Greece. Most of the main parties in Greece began to espouse anti-immigrant rhetoric in the wake of the Euro Crisis, but only Golden Dawn was able to establish itself as a legitimate voice for these concerns. The party did so by embracing extremist tactics that gave credence to its rhetoric and showed Golden Dawn’s dissatisfaction with the political establishment. By challenging the state monopoly on violence Golden Dawn demonstrated that it was a party dedicated to a nationalistic overhaul of
the state. The party promised drastic fixes to the country that centrist parties were unable to offer due to their international commitments. While Golden Dawn’s supra-political violence may have been directed specifically at immigrant communities, it symbolized a wider commitment to a principle of Greek nationalism that resonated with a significant minority of voters. The Greek people were exhausted by revelations of political and economic corruption and failure from the established parties, and this allowed some to overlook the taboo of Golden Dawn’s violence and stump for a party that demonstrated its extreme differences from the mainstream and offered a true alternative.

Evaluating the reasons for Golden Dawn’s success, the nationalist extremist model fits well. The party increased its anti-immigrant rhetoric and violent attacks as the Greek political and economic systems crumbled. It shifted its focus to immigration issues, and in this way created a rallying point around an issue with a large degree of popular support. Disaffected voters were able to see the party as truly concerned with the welfare of Greek citizens and as one of the few remaining forces in Greek with a steadfast commitment to its word. Golden Dawn established itself early as a party that cared about Greeks above all else. By tying economic issues with problems caused by immigration, and joining this with vociferous denunciation of the established political system, Golden Dawn was able to create a truly alternative option that addressed the major complaints of the average Greek citizen. The combination of this program with legitimizing actions allowed for a nationalist extremist breakthrough in Greece.

As with Jobbik, the key factor in Golden Dawn’s success was its use of paramilitarism and other supra-political actions such as food-handouts and blood drives. While these latter, more benign, activities certainly helped to raise Golden Dawn’s profile and cement the image of the party as one concerned with the welfare of Greek citizens, it was Golden Dawn’s violence
that initially drew headlines and established the Golden Dawn brand in the minds of voters. Golden Dawn’s violence demonstrated that the party’s extremist rhetoric was not mere lip service. By establishing the connection between the party’s word and its actions, Golden Dawn was also able to imply that given the chance it would bring a similarly extreme reckoning to the decayed political system in Greece. While the majority of Greeks may have been repulsed by Golden Dawn’s more violent actions, these deeds appealed to a significant minority of voters who were wiling to give an extremist party a chance because of the political and economic chaos.
Chapter 6. Conclusion

The successes of Jobbik and Golden Dawn were a shock even to experienced studiers of Europe’s political scene. For the first time since WWII, parties that embraced paramilitarism had won seats in national parliaments. The conventional wisdom had been that parties embracing supra-political violence and other legacies of the interwar period would be unelectable in established European democracies. While much was said about the breakthrough of these two parties, no academic work was produced that sought to explain Jobbik and Golden Dawn as results of the same phenomenon.

In order to theorize about Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s successes, the two parties had to be placed into an international party family. Jobbik and Golden Dawn are clearly different from both radical rightists and fascists – the two groups to which they are most often compared. Because no existing party family fully captured the nature of these parties, a new classification was needed. To properly account for the unique characters of Jobbik and Golden Dawn, I created a new party classification: nationalist extremists. Essentially, nationalist extremist parties are anti-democratic, anti-liberal and use tactics and language reminiscent of interwar fascists in the service of a nationalist outlook that places the ethnicity-based nation as the inheritor of a magnificent tradition.

