School of Arts and Sciences
Department of Philosophy

Symposia and Lectures

Fall 2025 Colloquium Series

October 24, 2025

Alison Peterman

Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Rochester

Location: Miner 224
3:30-5:30pm

Title: Cavendishian Acquaintance-First Epistemology

Abstract: Margaret Cavendish was a great 17th century English philosopher who had a strikingly naturalistic metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of science. In the first part of this talk, I introduce my interpretation of Cavendish's system, which centers this naturalism, and runs counter to common interpretations of her as a panpsychist. The panpsychist reading comes in part from Cavendish's claim that every creature, from animals to plants to stones and planets, is knowing. So in the second section of the talk, I develop a Cavendishian account of knowledge on which everything is knowing but panpsychism is not entailed, and I try to motivate this account of knowledge with an eye to contemporary epistemological concerns.

November 07, 2025

Martin Gustafsson

Professor of Philosophy, Åbo Akademi University

Location: Eaton 201
3:30-5:30pm

Title: Two Ways of Inheriting Frege

Abstract: In this paper, I identify two different ways of inheriting Frege. One is a broadly Quinean way, which sees Frege’s logicist project as an exercise in Quinean explication. The other is a broadly Wittgensteinian way, which emphasizes Frege’s conception of logical distinctions as distinctions that are radically different from mere differences in properties. My claim is not that one branch of inheritance is exegetically sounder than the other. Rather, my view is that the possibility of both branches of inheritance is indicative of certain important tensions in Frege’s work. I focus on one central moment in Frege’s thought, namely the notorious so-called Julius Caesar problem as it is discussed in Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Frege’s way of dealing with this problem – indeed, his sense that it constitutes a genuine problem at all encourages the Quinean branch of inheritance. The Wittgensteinians, by contrast, might here see a moment at which Frege’s better ideas should be turned against himself.

November 21, 2025

Shamik Dasgupta

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Berkeley

Location: Eaton 201
3:30-5:30pm

Title: The Metaphysics of Emptiness: Fine + Rorty = Nāgārjuna

February 12, 2026

Anncy Thresher

Assistant Professor of Philosophy & Public Policy, Northeastern University

Location: TBA
4:00-6:00pm

Title: "Protecting Squirrels with Telescopes: Environmental Ethics, Physics Infrastructure, and the Importance of Local Expertise"

Spring 2026 Colloquium Series

March 6, 2026

Chris Smeenk

Professor of Philosophy, Western University

Location: Eaton 201
3:30-5:30pm

Title: Dark Matter and Measurement Realism

Abstract: I will develop and defend measurement realism, a form of scientific realism grounded in the epistemic achievements of successful measurement practices. The central idea is that when multiple independent measurement techniques achieve stability and convergence, under steadily increasing precision, this warrants realist commitment to a ``thin'' concept of the measured entity: one specifying enough identifying features (related to causal roles) for stable inductive and explanatory practices, while remaining open to further elaboration and even significant theoretical revision. This account is grounded in George Smith's treatment of theory-mediated measurement and epistemic iteration. The case for molecular reality exemplifies this approach: diverse precision measurements of Avogadro's number converged despite employing distinct linking assumptions, transforming the atomic hypothesis into accepted science --- leading to insights regarding molecular scale properties that supported, and survived, the transition to quantum mechanics.

I then provide a detailed analysis of contemporary dark matter research based on this approach, examining how rotation curves, gravitational lensing, CMB acoustic peaks, BBN, and other techniques constrain dark matter's properties. Like the molecular case, each method involves substantive linking assumptions connecting observations to target quantities. However, there are important disanalogies with molecular reality: significant gaps in coherence between different measurement approaches, outstanding puzzles about the nature of what is being measured, and unresolved questions about the appropriate ``thinness'' of the dark matter concept.
 
These complications raise difficult questions about the scope and limits of measurement realism that I will explore by considering contrasts with other recent philosophical work on dark matter. Does measurement realism require actual convergence, or only the prospect of convergence? Can partial measurements of causally isolated aspects support realism? What modal commitments follow from reliable measurement practices? I contend that measurement realism offers a distinctive and attractive alternative to

March 27, 2026

Wendy Parker

Professor of Philosophy, Virginia Tech

Location: TBA
3:30-5:30pm

Title: TBA

April 10, 2026

Katie Creel

Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Computer Science, Northeastern University

Location: TBA
3:30-5:30pm

Title: TBA