On the surface, Jobbik and Golden Dawn are obviously united by their extremist rhetoric and actions, and if one delves into the ideologies of the two parties, the fundamental similarities become apparent. At a basic level, Jobbik and Golden Dawn are products of dissatisfaction. Their extreme tactics testify to a disillusion with the accepted methods of political participation and its potential for effecting societal change. Their character is a product not only of
disenchantment with economic and social conditions, but also of a fundamental disagreement with a liberal international tradition they feel is essentially opposed to the nation. Jobbik and Golden Dawn are also identical in the ways in which they exalt the ethnic nation and vilify both non-coethnics within the state and coethnics who are seen as internationalist betrayers of the nation. The parties are united by this fundamental ideological orientation, as well as their use of paramilitarism and espousal of aspects of interwar fascism.

However, in comparing the parties, a few differences emerge. While Jobbik may harken back to a fascist past and make racist appeals, unlike Golden Dawn, it does not directly glorify Nazism. Golden Dawn is also more violent than Jobbik – its paramilitarism extends to explicit acts of violence, whereas Jobbik stops just short of actual physical assaults. However, despite these differences, what unites the two parties is much more important than what divides them. Fundamentally, Jobbik and Golden Dawn are nationalist extremists, and their dissimilarities are merely details. These disparities certainly do not preclude their inclusion in the same party family.

Evaluating the specific causes of Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s initial electoral breakthroughs, one sees a virtually identical pattern. Shortly before these nationalist extremists’ first electoral successes, both Hungary and Greece experienced not only increasingly poor economic conditions, but also the implosion of major, established political forces. Further, the collapse of MIÉP in Hungary and LAOS in Greece evacuated the far right space and meant that Jobbik and Golden Dawn did not have to compete with established right-wing parties.

Turning to the specific actions of the parties, one can see how both Jobbik and Golden Dawn engaged in supra-political actions designed to whip up anti-minority sentiment in the areas that were most saturated with members of these minorities. Both parties languished in obscurity
until they began to speak and act against their country’s main minority groups. Jobbik and Golden Dawn advocated numerous issues related to their nationalist outlooks, but it was this shift in focus that allowed the parties to tap into a current of nationalist sentiment that had no political outlet and had been ignored by mainly anti-Semitic parties like MIÉP and LAOS. Though established parties in both countries attempted to coopt this rightist position, anti-minority rhetoric was a natural expression of Jobbik and Golden Dawn’s nationalism, whereas other parties struggled to fit it into their larger programs. Centrist parties that attempted to capitalize on the anti-minority dissatisfaction that these parties stirred up could not reach the nationalist extremists’ level of issue ownership in these areas. By espousing purposefully inflammatory rhetoric and acting in intentionally provocative ways, the parties legitimized themselves in the eyes of the country’s most right-wing voters, and also garnered coverage in the press well beyond what is merited by an upstart party. It was precisely because of this well-timed and well-placed extremism, and not in spite of it, that the parties were able to break out of electoral obscurity.

While the catalyzing effect of economic distress on nationalist extremist success is somewhat apparent and has been addressed in the literature examining Jobbik and Golden Dawn independently, another often overlooked, yet crucial ingredient for nationalist extremist success is political turmoil that largely discredits the established parties. Political crisis creates a situation in which it is vital for newcomer parties to establish themselves not only as outside of the system, but also as legitimate actors. In countries whose crystallized political systems have suddenly experienced flux, rhetoric loses worth. What becomes critical is that a newcomer party establishes that it is willing to do more than make promises – that it is prepared to take action. The paramilitary activities of Jobbik and Golden Dawn demonstrated that their extremist rhetoric
was sincere. Both parties emphasized issues of minority conflict with significant popular support, and by taking extremist action on these issues, Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to win support from voters with latent nationalist sentiment and a desire for political change. Because they organized into paramilitary bands, Jobbik and Golden Dawn were able to take advantage of a unique set of political and economic circumstances and achieve their electoral breakthroughs.
Notes


3 See note 2.


8 Ibid., 26.

9 Ibid., 65.

10 Ibid., 257.

11 Elisabeth Carter, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 17.

12 Ibid., 50-51.

13 Ibid., 50-52.

14 Ibid., 52.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 52-53.

18 Ibid., 52.

19 Ibid., 52.

20 Ibid., 29.


22 Ibid., 52.


25 Ibid.
In Hungarian, Jobbik is a play on words that means both better and more to the right. The party’s full name is Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary.


White, “Jobbik to Wilders and Le Pen.”

Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, 84-86.


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Mann, *Fascists*, 353.

Ibid., 16.

Ibid., 368.


Ibid.

Ibid., 49-58.

Ibid., 49.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 52.


68 Ibid.
70 Eatwell, “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right,” 54.
71 Ibid., 55.
74 Carter, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*, 141.
75 Ibid.
78 Ibid., 69.
79 Ibid., 71.
80 Ibid., 72.
83 Ibid., 63.
84 Ibid., 65.
85 Ibid., 66.
88 Eatwell, “Ten Theories of the Extreme Right,” 68.
89 Ibid., 69.
90 See note 5.
91 The majority of studies of Jobbik and Golden Dawn fall under this categorization. Most papers are addressed to the reasons for these parties’ electoral successes, and though they use certain terms, they do not explicitly focus on party classification.
92 Obviously the groups that most felt the effect of the Magyar Gárda and Golden Dawn’s violence were the Roma and immigrant communities they targeted respectively. Here though I am talking about the effect these paramilitaries had on the wider voting public.
94 Ibid., 71.
96 Ibid.
97 See note 5.
98 A good example of this is Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, “Greece: The Rise of Golden Dawn.”
100 Ibid.
101 Prejudice against Roma.
102 A mythical belief in the origins of the Hungarian peoples introduced on page 73.


“A Short Summary About Jobbik.”


“A Short Summary About Jobbik.”


Populism in Europe, 16.

White, “Jobbik to Wilders and Le Pen.”


Ibid.


This is not to say that all the marches were completely without incident. At one rally, a group of Roma youths attacked a small band of Magyar Gárda members who were marching through their neighborhood. The Roma claimed preemptory self-defense, and in a bizarre turn of events, they were charged with hate crimes and sentenced to prison terms.


Salman, “Radical Right Culture and the Youth,” 127.

Ibid., 127.

Ibid., 126-127.

Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, Hungarian Police Break Up Paramilitary Rally, August 24, 2009.

Jordan, “Rise of the Hungarian Right.”


In April 2011, the Red Cross helped to evacuate women and children of a Roma village in the face of a paramilitary training camp that was set up nearby.

Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, Hungarian Right-Wingers on Terrorism Charges, September 28, 2010.

Ibid.


“A Short Summary About Jobbik.”

Radical Change, 11.

“A Short Summary About Jobbik.”


Under Joseph II, Roma were forbidden to use their language and many of their children were confiscated and given to Hungarian families to be raised.


Violent Attacks Against Roma in Hungary, 9.


In what is surely one of the most bizarre turn of events to emerge from the far right political realm, it was discovered that Szegedi, who was one of the earliest and most prominent members of Jobbik, had Jewish ancestors he was unaware of. Shortly after this information came to light, Szegedi left the party and began living as an Orthodox Jew. He claims that he was essentially kicked out of the party once his heritage was discovered and publicized. Györgyösi maintains that he was forced to leave the party because he used funds obtained from the European Parliament for illegal purposes. Szegedi disputes this, arguing that other Jobbik ministers used funds in similar ways without reprimand.


Ibid.

Ibid.

For instance, from 2008 to 2009, a group of a half-dozen ethnic Magyars organized a reign of terror which included grenade attacks, fire-bombings, and shootings that eventually left six Roma dead and many more seriously injured.

Radical Change, 2.

Ibid., 11.


Ibid.


Violent Attacks Against Roma in Hungary, 9.

Racism, Discrimination, Intolerance and Extremism, 27.

Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 87.


Ibid.

“Jobbik Needs Jews to Run the World.”


“Israeli President: We Are Buying Up Manhattan, Hungary, Romania and Poland,” Youtube.com, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JL4Cu-K17vE.


Ibid.

177 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
184 Applebaum, “Anti-Semite and Jew,” 33-34.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
190 White, “Jobbik to Wilders and Le Pen.”
192 Radical Change, 21.
196 Radical Change, 14.
198 LeBor, “Marching Back to the Future,” 36.
199 Benakis, “Hungary’s Jobbik.”
200 Radical Change, 23.
202 Radical Change, 15.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid., 2.
206 Radical Change, 15.
207 Ibid., 2.
209 “Autonomy for Székelyland.”
212 Radical Change, 9.
213 Ibid., 16.
214 These are just three of the twenty-seven sections that comprise the manifesto – one is even devoted to sport policy


Kiss and Zahorán, “Hungarian Domestic Policy in Foreign Policy,” 62.


Ibid., 74.


Ibid.


Lahav, “Hungarian Far-Rightist.”


Saltman, “Radical Right Culture and the Youth,” 120.


Ibid.


Populism in Europe, 23.

Ibid.


Saltman, “Radical Right Culture and the Youth,” 123.


Ibid., 229.

Radical Change, 6.

Populism in Europe, 15.


Saltman, “Radical Right Culture and the Youth,” 124.

Verseck, “Young, Wired and Angry.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Georgiadou, “Right-Wing Populism and Extremism,” 89.


Ibid.

Ibid.


266 Donadio, “Hard Times.”

267 "The Black Bible of Golden Dawn.”


269 "The Black Bible of Golden Dawn.

270 Chatzistefanou, “Neo-Nazi Tattoos.”

271 Donadio, “Hard Times.”


273 "The Black Bible of Golden Dawn.”

274 Ibid.


276 "The Black Bible of Golden Dawn.”

277 Racism, Discrimination, Intolerance and Extremism, 23.

278 "Frequently Asked Questions.”

279 Ibid.


283 “The Manifesto of Golden Dawn.”


285 "Frequently Asked Questions.”


290 National Populism and Xenophobia in Greece, 26.

291 Ibid.


Years before he became the leader of Golden Dawn, Michaloliakos went to jail in the 1970s for bombing theaters showing Soviet movies. The party attracted people who were not afraid of using violence in the service of their goals.

_Hate on the Streets_, 41.

_Hate on the Streets_ is the most comprehensive and best organized of these.


Ibid.


Ibid., 32.

Ibid., 30.


Ibid.


“The Manifesto of Golden Dawn.”

Donadio, “Hard Times.”


Ibid.


_Hate on the Streets_, 37.

Ibid., 31.


_Hate on the Streets_, 31.


European Commission, _Eurobarometer 71, Future of Europe_, (January 2010), 59.

Ibid.

Ibid., 53-54.


Ibid., 15.

Ibid.
National Populism and Xenophobia in Greece, 34.
Racism, Discrimination, Intolerance and Extremism, 10.
Hate on the Streets, 35.
Sotiris, “The Dark Dawn of Greek Neo-Fascism.”
Ibid. Hate on the Streets, 16.
Ibid.
Ibid., 333.
Ibid.
Ibid., 332.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 11-12.
A Law Unto Themselves, 30.
Papathanasiou, “Golden Dawn Recruits Children.”
Ibid., 275.
Donadio, “Hard Times.”
Hate on the Streets, 35.
Ibid., 36.
Ibid., 16.
Georgiadou, “Right-Wing Populism and Extremism,” 83.
Sakellariou, “Greek Society.”
Sakellariou, “Greek Society.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
376 Sakellariou, “Greek Society.”
377 National Populism and Xenophobia in Greece, 30.
378 Ibid.


---------. *Violent Attacks Against Roma in Hungary: Time to Investigate Racial Motivation.*


   http://extremisproject.org/2012/10/the-radical-right-in-europe-available-on-demand/.


http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/hairline-cracks-scrambling-power-within-jobbik/.


